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Over the past decade, many natural resource-rich developing economies have deployed 
commodity-based Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) to manage their natural resource 
revenues. However, many of these efforts were premature. Establishing a commodity-
based SWF only makes sense in a country that possesses robust mechanisms for 
capturing and accounting for resource rents and a budgetary framework that channels 
those rents to broad-based and inclusive social and economic development. In 2009, the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) encouraged the government of 
Zimbabwe to establish an SWF to ameliorate challenges associated with the natural 
resource curse. However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) advised the government 
of Zimbabwe to re-examine the fiscal regime of its extractive industries before launching 
its SWF. Zimbabwe’s extractive industries are captured by a comprador securocrat 
bourgeoisie that feels entitled to rule and loot the country in perpetuity. Consequently, very 
little natural resource revenue is deposited in government coffers. Contrary to the advice 
of the IMF, the government of Zimbabwe rushed to establish an SWF before it had re-
examined the fiscal regime of its extractive industries. Resultantly, Zimbabwe’s SWF is a 
premature fund. Existing literature defines what premature funds are. However, it does 
not go onto explain why some governments rush to establish SWFs before acquiring the 
prerequisite conditions required to successfully operationalise one. Using Zimbabwe as a 
case study example, this qualitative study explains why some governments prematurely 
establish SWFs. Data were collected using elite interviews and unobstructive methods. 
Moreover, data were presented using thematic and qualitative content analysis. Research 
findings reveal that the government of Zimbabwe rushed to establish an SWF because of 
the fear of being the odd one out among its structural equivalents, it felt obliged to 
implement the recommendations of its biggest development partner the UNDP, it needed 
to look modern and sophisticated through finance and it also needed to widen its 
patronage turf. Moreover, research findings also reveal that the design of Zimbabwe’s 
SWF as a financial institution is not designed in such a way to make it an effective 
investment fund, as compared with global standards of investment management. The 
study recommends that the government of Zimbabwe needs to re-examine the fiscal 
regime of its extractive industry and the governance architecture of its SWF before it can 
successfully operationalise its SWF. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
GENERAL SCIENTIFIC AND METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATION TO THE 
STUDY 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
The government of Zimbabwe established a commodity-based Sovereign Wealth 
Fund (SWF) in November 2014. However, the government has failed to operationalise 
the SWF because it was poorly designed and poorly attuned to the country’s 
macroeconomic circumstances and development needs. In other words, Zimbabwe’s 
SWF is a premature fund. This thesis explains the factors behind the creation of a 
premature SWF in Zimbabwe. Moreover, the study suggests how the government of 
Zimbabwe can operationalise its commodity-based SWF. 
Chapter One provides the general introduction to the study. It consists of the 
background, research rationale, and the problem statement. In addition, the chapter 
poses the research questions and sets the objectives of the study. This chapter also 
highlights the methodology adopted by the study to generate data and the manner in 
which data are presented and analysed. The chapter also provides the research 
paradigm and approach, the research design, data-collection methods, data-analysis 
techniques, and sampling techniques. Furthermore, the ethical considerations of the 
study and an outline of the study are also presented.  
1.2  BACKGROUND, RESEARCH RATIONALE, AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The background section of this thesis defines the term “Sovereign Wealth Fund”. It 
also traces the origins, rise, and significance of SWFs to the global economy. The 
section also explains why governments create SWFs. It also highlights and discusses 
the taxonomy of SWFs. Moreover, the section presents the background to the creation 
of Zimbabwe’s SWF and the associated challenges. Lastly, this section presents the 
problem statement. 
1.2.1  Definition of the term “Sovereign Wealth Fund” (SWF) 
Chhaochharia and Laeven (2008:1) and Karametaxas (2018:271-272) define the term 
“Sovereign Wealth Fund” (also called sovereign investment fund, or social wealth 
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fund) as a state- or government-owned investment entity or fund, which acquires and 
manages public assets by “investing in real and financial assets such as stocks, 
bonds, real estate, precious metals, or in alternative investments such as private 
equity funds or hedge funds in order to achieve a variety of macroeconomic purposes”. 
SWFs “are typically supported by commodity earnings from a country’s natural 
resources sector or non-commodity financing such as general taxation revenues and 
foreign currency exchange reserves” (Karametaxas 2018:272). According to Balding 
(2012:18-19), an SWF is a pool of capital derived from net wealth accumulation (official 
foreign exchange reserves, excess natural resource revenue accrued because of the 
adoption of fiscal rules, current account, and/or fiscal surplus) controlled by a 
government or government-linked entity that invests the assets under its control in 
order to reap returns (i.e. interests, profits) for its owner. However, it is important to 
stress that, successful SWFs such as Botswana’s Pula Fund and Norway’s 
Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) are by-products of prudent natural 
resource revenue management frameworks and robust macroeconomic policies 
(Matambo and Dixon 2021:37). The following subsection discusses the origin, rise, 
and significance of SWFs. 
1.2.2  The origin, rise, and significance of SWFs 
SWFs are a topical issue in public and development finance (Braunstein and Asim 
2019:191). According to Clark, Dixon and Monk (2013:12), “sovereign investors are a 
core element of the geography of finance that represents the high-water mark of 
financialisation and the current instalment of capitalist development after pension 
funds”. When the world’s largest SWF GPFG, exceeded the US$1 trillion threshold in 
2017, a year before Apple and Amazon, two of the world’s largest technology 
companies, it sent a signal to the markets that states can do better than private 
corporations (World Finance 2019). By 2019, the total assets under the management 
of SWFs were almost twice the size of global private equity and hedge funds combined 
(Braunstein 2019:1).  
SWFs have existed since the creation of the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) in 1953 
(Klitzing, Lin, Lund and Nordin 2010:4). However, they were known as stabilisation 
funds until they acquired their more ominous sounding “SWF” moniker propounded by 
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Andrew Rozanov in 2005 in his work titled Who Holds the Wealth of Nations? 
(Rozanov 2005:1). 
The turn of the millennium is generally regarded as the golden age of SWFs (Bortolotti 
and Massi 2017:31), because the number of SWFs increased from less than 20 in 
2000 to over 94 across 65 countries in 2019 (Capape 2019:26). SWFs became 
popular among commodity-based economies of all political stripes and levels of 
development after the year 2000 because of the rise of commodity prices on the 
international commodity market at the turn of the millennium (World Finance 2019). 
Between 2000 and 2007, commodity-dependent economies amassed US$3.5 trillion 
in excess of foreign currency reserves (Bortolotti and Massi 2017:31). Commodity-
dependent economies created SWFs to release currency and inflationary pressure on 
the domestic economy and to accrue higher returns for their sponsoring governments 
because the accumulated reserves were well beyond the equilibrium level suggested 
by monetary policy (Bortolotti and Massi 2017:31). By the end of 2019, the world’s 94 
SWFs managed over US$8.3 trillion in assets (Capape 2019:26), which was 
equivalent to 10% of the global gross domestic product (GDP) (The Economist 2020a). 
Following is a discussion of the reasons why countries establish SWFs. 
1.2.3  Why governments create SWFs 
SWFs are usually created to manage macroeconomic or fiscal challenges associated 
with resource abundance such as commodity price volatility and Dutch disease (i.e. 
an increase in the economic development of a specific sector of the economy and the 
decline in others) (Dixon 2020:1). For example, in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, a number of commodity-based Asian countries such as Kazakhstan 
used reserves accumulated during commodity price booms to create stabilisation 
funds as buffers against commodity price volatility (Monk 2010:6). Similarly, in an effort 
to mitigate the negative effects of Dutch disease, cash-rich economies such as 
Singapore and Norway invest excess financial capital derived from current account or 
fiscal surplus abroad for the benefit of future generations (Balding 2012:6). 
In addition to the need to manage macroeconomic or fiscal challenges associated with 
resource abundance such as commodity price volatility and Dutch disease, discussed 
above, the decision to establish SWFs can also be based on political decisions and 
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public debates about the allocation of wealth (Dixon 2020:1). Countries with current 
account deficits such as Turkey (Turkey had a US$3 billion current account deficit 
when it established an SWF in 2017) establish SWFs for political reasons (Braunstein 
2019:3). In the aftermath of a failed coup attempt that shocked the Turkish economy 
in January 2016, President Tayyip Erdogan created an SWF to expand his patronage 
turf (The New York Times 2016). Therefore, while it is ideal for countries to establish 
SWFs as remedies to specific macroeconomic challenges such as commodity price 
volatility and Dutch disease, there were some instances in which SWFs were created 
for political reasons, as discussed above. Following is a discussion of the taxonomy 
of SWFs. 
1.2.4  Taxonomy of SWFs 
Balding (2012:6) categorises SWFs into three broad categories according to their 
source of funding. The three categories are trade-dependent funds, commodity-
dependent funds, and vanity funds. Trade-dependent funds, also known as reserve-
based funds, such as the China Investment Corporation (CIC), invest foreign currency 
reserves, derived from excess balance of payment proceeds or excess government 
revenue (The Straits Times 2015). According to Reuters (2020), as of July 2020, 
China’s foreign currency reserves were estimated to be around US$3.154 trillion. 
Theoretically, vast idle foreign currency reserves such as those possessed by the 
Chinese government exert inflationary pressure on the local currency (Du, Lin and Han 
2018:10). 
Thus, in an effort to mitigate the negative macroeconomic effects of abundant foreign 
currency reserves such as inflationary pressure on the Renminbi (China’s domestic 
currency), the Chinese government created the CIC to diversify China’s abundant 
foreign currency reserves (CIC 2020:1). 
Similarly, in an effort to mitigate the negative effects of Dutch disease and commodity 
price volatility, commodity-dependent funds, also known as resource-based funds or 
natural resource funds, such as Norway’s GPFG, the KIA, and Chile’s Economic and 
Social Stabilisation Fund (ESSF), invest proceeds derived from natural resource 
exports for the benefit of future generations or use them to act as lenders of last resort 
during economic slowdowns (Rietveld and Alsweilem 2018:20). 
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In contrast, vanity funds are a more idiosyncratic or peculiar category of SWFs (World 
Finance 2019). Unlike commodity-dependent and trade-dependent funds that invest 
excess capital, vanity funds invest ongoing government revenue and they are often 
notorious for fiscal indiscipline (spending more than they earn) (Balding 2012:6). There 
is no macroeconomic justification for the creation of vanity funds (i.e. managing Dutch 
disease, potential inflationary pressure, or commodity price volatility) (World Finance 
2019). However, there are examples of countries such as Senegal, Italy, and France 
that created SWFs from capital injections derived from other government departments, 
loans, and diaspora remittances (Braunstein and Asim 2019:120).   
The International Monetary Fund (IMF 2008:5) also identifies five types of SWFs, 
namely reserve investment corporations, contingency pension funds, stabilisation 
funds, sovereign development funds, and savings funds. Reserve investment 
corporations such as the CIC are established to increase returns on a country’s foreign 
currency reserves (Monk 2010:6). Contingency pension funds such as Australia’s 
Future Fund and New Zealand’s Superannuation Fund help to reduce future 
superannuation liabilities of the state by saving and investing for a time when pension 
liabilities start straining the fiscus (Clark and Knight 2011:323). Contingency pension 
funds are peculiar to the developed world (industrialised countries) because the 
developed world’s ageing population is threatening to increase governments’ pension 
liabilities in the near future (Monk 2010:12). 
The primary objective of stabilisation funds such as Chile’s ESSF is to hedge the 
economy and insulate the budget against commodity price volatility (IMF 2008:5). 
Commodity-dependent states receive at least 20% of government revenue through 
royalties or profit-sharing agreements with mining companies; for example, the 
partnership between the government of Botswana and De Beers in the form of 
DEBSWANA (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 
2018:6). The fiscal position of commodity-dependent states is therefore highly 
correlated to commodity prices. When commodity prices are high, excess resource 
revenues flow into government coffers; conversely, when resource revenues are low, 
government revenue drops drastically (Balding 2012:6). A stabilisation fund helps to 
smoothen natural resource revenue throughout the commodity cycle by setting clear 
rules for the deposit of a portion of resource revenues during periods of high 
commodity prices so that the government has a stable source of income that can be 
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withdrawn during periods of low commodity prices following clear withdrawal 
procedures (Dixon and Monk 2011a:6). Such stability helps to stretch the budget 
planning process (Dixon and Monk 2011a:6). Moreover, stabilisation funds can also 
be used to help stabilise the value of a country’s currency during economic shocks 
(International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds [IFSWF] 2018:6). 
Development funds, also known as holding funds, such as Singapore’s Temasek, help 
to fund socioeconomic projects and promote industrial policies that are likely to raise 
the country’s growth potential (Santiso 2008:11). However, development funds are 
relatively more sophisticated than other types of SWFs because their investment 
objectives necessitate institutional architecture that does not typically exist within 
government and human resource capabilities of government agencies (Dixon and 
Monk 2011a:8). In other words, development funds function more like private equity 
funds (Santiso 2008:11). 
Savings funds, also known as intergenerational equity funds or future generations 
funds, such as Norway’s GPFG, mitigate the effects of Dutch disease through 
investing excess capital derived from balance of payment proceeds or fiscal surplus 
abroad for the benefit of future generations (IMF 2008:5). Savings funds are common 
in stable, cash-rich, highly industrialised, and developed economies such as Norway 
(Dixon and Monk 2011a:8). Table 1.1 summarises the foregoing discussion to clarify 
the point by listing SWFs that exist in the world, the categories and typologies of the 
SWFs, and the year in which they were established. 
Table 1.1: List of the world's SWFs 
SWF 
sponsor Name(s) of SWF SWF category SWF type 
Year 
established 
Angola FSDEA Commodity 
dependent  
Development 2012 
Australia Future Fund Trade dependent Contingency; 
pension  
2006 






Bahrain Mumtalakat Trade dependent Development 2006 





Brunei Brunei Investment Agency Trade dependent Stabilisation; 
development 
1983 




Saving a.  1976 
b.  2012 
7 
SWF 
sponsor Name(s) of SWF SWF category SWF type 
Year 
established 
b. Quebec Future 
Generations Fund 
Chile a. ESSF 







a.  2007 
b.  2006 
China a. CIC 
b. State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange 
Investment Company  





Columbia Fideiconomiso Fondo de 






Cyprus Cyprus National Investment 
Fund 
Trade dependent Development 2014 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo  




Not known 2005 
Egypt Amlak Vanity Development 2015 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Fund for Future Generations Commodity 
dependent 
Saving 2002 
France Fonds Strategiques 
d’Investissements 
Vanity Development 2008 






Georgia Georgian Co-Investment 
Fund 
Trade dependent Development 2013 
Ghana a. Ghana Heritage Fund 






Guyana Natural Resources Fund Commodity 
dependent 
Not known 2019 
India National Investment and 
Infrastructure Fund 
Trade dependent Development 2015 





Ireland Ireland Strategic Investment 
Fund 
Trade dependent Development 2014 
Israel Israeli Citizens’ Fund Commodity 
dependent 
Saving 2014 
Italy Cassa Depositi e Prestiti 
S.p.A. 
Vanity Fund Development 2003 
Kazakhstan a.  National Oil Fund 
























Malaysia 1Malaysia Development 
Berhad (1MDB) 
Trade dependent Development 2009 
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SWF 
sponsor Name(s) of SWF SWF category SWF type 
Year 
established 
Malta National Development and 
Social Fund 
Trade dependent Development 2015 





Mexico Fondo Mexicano del 
Petroleo para la Stabilizacion 




Mongolia a. Fiscal Stability Fund 











Nauru Intergenerational Trust Fund 




New Zealand Superannuation Fund Trade dependent Contingency; 
pension 
2001 








Norway GPFG Commodity 
dependent 
Saving 1990 





Palestine Palestine Investment Fund Trade dependent Development 2003 







Papua New Guinea 











Qatar Qatar Investment Authority Commodity 
dependent 
Development 2005 
Russia Russia National Wealth Fund Trade dependent Stabilisation; 
saving 
2008 
Rwanda Agaciro Development Fund Vanity Development 2012 
São Tomé 
and Príncipe 





Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund Commodity 
dependent 
Development 1971 
Senegal Fonds Souverain 
d’Investissements 
Stratégiques 
Vanity Development 2012 
Singapore a. Temasek Holdings 
b. Government Investment 
Corporation 
Trade dependent a.  Development 
b.  Reserve 
investment 
corporation 
a.  1974 
b.  1981 
South Korea Korea Investment 
Corporation 









Spain Social Security Reserve 
Fund 





sponsor Name(s) of SWF SWF category SWF type 
Year 
established 

















Turkey Turkey Wealth Fund Vanity fund Development 2016 






















Alaska Permanent Fund Commodity 
dependent 
Saving 1983 
















Source: Researcher’s compilation from SWF websites. 
 
In terms of categories of SWFs, Table 1.1 shows that the majority of the world’s SWFs 
are commodity-dependent funds (45 out of 65 countries possess commodity-based 
SWFs). This implies that SWFs are a phenomenon peculiar to economies endowed 
with natural resource wealth. SWFs are also common among economies that incur 
budget or current account surpluses (17 out of 65 countries possess trade-dependent 
SWFs). Moreover, it can be deduced that vanity funds are a rare phenomenon in the 
global economy (only four out of 65 countries finance SWFs from ongoing government 
expenditure). In short, SWFs are peculiar to natural and financial resource-rich 
nations. Gleaned from this conclusion is the fact that the majority of the world’s SWFs 
were created to manage macroeconomic or fiscal challenges associated with resource 
abundance. 
Furthermore, in terms of SWF typologies in Table 1.1, it can be deduced that from the 
82 SWFs whose mandate is known, 27 are development focused, four are contingency 
pension funds, 25 are stabilisation funds, 22 have a saving mandate, and four are 
reserve investment corporations. Implied here is the fact that the majority of the world’s 
SWFs have a stabilisation, development, or saving mandate. These mandates are a 
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panacea to numerous macroeconomic or fiscal challenges that plague natural or 
financial resource-rich economies (i.e. commodity price volatility and Dutch disease). 
The following subsection discusses the rationale for establishing the SWF in 
Zimbabwe. 
1.2.5  Background to the creation of a premature fund in Zimbabwe 
Natural resource-rich developing economies such as Zimbabwe are plagued by the 
‘natural resource curse’ (i.e. develop at slower rates than countries that do not possess 
natural resource wealth) (Mlambo 2018:23). During the Government of National Unity 
(2009-2013), the then Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti, often alleged that Zimbabwe’s 
dominant political party, the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-
PF), was running a parallel fiscus (using revenue that was supposed to fund 
government activities to finance its own operations). In his 2012 mid-term fiscal policy 
review statement, Minister Biti had to revise the national budget downwards from 
US$4 billion to US$3.6 billion because of the underperformance of diamond dividends 
(Biti 2012:71). Only US$43 million was remitted to Treasury against a projection of 
US$400 million, despite the fact that Zimbabwe had exported diamonds worth 
US$563 million (Zimbabwe’s diamond industry almost entirely owned by the 
government; diamond remittances should therefore be deposited in government 
coffers) (Biti 2012:233).  
Hawkins (2009:47) advised the government of Zimbabwe to establish a commodity-
based SWF to ameliorate challenges associated with the natural resource curse. 
However, while SWFs offer hope to natural resource-rich economies, they are not a 
replacement for the rule of law or poorly designed regulations (Dixon and Monk 
2011b:2). Zimbabwe does not possess a mining policy or Act of Parliament that guides 
how the country’s natural resource revenue should be managed (Centre for Natural 
Resource Governance n.d.:4). The only available legal instrument is section 298(1)(c) 
of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Constitution Amendment Number 20 of 2013), which 
merely states that the burdens and benefits of Zimbabwe’s (natural) resources must 
be shared equitably between present and future generations. Though the Constitution 
suggests that Zimbabwe’s natural resource revenue should be channelled towards 
national development (i.e. replacing the country’s depleting natural resource base with 
other forms of capital such as physical, human, social, and financial capital), there is 
no supporting law or Act of Parliament to give effect to this constitutional requirement. 
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Consequently, the country’s natural resource revenue is almost entirely spent on 
recurrent expenditure (over 80% of the country’s budget goes towards financing the 
government’s wage bill) (Jourdan, Chigumira, Kwesu and Chipumho 2012:39). Very 
little is invested in other forms of capital that compensate for the country’s depleting 
natural resource base (Jourdan et al. 2012:39).  
In fact, the IMF (2014a:18) advised the government of Zimbabwe to re-examine the 
fiscal regime of its extractive industries before launching a commodity-based SWF but 
Zimbabwean policymakers ignored the IMF’s advice. In other words, if the government 
of Zimbabwe had listened to the IMF’s advice, it should have improved the way it 
manages natural resource revenue before launching a commodity-based SWF. 
Despite the absence of a robust fiscal regime for its extractive industries, the 
government of Zimbabwe rushed to create an SWF in November 2014 (Eldredge 
2016:104). The government’s failure to re-examine the fiscal regime of its extractive 
industries before establishing an SWF led Bauer and Mihalyi (2018:3) to argue that 
Zimbabwe prematurely created an SWF.  
To make matters worse, contrary to research that shows that the success of an SWF 
depends on the strength of the fund’s governance framework (Dixon and Monk 
2011b:3), Chapter Five (dealing with SWF governance principles and best practices) 
shows that Zimbabwe’s SWF had, and still has, a weak governance framework. The 
mandate of the SWF is not coherent. It wants to do everything (macroeconomic 
stabilisation, promote economic development, and save for future generations) 
(Mlambo 2018:1). SWFs that do not clearly define their objectives or that crowd 
multiple objectives into a single SWF risk having a fund management strategy that is 
not targeted appropriately or that have managers with capabilities that are misaligned 
to the SWF’s objectives (Markowitz 2020:12).  
Furthermore, as Chapter Five shows, the enabling legal framework of Zimbabwe’s 
SWF promotes undue political interference in the affairs of the SWF. Section 11 of 
Zimbabwe’s SWF Act (Statutory Instrument Number 7 of 2014) allows the Minister of 
Finance, in consultation with the president, to give policy direction to the board in 
“national interest”. Cases of failed SWFs, such as 1 Malaysia Development Berhard 
(1MDB), Libya Investment Authority (LIA), and Fundo Soberano de Angola (FSDEA), 
suggest that SWFs with close ties to the ruling elite tend to be used to further the 
political interests of the ruling elite instead of pursuing the macroeconomic objectives 
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they were established to pursue (Markowitz 2020:18). For example, during former 
president Gaddafi’s era, the LIA was notorious for investing in enterprises linked to 
Gaddafi’s regime because his son (and his touted successor), Saif-al-Islam Gaddafi, 
decided most of the SWF’s investment deals (Stone and Truman 2016:9). Therefore, 
the fact that Zimbabwe’s Minister of Finance, in consultation with the president (the 
political authority), can give policy direction (make investment decisions) to the SWF’s 
board suggests that Zimbabwe’s SWF is likely to be used to further the interests of 
state elites rather than pursuing the macroeconomic objectives it was established to 
achieve (stabilisation, development, and saving) (Eldredge 2016:107). In short, 
Zimbabwe’s SWF is a premature fund. 
1.2.6  Problem statement 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the factors that impede the operationalisation 
of Zimbabwe’s commodity-based SWF, which, according to the argument in Section 
1.2.5, is a premature fund. The above background clearly shows that Zimbabwe’s 
SWF is a premature fund. Bauer and Mihalyi (2018:1) define a premature fund as an 
SWF that was poorly designed and poorly attuned to a country’s macroeconomic 
circumstances and development needs. However, current literature does not 
extensively explain the factors behind the establishment of premature SWFs. This 
study theoretically and empirically uses Zimbabwe’s case to extend the debate about 
premature funds. Moreover, the study suggests how the government of Zimbabwe can 
operationalise its commodity-based SWF. The following primary research question 
forms the crux of the problem statement of this thesis: What factors explain the 
creation of a premature SWF in Zimbabwe, and how can the government of 
Zimbabwe operationalise its commodity-based SWF? 
1.3  SUB-RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
According to Creswell (2009:176), in a qualitative study, inquirers state research 
questions that assume two forms, namely a central question (as stated above) and 
associated sub-questions, as stated below: 
• What theoretical and conceptual issues underpin the creation of premature 
funds? 
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• How does Zimbabwe’s political economy impede the operationalisation of the 
country’s commodity-based SWF? 
• What natural resource revenue management principles and practices enable or 
impede the operationalisation of commodity-based SWFs in the developing 
world? 
• What governance principles and practices enable and impede the 
operationalisation of commodity-based SWFs in the developing world?  
• How can the government of Zimbabwe operationalise its commodity-based 
SWF? 
1.4  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In order to provide conceptual and contextual clarification of the above primary and 
secondary research questions, the following study objectives were formulated for the 
purposes of this topic. This study sought: 
• to analyse the theoretical and conceptual variables that underpin the creation 
of premature funds; 
• to explain how Zimbabwe’s political economy impedes the operationalisation of 
its commodity-based SWF; 
• to examine natural resource revenue management principles and practices that 
enable and impede the operationalisation of commodity-based SWFs in the 
developing world; 
• to examine governance principles and practices that enable and impede the 
operationalisation of SWFs in the developing world; and 
• to provide recommendations on how the government of Zimbabwe can 
operationalise its commodity-based SWF.  
1.5  SCIENTIFIC AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES OF THE STUDY 
This section presents the rationale behind the scientific reasoning of the research 
methodology and the design of this study. The main objective of an academic activity 
is to engage in constructing knowledge (Auriacombe and Holtzhausen 2014:1). Social 
scientists conduct academic research in order to find answers to theoretical questions, 
to understand aspects of the social world, to investigate solutions to complex 
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problems, and to increase knowledge (Berg 2001:6). Kerlinger (1970 cited in Cohen, 
Manion and Morrison 2011:4) defines research as “a systematic, controlled, empirical 
and critical investigation of hypothetical propositions about presumed relations among 
natural phenomena”. 
Auriacombe and Holtzhausen (2014:9-11) concur with Kerlinger (1970 cited in Cohen 
et al. 2011:4) as they aver that research is the process through which scientific 
methods are applied in order to discover scientific knowledge. Research is based on 
rigorous methodological inquiry, scientific knowledge treats knowledge claims as 
provisional, and it is inherently evidence based in nature (Terre Blanche, Durrheim 
and Painter 2008:04). Replication and reproducibility of research findings are central 
to the creation and testing of theories and their acceptance by scientific communities 
(Berg 2001:07). The following subsection discusses the philosophical frames of social 
science research.  
1.5.1  Philosophical frames of social sciences research 
Cohen et al. (2011:3) and Terre Blanche et al. (2008:6) aver that ontological 
assumptions (assumptions of nature of reality and nature of things) give rise to 
epistemological assumptions (ways of researching and inquiring into the nature of 
reality and the nature of things). In turn, epistemological assumptions give rise to 
methodological considerations, which give rise to issues of instrumentation and data 
collection (Cohen et al. 2011:3). 
According to Mouton (2009 cited in Auriacombe and Holtzhausen 2014:18), there are 
three basic assumptions about the research process, which are nomothetic, 
ideographic, and the pragmatic approach. The nomothetic assumption emphasises 
the examination of regularities, as well as universal laws (positivism or quantitative 
research approach) (Auriacombe and Holtzhausen 2014:18). The ideographic 
approach seeks to understand the social world through obtaining first-hand knowledge 
of the subject and understanding the subjects’ innermost feelings (qualitative research 
approach or interpretivism) (Auriacombe and Holtzhausen 2014:18). The pragmatic 
approach makes use of both nomothetic and ideographic assumptions (mixed 
methods) (Auriacombe and Holtzhausen 2014:18). 
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According to Creswell (2009:6), there are four different worldviews or paradigms that 
influence the type of research design to be adopted by a researcher. These are 
positivism or post-positivism, constructivism, advocacy or participatory, and 
pragmatism (Creswell 2009:6). The aforementioned worldviews are shaped by the 
discipline of the student, the beliefs of the supervisor and the faculty in a student’s 
area, past experiences, and the researcher’s research problem (Creswell 2009:6). 
Positivists look for regularities and causal relationships to understand and predict the 
social world and they believe that science needs to be studied objectively (Auriacombe 
and Holtzhausen 2014:17). 
Creswell (2009:5 cited in Auriacombe and Holtzhausen 2014:18) avers that anti-
positivists or interpretivists are of the view that social reality is viewed and interpreted 
by individuals according to their personal and ideological inclination. Interpretivists 
also believe that knowledge is personally experienced and they perceive social 
sciences to be subjective, and they are of the view that a single phenomenon has 
multiple realities (Auriacombe and Holtzhausen 2014:18). Creswell (2009:5 cited in 
Auriacombe and Holtzhausen 2014:5) argues that realists embrace both qualitative 
and quantitative research in order to understand a phenomenon as they hold both 
qualitative and quantitative viewpoints. The assumptions of the aforementioned 
paradigms are summarised in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2: Paradigm classification 
Classification 




There is a single, 
tangible, fragmentable 
phenomenon of 
interest and there is a 
unique best 
description of any 
aspect of that 
phenomenon. 
Social world is not “given”. It 
is produced and reinforced 
through human actions and 
interactions. Interpretations 




alienated from their 
potential by prevailing 
economic, political, and 
cultural authority. Social 
reality is produced by 





the notion of 
knowledge 
Deductive logic to 
discover unilateral, 
causal generalised 
relationships and to 
predict patterns of 
behaviour across 
situations. 
Involves getting inside the 
world of those generating the 
social process. The models 
are not unidirectional, but are 
circular or reciprocally 
interacting models of 
causality. No a priori 
What it has been, what 
it is becoming and what 
it is not. Interpretation 






criteria Positivist Interpretivist Critical 
researcher-imposed 
formulations of structure, 
function, and attribution are 
assumed. 
possible through the 










If the appropriate 
general laws are 
known and the 
relevant initial 
conditions can be 
manipulated, we can 
produce a desired 
state of affairs, natural 
or social. Research is 
value-free. 
Knowledge is never value-
free. Weak constructionist 
view: the researcher merely 
describes the phenomenon 
in words of the actors. In the 
strong view, the researcher‘s 
interpretations intervene with 
the actual meaning of the 
world, thus the researcher is 
in part enacting the social 
reality of the actors. 
Can transform both the 
actor and the 
researcher. Role of 
theory is to initiate 
change in social 
relations eliminating 
domination. 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979:17). 
 
This study adopted the social constructionist or interpretivist perspective. Social 
constructionists hold the assumption that individuals seek understanding of the world 
in which they live and work (Robin 2011:24). This thesis sought to obtain an in-depth 
understanding of the factors that impede the operationalisation of Zimbabwe’s 
commodity-based SWF. The next subsection discusses the study’s research 
approach. 
1.5.2  Research approaches 
According to the Bradford University School of Management (2012:2), research can 
be approached as deductive or inductive, applied or basic, and quantitative or 
qualitative. According to Neuman (2014:36), research can be further dichotomised 
through the forms of knowledge that it creates, which are instrumental or reflective 
knowledge, as well as the audience of the research findings. 
1.5.2.1  Qualitative approach 
This study is interpretive and thus qualitative in nature. Qualitative researchers seek 
to understand the context of participants (Creswell 2009:4). This is done through 
visiting the context and gathering information personally through understanding the 
meaning individuals or groups ascribe to social and human problems (Creswell 
2009:15). According to Flick (2014:11), qualitative research is of specific relevance to 
17 
the study of societal relations and when little is known about the phenomena under 
study. Furthermore, qualitative research is useful when there is a need to sensitise 
concepts to explore and understand the phenomena under study (Flick 2014:11). 
According to Creswell (2009:15), qualitative research is largely inductive. The inquirer 
generates meaning from the data collected in the field (Creswell 2009:15). 
Oevermann, Allert, Konau and Krambeck (1979:32 cited in Flick 2014:12) argue that 
qualitative research methods provide the actual scientific explanation of facts. 
1.5.2.2  Deductive and inductive logic 
Logic is the process of using an argument to arrive at a conclusion (Bradford University 
School of Management 2012:4). Deductive logic is mostly used in quantitative 
research. Inductive logic is mainly used in qualitative research (Bradford University 
School of Management 2012:4). Deductive logic seeks to test a hypothesis 
(Auriacombe and Holtzhausen 2014:13). On the other hand, inductive logic seeks to 
proceed from the particular to the general through generating research questions, data 
gathering, analysing and interpreting collected data, and ultimately developing 
theories and models that explain the phenomena under study (Auriacombe and 
Holtzhausen 2014:13). This study is qualitative in nature; inductive logic was thus 
adopted. According to Auriacombe and Holtzhausen (2014:43), there are four 
conditions for using inductive logic: 
• There is a need for rigorous recording and observation. 
• The collected data must be accurate and collected from the universe the study 
is researching. 
• Observation must cover a representative case and the cases must be of a 
sufficient number. 
• It must refute or expand theory. 
In an effort to uphold the aforementioned conditions for using inductive logic as 
prescribed by Auriacombe and Holtzhausen (2014:43), the researcher rigorously 
recorded data. Moreover, the researcher collected data from a heterogeneous sample 
of key informants. The researcher used the collected data to expand the “premature 
fund” debate.  
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1.5.2.3  Types of research 
There are three types of research in social science research, namely exploratory 
research, descriptive research, and explanatory research. As Terre Blanche et al. 
(2008:39) argue, exploring and describing are inferior to explaining. A worthy doctoral 
thesis must provide an explanation of the phenomenon under investigation. Therefore, 
this thesis is primarily explanatory in nature. 
(a)  Explanatory research 
According to Neuman (2014:38), when a phenomenon is not known or well described, 
researchers may wonder why things are the way they are. Bauer and Mihalyi (2018:1) 
describe “premature funds”; however, the literature does not go into detail to explain 
the factors behind the creation of premature funds. Explanatory research explains 
causal relationships and attempts to answer the “why” and “how” questions (Terre 
Blanche et al. 2008:44). It makes a researcher understand society better and in certain 
instances able to predict the consequences of certain actions (Auriacombe and 
Holtzhausen 2014:22). This study is explanatory in nature because it explains the 
factors behind the creation of a premature SWF in Zimbabwe. It also explains how the 
government of Zimbabwe can successfully operationalise its commodity-based SWF. 
1.5.2.4  Basic applied research dichotomy  
Basic research, which is also known as academic, pure, or fundamental research, 
seeks to advance fundamental knowledge about the social world (Magwa and Magwa 
2015:24). Basic research is used to refute or support existing theories (Terre Blanche 
et al. 2008:45). It is a source of most new scientific ideas and schools of thought about 
social events, with the scientific community being its primary audience (Neuman 
2014:26). Research questions are often in a “what” and “why” form (Creswell 2009:46). 
This study is basic research because it is a thesis written in fulfilment of the 
requirements of a doctoral degree in Public Management and Governance. According 
the University of Johannesburg (n.d:1) for one to be awarded a PhD in Public 
Management and Governance he or she must submit a thesis that makes an original 
contribution to the field of study/discipline. 
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Applied research is conducted to address a specific concern for utilitarian purposes 
(Magwa and Magwa 2015:25). It offers practical results that can be used within a year 
or less and it rarely attempts to build, test, or make connections to existing theories 
(Neuman 2014:26). It is rather used to make decisions based on findings (Babbie 
2010:26). Active practitioners are the audience of applied research and it is less likely 
to appear in peer-reviewed publications, if at all, because scientific rigour is 
compromised so as to obtain fast, usable results (Babbie 2010:26). This study, 
although primarily pure research, is also applied research in the sense that it may be 
of significance to the government of Zimbabwe, civil society, and the general citizens. 
It may improve the understanding of the SWF discourse in Zimbabwe. Table 1.3 
summarises the comparisons between basic and applied research. 
Table 1.3: Basic and applied research compared 
Aspect Basic Applied 
Primary audience Scientific community Practitioners, participants, or 
supervisors (non-researchers) 
Evaluators Research peers Practitioners, supervisors 
Autonomy of the researcher High Low-moderate 
Research rigour Very high Varies; moderate 
Highest priority Verified truth Relevance 
Purpose Create new knowledge Resolve a practical problem 
Success indicated by  Publication and impact on 
knowledge/scientists 
Direct application to address a 
specific concern/problem 
Source: Neuman (2014:28). 
 
The next subsection discusses the research design of the study. 
1.5.3  Research design 
There are numerous types of qualitative strategies of inquiry or research designs, 
which include the narrative design, phenomenology, ethnography, grounded theory 
studies, and case studies (Creswell 2009:13). This interpretivist study adopted a single 
instrumental explanatory case study focusing on Zimbabwe’s SWF as the only unit of 
analysis. According to Stake (1995 cited in Creswell 2009:13), in a case study strategy 
of inquiry, the researcher explains in-depth a programme, event, activity, process, or 
one or more individuals. The cases are bound by time and activity, and researchers 
collect detailed information using a variety of data-collection procedures over a 
sustained period of time (Yin 2014:131). This research adopted a single case study 
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approach because a multiple case study requires extensive resources and time 
beyond the means of a single student. As Creswell (2009:57) argues, a single case 
represents a significant contribution to knowledge and theory building, by confirming, 
challenging, or extending existing theory. The study also adopted a case study design 
because case studies are suitable for practice-orientated disciplines such as Public 
Administration (Magwa and Magwa 2015:53). The next subsection presents the data-
collection methods. 
1.5.4  Data-collection methods  
Data can be collected through qualitative data-gathering techniques such as fieldwork, 
documentary analysis, interviews, and historical comparative analysis and quantitative 
data-gathering techniques such as experiments and surveys (Neuman 2014:46). This 
qualitative study made use of qualitative data-gathering techniques such as elite 
interviews and unobtrusive research methods. These techniques are defined and their 
strengths and weaknesses are discussed below. The researcher also justifies why he 
adopted these particular data-collection techniques. 
1.5.4.1  Elite interviews 
As Gillman (2009:3) and Aberbach and Rockman (2002:673) argue, interviews are 
used to gain an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon. The researcher made use 
of elite interviews because they are useful data-collection tools used by social 
scientists interested in understanding the perspectives and behaviours of leaders in 
business, politics, and society (Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Zig 2004:207). According 
to Gillman (2009:54), elite interviews involve talking to experts about the subject under 
study. Doing so helps a researcher fill in the pieces of a puzzle or confirm the proper 
alignment of pieces already in place (Aberbach and Rockman 2002:673). In this study, 
the researcher interviewed key policymakers and academic specialists involved in the 
creation of Zimbabwe’s SWF. 
(a)  Sampling of elite interviewees 
As Burnham et al. (2004:207) argue, conventional sampling techniques are not useful 
for elite interviews. Snowball or referral sampling is more common when employing 
this data-collection tool. Referral sampling entails using a network (Kumar 2005:179). 
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In practice, it means starting with a few key informants identified from the literature or 
other means (Burnham et al. 2004:207). The researcher met one of the inaugural 
board members of Zimbabwe’s SWF (an expert administrator) at a policy dialogue 
forum hosted by a think tank in Harare in 2017. This was at the time when the 
researcher was still conceptualising his research proposal. After the symposium, the 
researcher established rapport with this key informant. As prescribed by Harvey 
(2011:5), in order to gain the respect of the board member and guarantee an interview, 
the researcher had to make a positive impression on the key informant by 
demonstrating knowledge of the subject matter. The board member agreed to further 
discuss the subject matter with the researcher in future. An elite interview with the 
board member was eventually conducted telephonically in January 2020 because the 
key informant preferred to be interviewed over the telephone. The elite interview with 
this expert administrator helped the researcher to incorporate the perceptions of one 
of the strategic leaders of Zimbabwe’s SWF into the thesis. The expert administrator’s 
perceptions provided invaluable points that enriched the arguments in this study.  
The researcher also identified a leading SWF academic specialist from the literature. 
The aforementioned academic specialist referred the researcher to a Treasury director 
in the Ministry of Finance in Zimbabwe. The Treasury director referred the researcher 
to another Treasury official knowledgeable about the subject under study. In turn, the 
aforementioned Treasury director referred the researcher to a think tank that 
conducted research on the subject under study. The head of the think tank referred 
the researcher to an academic specialist who conducted research on the subject 
matter. Thus, in total, the researcher interviewed one board member (an expert 
administrator), two academic specialists, and two Treasury officials who were 
instrumental in the development of Zimbabwe’s SWF. In addition, the researcher 
interviewed two politicians who were at the centre of creating Zimbabwe’s SWF. The 
politicians were from the ruling ZANU-PF party and the main opposition, the Movement 
for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A). The researcher interviewed both sides of 
the political divide in order to obtain a balanced view of the subject under study. Table 
1.4 presents a summary of the key informants interviewed for the purposes of this 
study. 
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Table 1.4: Summary of key informants interviewed 
Category of key 
informants Number interviewed Rationale 
Expert administrator Three: One board member and 
two Treasury officials 
Part of the strategic apex of 
Zimbabwe’s SWF. 
Academic specialist Two Advised the government of Zimbabwe 
to create an SWF. 
Political elite Two Made policy pronouncements on the 
creation of Zimbabwe’s SWF. 
Source: Compiled by researcher. 
 
Thus, as shown in Table 1.4, seven key informants were interviewed for the purposes 
of this study. Mears (2009 cited in Liu 2018:1) argues that if a researcher seeks to 
achieve depth rather than breadth in understanding a phenomenon under study, six 
to nine elite interviews can suffice. Therefore, the number of elite interviews conducted 
is in tandem with Mears’ (2009 cited in Liu 2018) and Liu’s (2018:1) prescriptions. 
(b)  Elite interview procedure adopted 
As prescribed by Aberbach and Rockman (2002:673), the researcher used an 
imprimatur obtained from the University of Johannesburg to gain access to the elites 
sampled to be interviewed for the purposes of this study. In March 2019, the parliament 
of Zimbabwe approved the researcher’s request to conduct this study (approval 
attached as Appendix E). The researcher sought approval from the parliament of 
Zimbabwe to conduct this study because the enabling legal framework of Zimbabwe’s 
SWF enacted by the parliament of Zimbabwe is the only tangible feature of 
Zimbabwe’s SWF.  
The researcher presented the approval letter to all key informants interviewed for the 
purposes of this study. However, in most instances, the researcher had to be politely 
persistent to be granted an interview. As forewarned by Gillman (2009:54), the elites 
were initially reluctant to participate in this study because they were not sure of the 
motives behind the research. Possibly some of them (especially political elites) 
misconstrued this study as a witch-hunting exercise. As Harvey (2011:5) and Liu 
(2018:3) prescribe, the researcher had to gain the trust of interviewees in order to gain 
high-quality data. 
To gain access to the elites, the researcher had to make use of political and academic 
acquaintances close to the elites. The elites were more forthcoming when the 
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researcher identified with one of their own. Premised on the advice of Liu (2018:1), 
prior to the interviews, the researcher gained a deeper understanding of the 
interviewees’ personal and professional biographies. This enabled the researcher to 
become familiar with the interviewees, establish rapport, and gain their trust. In an 
effort to make the interviewees comfortable during the interviews, the researcher 
informed the key informants that they may skip any question that they deemed 
confidential or too sensitive. In addition, as prescribed by Harvey (2011:6-15), the 
researcher offered the informants anonymity. The researcher made use of 
pseudonyms during the data presentation and analysis stages of the research. 
In order to make the key informants comfortable during the interviews, the researcher 
first asked easy questions before asking more difficult questions. As prescribed by Liu 
(2018:2), the interview guides were person-specific because in some instances 
particular questions were appropriate or relevant only to a specific interviewee. During 
the interviews, the researcher demonstrated that he had done his homework. As 
forewarned by Harvey (2011:5), elites often consciously and subconsciously challenge 
the researcher on the subject matter and its relevance. The researcher confidently 
defended his position, which made a positive impression on the interviewees and 
improved the quality of the responses to the researcher’s questions. 
Elite interviews conducted for the purposes of this study were loosely structured 
because the key informants interviewed were not naïve subjects who would submit to 
a series of prepared questions (Guion, Diehl and MacDonald 2011:22). As prescribed 
by Aberbach and Rockman (2002:673), the elite interviews had more of a 
conversational quality. The open-ended questions allowed the key informants to 
engage in wide-ranging discussions with the researcher. Not only did most 
interviewees know more than the researcher about certain key dimensions of the area, 
they were usually aware of the implications of the questions and of their answers to 
them (Liu 2018:6). 
Elite interviews are expensive in terms of time and costs (Aberbach and Rockman 
2002:674). The researcher spent a great deal of time preparing for the interviews, as 
well as conducting, transcribing, and coding them. As prescribed by Creswell 
(2009:180), Burnham et al. (2004:31), and Yin (2014:23), the disadvantages of elite 
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interviews were reduced by complementing them with documentary search and 
literature review. This enhanced research validity.  
1.5.4.2  Documentary search 
Documents are a rich source of qualitative data that provide insight into the origins 
and meaning of the processes and practices being discussed (Liu 2018:6). 
Documentary sources were used alongside elite interview transcriptions to help 
identify any biases. The researcher made use of official government publications, 
parliamentary debates, and newspapers. Official government publications and 
parliamentary debates offered the researcher a reliable starting point because they 
are a result of the policymaking process. However, although the Hansard provides 
potentially rich source of information by and large, it records political talk and does not 
reveal the mechanics of administrative actions (Burnham et al. 2004:171). The 
researcher used newspapers with caution. A full analysis of the journalist who wrote 
the article, the role of the editor and the ownership structure, and processes of 
production were taken into cognisance. The researcher also paid particular attention 
to the conditions under which a particular document was produced and the material 
interests that may have driven the author to write the document (Burnham et al. 
2004:186). 
Documentary analysis was used to produce an objective and systematic description 
of communicative material, and it turns qualitative information into quantitative data 
through converting information into themes, codes, and numbers (Auriacombe 
2016:6). Bias may arise from the lack of information on the actual way the recorded 
data were collected (Auriacombe 2016:6). Sampling is critical in documentary 
analysis, although it is complicated as the unit of analysis and the unit of observation 
differ. The researcher therefore had to be clear on what constitutes the unit of analysis 
and the unit of observation, as well as the universe to be sampled from (Auriacombe 




Table 1.5: Advantages and limitations of documentary content analysis 
Advantages Limitations 
Enables a researcher to obtain the language and 
words of participants. 
Not all people are equally articulate and proffer 
sound perspectives. 
Can be accessed at a time convenient to the 
researcher as it is an unobtrusive source of 
information. 
May be protected information unavailable to the 
public and private access only. 
Represents data that are thoughtful in that 
participants paid attention when compiling it. 
Requires the researcher to search for the 
information in hard-to-find places. 
As written evidence, it saves a researcher the 
time and expense of transcribing. 
Requires transcribing or optical scanning for 
computer entry. 
It seldom has any effect on the subject being 
studied. 
Material may be incomplete. 
It allows the correction of errors. The documents may not be authentic or accurate. 
It is limited to the examination of recorded 
communications 
Source: Compiled from Creswell (2009:180); Babbie (2010:331-352); Kumar (2005:41); Berg 
(2001:258). 
 
Documentary research was used to complement elite interviews to address the 
research objectives. 
1.5.4.3 Literature review 
As Creswell (2009:23), Magwa and Magwa (2015:31), Terre Blanche et al, (2008:31), 
and Neuman (2014:126) argue, in an effort to fill gaps and extend prior studies, a 
literature review relates a study to the larger, ongoing dialogue in the literature. The 
literature review established the context of the topic to show state-of-the-art 
developments. It also rationalised the significance of the problem (Hart 2014:27). The 
literature review exposed main gaps in knowledge and identified principal areas of 
dispute and uncertainty (Robin 2011:53). It identified general patterns to findings from 
multiple examples of research in the same area (Hart 2014:27). Furthermore, the 
literature review helped to define terminology or identify variations in the definitions 
that the researcher used. The literature review also helped the researcher to identify 
appropriate research methodologies and instruments (Robin 2011:53). After 
conducting a thorough literature review, the researcher acquired the subject 
vocabulary (Hart 2014:27). Moreover, the literature review helped the researcher to 
relate ideas and theory to application (Hart 2014:27). The next section explains how 
data were analysed and assessed in this research. 
26 
1.6  DATA ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT 
Data analysis is the interpretation of data for the purposes of drawing conclusions to 
answer research questions in an inquiry (Babbie 2010:112). It involves breaking down 
existing complex factors into simpler parts and putting the parts together in new 
arrangements for the purpose of interpretation (Singh 2006:223). Qualitative data 
analysis seeks to describe a phenomenon as it focuses on comparing several cases 
and what they have in common, as well as their differences. It requires the researcher 
to read between the lines of what is said so as to identify what influences an individual 
to say something (Flick 2014:369). This research utilised thematic analysis and 
qualitative content analysis to present and analyse the collected data. 
1.6.1  Thematic analysis 
Thematic analysis was used to thematically analyse the data derived from the elite 
interviews. Thematic analysis is a qualitative data-analysis tool that identifies, 
analyses, and reports themes or patterns that emerge from data, which can answer 
research questions (Ibrahim 2014:40). The researcher first immersed himself in the 
data through data transcription in order to gain a deep understanding of the data (Terre 
Blanche et al. 2008:322). The researcher read and re-read fieldnotes and 
transcriptions and listened to the audio recordings several times (Magwa and Magwa 
2015:100). This resulted in the identification of meaning, interesting views, as well as 
emerging patterns. Codes were then used to identify ideas in the data that answer the 
research questions (Braun and Clarke 2006:04). The identified themes produced 
useful insights into the factors behind the creation of a premature SWF in Zimbabwe. 
1.6.2  Qualitative content analysis 
Data derived from documentary sources were analysed using content analysis. 
Textual data and their properties were categorised. Content or document analysis 
serves a useful purpose in research by adding important knowledge to a field of study 
or yielding information that is helpful in evaluating and improving social or educational 
practice (Singh 2006:150). In the context of this study, this method was mainly used 
to analyse data drawn from documents such as reports, speeches, Acts of Parliament, 
journal articles, books, and newspapers. 
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1.7  TRUSTWORTHINESS AND VERIFICATION OF DATA 
Terre Blanche et al. (2008:67) argue that interpretive and constructivist researchers 
believe that research should be verified. According to Magwa and Magwa (2015:93), 
the verification of data is the basis upon which the quality of data is judged. As 
Korstjens and Moser (2018:120) argue, “the quality criteria of all qualitative research 
is credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability”. Reflexivity is also an 
integral part of ensuring the transparency and quality of research. It is the process of 
critical self-reflection about oneself; that is, the researcher’s preferences, own biases, 
preconditions, and preferences. The relationship of the researcher to the key 
informants of the study affected how the key informants answered the questions. The 
researcher is a Zimbabwean by origin. Therefore, the issue of sustainable natural 
resource revenue management is an emotive issue close to the researcher’s heart. 
Despite Zimbabwe’s vast natural resource base, the country’s riches have failed to 
transform the country into a middle-income economy. In an effort to ensure that the 
researcher’s own biases did not compromise the research process, the researcher 
ensured that the primary data obtained for the purposes of this study were derived 
from heterogeneous sources. Ruling party officials, government officials, opposition 
political party officials, civil society activists, and academic specialists were sampled 
as key informants for this study. This ensured that different viewpoints from different 
stakeholders were incorporated into the study. 
According to Korstjens and Moser (2018:121), credibility is the equivalent of internal 
validity in quantitative research. Credible research is research whose findings can be 
trusted (Palailogou, Needham and Male 2016:6). As prescribed by Korstjens and 
Moser (2018:121), the researcher first built trust and got to know the key informants 
better. The researcher also triangulated multiple data sources and methods. Member 
checking as a means of enhancing credibility was also employed (Magwa and Magwa 
2015:93), in which the researcher fed the data back to the key informants of the study. 
This process strengthened the data because the researcher and the key informants 
looked at the data with different eyes (Korstjens and Moser 2018:121). 
According to Terre Blanche et al. (2008:67), conformability determines whether the 
research findings are biased or not; it relates to how neutral and objective the 
researcher is. On the other hand, according to Moon, Brewer, Januchoskwi-Harley, 
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Adam and Blackman (2016:2), “dependability refers to the consistency and reliability 
of the research findings and the degree to which research procedures are 
documented, allowing someone outside to follow, audit, and critique the process”. In 
an effort to enhance dependability and conformability, the researcher transparently 
described the research steps from the start of the research project through to the 
development and reporting of the findings. Records of the research path were kept 
throughout the study (Terre Blanche et al. 2008:67). In an effort to ensure 
conformability, the researcher demonstrated that the results are clearly linked to the 
conclusions in a way that can be followed and replicated (Moon et al. 2016:2). 
Transferability refers to whether the research findings can apply to other contexts 
(Palailogou et al. 2016:31). However, Moon et al. (2016:2) argue that “often, it is not 
possible, or desirable, to demonstrate that findings or conclusions from qualitative 
research are applicable to other situations or population. Instead, the purpose can be 
to identify, and begin to explain, phenomena where a lack of clarity prevents it from 
being, as yet clearly defined”. As prescribed by Korstjens and Moser (2018:121), the 
researcher enhanced transferability through thick descriptions. The researcher did not 
just describe the behaviour and experiences of the key informants, but the context as 
well, so that the behaviour and experiences become meaningful to an outsider.  
1.8  DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
According to Simon (2011:2), delimitation of a study refers to the limit or scope that 
defines the boundaries of a study. It encompasses the participants involved in the 
study, the geographical region covered by a study, and the profession or organisation 
involved (Simon 2011:2). The delimitation of this study is Zimbabwe’s SWF. The 
participants involved in the study were drawn primarily from Zimbabwe’s SWF, 
Treasury, think tanks, ZANU-PF, the MDC-A, and academia. The researcher chose 
the aforementioned elites because academic specialists and think tanks mooted the 
idea of creating an SWF in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, political elites were also selected 
because politicians made policy pronouncements that created Zimbabwe’s SWF. In 
addition, Treasury was chosen because ideally it is the parent ministry of Zimbabwe’s 
SWF. Finally, Zimbabwe’s SWF was selected because it is the subject under study. 
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1.9  LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
According to Simon (2011:2), the limitations of a study are possible weaknesses that 
are beyond the control of the researcher. SWFs the world over are generally shrouded 
in secrecy for political reasons (Barbary and Bortolotti 2012:192). Section 28 of 
Zimbabwe’s SWF Act prohibits Zimbabwe’s SWF board members, employees, and 
agents of the board from disclosing to “any person any information relating to the 
affairs of the board or fund”. Thus, the board member and Treasury officials and 
policymakers who were interviewed for the purposes of this study could not fully 
disclose some of the issues asked about by the researcher. The researcher attempted 
to minimise the impact of this problem by assuring the key informants that the study 
would be used for academic purposes only. The researcher also promised the 
participants anonymity by using pseudonyms when he presented and analysed the 
data. Consequently, most key informants divulged information relating to the 
management of Zimbabwe’s SWF. 
1.10  ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
According to Neuman (2014:151), researchers must never coerce respondents to 
participate in their research. The researcher was guided by the following ethical 
considerations: authorisation to conduct research, informed consent, and respect for 
anonymity and confidentiality.  
1.10.1  Permission to conduct research 
This research was approved by the College of Business and Economics’ Research 
Ethics Committee, with ethical clearance code (20PMGPP12). Using an imprimatur 
from the University of Johannesburg, the researcher sought permission from the 
government of Zimbabwe to conduct this study. Initially, the researcher approached 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and the Ministry of Mines for 
approval. However, the aforementioned ministries referred the researcher to the 
parliament of Zimbabwe for approval. The ministries highlighted that they could only 
entertain the researcher after the study had been approved by the August House. 
Authorisation from the parliament of Zimbabwe enabled the researcher to access 
respondents for this study (see approval letter attached in Appendix E).  
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1.10.2  Informed consent 
Informed consent is a fundamental ethical consideration in research (Neuman 
2014:151). To ensure that the respondents made informed decisions on whether to 
participate or not, the researcher explained in detail the purpose of the study in a 
language that the respondents are familiar with. The researcher also assured the key 
informants of the study that participation in the research was voluntary and that they 
could withdraw at any time if they were no longer interested in the study. Moreover, 
after giving a detailed account of the study, the researcher gave the key informants 
the opportunity to ask questions to ensure that they understood the purpose of the 
research and the associated risks and benefits.   
1.10.3 Respect for anonymity and confidentiality 
Anonymity and confidentiality entail that any information provided by key informants 
must not be made public or availed to others (Neuman 2014:151). The researcher 
protected the identity of the key informants at all times. Interview guides were designed 
in a manner that enhanced key informant anonymity. Pseudonyms were assigned to 
the different interview guides to help the researcher in data analysis. In other words, 
the researcher used pseudonyms during that data presentation and analysis stage of 
the research.  
1.11  DEFINITION OF COMMONLY USED TERMINOLOGIES  
Concepts are defined as and when they are used in different sections and chapters of 
this thesis. However, in order to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity in the interpretation 
of the concepts, the terms used in this thesis are also concisely defined as follows. 
1.11.1  Natural resources 
Howe (1979 cited in Mlambo 2018:3) defines natural resources as “all the living and 
non-living endowments of the earth”. Traditional usage confines the term to naturally 
occurring resources and systems that are useful to humans (Mlambo 2018:3). 
According to Zimmermann (1951 cited in Mlambo 2018:3), for something to be a 
resource, there should be human demand for it, as well as the technology to exploit it 
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for the benefit of mankind. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, natural resources 
denote minerals. 
1.11.2  Revenue management  
Revenue management with regard to this study refers to the management of 
government revenue. Government revenue generally denotes all income due to the 
state such as taxes, user fees or charges, fines, and loans that a government can 
mobilise (Zhou and Chilunjika 2013:233). Efficient revenue management systems are 
the bedrock of sound public administration because public administration without 
adequate funding is a nullity (Madhekeni and Zhou 2013:49). Fiscal systems across 
the globe are continually reviewed and strengthened in a bid to sustain effective 
revenue collection, expenditure, and debt servicing because robust public finance 
management approaches are needed to ensure that adequate revenues are collected 
and remitted to Treasury (Zhou 2012:152). Prudent revenue management ensures 
that scarce financial resources are allocated and used in ways that stimulate economic 
growth and social welfare (Zhou 2017:124). 
1.11.3  Sustainable  
According to Kuhlman and Farrington (2010:3437), the term “sustainability” was 
coined in forestry, where it means “never harvesting more than what the forest yields 
in new growth”. The policy concept of sustainability is generally regarded to have 
originated from the Brundtland Report of 1987, which was concerned with the tension 
between the aspirations of humanity to improve their lives on the one hand and the 
limitations imposed by nature on the other hand (Kuhlman and Farrington 2010:3436). 
The term “sustainable” is holistic and has varied meanings in different disciplines 
because it considers ecological, social, and economic dimensions, which must all be 
considered together (University of Alberta n.d.:1). According to Markulev and Long 
(2012:2), sustainability can only be achieved when each dimension has been 
promoted. Therefore, generally, sustainability refers to the capacity to continue an 
activity or process indefinitely or in perpetuity through maintaining the total stock of 
capital (Ben-Eli 2015:3). It emphasises meeting present needs without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (University of Alberta n.d.:1). 
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For the purposes of this study, sustainability is premised on the notion of 
intergenerational equity.  
1.11.4  Development 
The late former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan (2007 cited in 
Mills, Herbst, Obasango and Biti 2019:46), defined development as “freedom from 
oppression and poverty”. In other words, development entails improving the quality of 
human life through exploiting the natural environment for the benefit of mankind 
(Rodney 1973:10). It is a multidimensional process that involves the reorganisation 
and reorientation of the entire economy and social systems in order to improve income 
and output through radically changing social and administrative structures, as well as 
popular attitudes and sometimes even beliefs and customs (Todaro 1992:98). The 
core values of development proffered by Professor Goulet (1990 cited in Todaro 
1992:101) include life-sustenance (the ability to provide basic human needs such as 
food, shelter, health, and protection), self-esteem (to be a person), and freedom from 
servitude (to be able to choose). For the purposes of this study, the term 
“development” refers to improving the quality of human life. 
1.12  STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter One: General scientific and methodological orientation to the study 
Chapter One provides the background, research rationale, and the problem statement 
of the study. In addition, the chapter poses the research questions and objectives of 
the study. This chapter also highlights the methodology adopted by the study to 
generate data, as well as the manner in which data are presented and analysed. 
Moreover, the chapter provides the research paradigm and approach, as well as the 
research design, data-collection methods, data-analysis techniques, and the sampling 
technique. In addition, ethical considerations are discussed. 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical and conceptual issues underpinning the creation of 
premature SWFs 
Chapter Two presents the theoretical and conceptual issues that underpin the creation 
of premature SWFs. 
Chapter Three: Zimbabwe’s SWF: A case of a premature fund 
Chapter Three applies the framework set out in Chapter Two to the Zimbabwean 
context. 
Chapter Four: Natural resource revenue management principles and practices 
in the developing world 
Chapter Four examines natural resource revenue management principles and 
practices in the developing world. 
Chapter Five: Governance principles and best practices for SWFs 
Chapter Five examines governance principles and practices that enable and disenable 
the operationalisation of SWFs. 
Chapter Six: Synthesis, evaluation, conclusions, and proposals 
Chapter Six synthesises and concludes the study. It also provides proposals on how 
the government of Zimbabwe can successfully operationalise its commodity-based 
SWF. 
1.13  CONCLUSION 
This chapter consisted of a general introduction to the study. It provided an overview 
of the origins of SWFs, how and why they came into existence, and how they have 
transformed the global economy. The chapter also traced the creation of a premature 
fund in Zimbabwe. The chapter presented the research problem, research questions, 
and research objectives. The sampling methods and research design, as well as the 
justification of the research methods, were also outlined. Ethical considerations, 
limitations, and delimitations were also discussed. The chapter also presented the 
outline of the study.  
The next chapter presents the theoretical and conceptual issues that underpin the 
creation of a premature SWF.  
34 
CHAPTER TWO: 
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES UNDERPINNING THE CREATION 
OF PREMATURE SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (SWFs) 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter provided a general introduction to the study, the research design 
and methodologies, and an overview of the origins of SWFs. Chapter Two focuses on 
the first research objective, which is to analyse theoretical and conceptual issues that 
underpin the creation of premature SWFs. The organisation of the chapter is as 
follows: Section 2.2 presents the theoretical framework of the study, Section 2.3 
presents the conceptual framework of the study, and Section 2.4 concludes the 
chapter.  
2.2  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The scientific community recognises theory as essential to scientific enterprise 
(Neuman 2014:58). As Creswell (2009:49) argues, one component of reviewing 
literature is to determine what theories might be used to explore research questions in 
a scholarly study. In this thesis, the theoretical framework is provided to provide a lens 
that shapes what is examined and the questions asked (Kivunja 2018:46). Theory 
provides assurance to researchers that what they are doing is in line with attempts by 
other researchers to understand what is happening to the phenomenon under study 
(Silverman 2010:103). 
In fact, research findings make little scientific sense if they are presented outside the 
context of a particular theory (Van der Waldt 2017:183). Theory therefore plays a 
pivotal role in advancing knowledge and in organising the ways researchers conduct 
research (Neuman 2014:56). Theory serves as an orientation for gathering facts since 
it specifies the types of facts to be systematically observed (Terre Blanche et al. 
2008:20). Theory clarifies the thinking, extends the understanding, deepens the 
discussion, enriches the analysis, and helps to build knowledge (Neuman 2014:56). 
The researcher used the natural resource curse hypothesis and policy transfer 
research tradition to explain the rise of premature funds among natural resource-rich 
developing economies. 
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2.2.1  The natural resource curse hypothesis/theory/trap 
Theoretically, natural resource wealth should promote economic growth and improve 
the standards of living of a country’s people (Badeeb, Lean and Clark 2016:13). 
Natural resource revenue accrued from mineral exploitation can give a “big push” to 
the economy through investment in infrastructure and rapid human capital 
development (Ossowski and Halland 2016:1); however, in practice this is not always 
the case (Gylfason 2011:7). Natural resource-rich developing countries such as 
Afghanistan (gemstones), Angola (diamond and oil), and the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC) (copper, gold, coltan, tin, and diamonds) are growing and developing 
at much slower rates than countries that do not possess natural resources, such as 
Singapore (Atkinson and Hamilton 2003:1794). The “natural resource curse”, coined 
by Auty (1993:1) and Karl (1997:3), and the “natural resource trap”, coined by Collier 
(2007:40), refer to developing countries that are richly endowed with abundant natural 
resource wealth but have little to show for it (Wills, Simbanegavi and Senbet 2016:3). 
According to Auty (1993:1), explanations for the natural resource curse include Dutch 
disease, commodity price volatility, economic mismanagement, and rent-seeking 
behaviour also known as “political Dutch disease”. The following subsections parse 
out the aforementioned explanations of the natural resource curse.    
2.2.1.1 Dutch disease 
In 1977, the London-based popular weekly newspaper, The Economist, coined the 
term “Dutch disease” to describe how a commodity boom in the 1970s raised the value 
of the guilder (Netherland’s currency) by a sixth, which negatively impacted the 
competitiveness of Dutch manufacturing and services industries (The Economist 
2014). The term is now conventionally used by economists to describe how a boom in 
the natural resource sector leads to a decline in the fortunes of other sectors of the 
traded market, particularly the agricultural and manufacturing sectors (Atkinson and 
Hamilton 2003:1796). In short, Dutch disease damages the growth process of an 
economy by “crowding out” export activities that otherwise have the potential to grow 
rapidly (Collier 2007:39). For example, because of an oil price boom in the 1980s, 
Nigeria built up significant reserves. These reserves crowded out the country’s other 
exports (peanuts and coca) and made them unprofitable and production rapidly 
collapsed (Collier 2007:39).  
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2.2.1.2  Commodity price volatility 
Cyclical variability (fluctuation) of natural resource revenues, induced by booms and 
busts in the international commodity market, makes medium- to long-term planning 
and budgeting difficult in natural resource-rich economies (Sobel and Wagner 
2003:583). The cost of not managing or poor management of commodity price volatility 
is high (Triki and Affes 2011:1) because it curbs economic growth (Van der Ploeg and 
Poellekke 2008:5). During commodity price booms, governments tend to unjustifiably 
overspend on “legacy projects” such as monuments, cultural centres, or new 
government buildings (Natural Resource Governance Institute 2015:1). They are 
usually forced to cut back during a recession (Collier 2007:40). What is usually cut in 
such scenarios are not the frivolous items that were added to the government’s 
balance sheet during the boom but whatever is politically the most vulnerable (Natural 
Resource Governance Institute 2015:1).  
For example, when Nigeria enjoyed a huge oil boom in the 1980s, the government 
made a catastrophic mess of the boom by borrowing heavily and spending money on 
massively wasteful projects saturated with corruption (Collier 2007:40). In 1986, the 
world price of oil crashed and the Nigerian gravy train came to a halt. As a result, oil 
revenues were drastically reduced and the banks demanded repayment of the loans 
advanced to the Nigerian government (Collier 2007:40). This had the net effect of 
halving the standard of living of the ordinary Nigerian as the government abrogated 
most of its sovereign duties while it paid off the borrowed money (Collier 2007:40).  
2.2.1.3  Economic mismanagement 
Natural resource bonanzas (anticipated windfalls) imbue state elites with over-
confidence in their economies, reduce their critical faculties, and induce a false sense 
of security (Iimi 2007:66). For example, before the “jubilee find” (discovery of oil on 
Ghana’s 50th independence anniversary) in 2009, Ghana had a good record of 
macroeconomic and fiscal stability (Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative 
[CABRI] 2016:14). However, the discovery of oil and the windfall it promised ushered 
in an era of economic imprudence (profligate spending and heavy borrowing) (Cust 
and Mihalyi 2017:37). Since the discovery of oil in 2009, Ghana has borrowed over 
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US$3.9 billion from the international financial market to finance its budget deficits 
(Offori-Atta 2019:11). 
2.2.1.4  Political Dutch disease 
Closely related to the economic mismanagement strand of the natural resource curse 
(Collier 2007:39), “political Dutch disease” is a term used by political economists such 
as Ross (2001:356) to describe how natural resource wealth hinders democracy in 
developing natural resource-rich economies. Authoritarian regimes that possess 
natural resource wealth are sustained by natural resource rents at the expense of 
inclusive growth and sustainable development (Lam and Wantchekon 2003:1). For 
example, Equatorial Guinea’s oil reserves, the third largest on the continent after 
Nigeria and Angola (World Bank 2020c:1), could transform the country from an 
impoverished backwater into an economic powerhouse (Biko 2002:1). However, 
President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo and his extended family have used the 
oil rents to fund their lavish lifestyles; consolidate their brutal, authoritarian regime; 
and further criminalise one of the world’s most criminal states (Equatorial Guinea is a 
major world drug transhipment centre) (Esteban 2009:668). 
Between 1995 and 2004, over US$700 million worth of oil revenue was deposited into 
accounts owned by the Nguema family in the now defunct Riggs Bank in Washington, 
D.C. (Human Rights Watch 2009b:1). Moreover, according to the United States (US) 
Justice Department, President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo’s eldest son, vice 
president and touted successor Teodorin (more commonly referred to as little 
Teodoro) amassed assets worth over US$300 million while earning less than 
US$100 000 a year between 2000 and 2011 (Fernandes 2017). The assets include a 
mansion in Malibu and a €107 million mansion in France (Alicante 2019:17), which 
boasts a disco, gym, hairdressing studio, gold-plated taps, decorated with over 
€40 million worth of furniture, including a €1.6 million Louis XV desk, a Rodin 
sculpture, and a dozen Fabergé eggs (Chrisafis 2017). Little Teodoro also owns a 
Gulfstream jet, a £120 million yacht (Alicante 2019:17), and Michael Jackson’s 
diamond-studded gloves from the artist’s “Bad” tour (1987-1989) (CiFAR 2017), 
valued at €233 000 (Blomfield 2019); among other assets, at a time when the World 
Bank estimated that 76.8% of the population lived in abject poverty (Cardamone and 
Heydt 2019:1). 
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2.2.2  Some SWFs haphazardly created to eliminate the natural resource 
curse 
In an effort to ameliorate challenges associated with the natural resource curse (i.e. 
commodity price volatility, Dutch disease, economic mismanagement and political 
Dutch disease), more and more natural resource-rich developing economies are 
establishing commodity-based SWFs to manage their natural resource revenues 
(Dixon and Monk 2011a:1). While SWFs offer hope to natural resource-rich countries 
plagued by the natural resource curse (i.e. smoothening natural resource revenue 
across the commodity cycle), establishing a commodity-based SWF does not replace 
the need for a prudent natural resource revenue management framework and robust 
macroeconomic policies. Natural resource-rich developing economies should be able 
to capture and account for resource rents before they can operationalise successful 
commodity-based SWFs such as Botswana’s Pula Fund (Matambo and Dixon 
2021:37). Some natural resource-rich developing countries such as Zimbabwe rushed 
to create commodity-based SWFs before they had acquired the prerequisite 
conditions required to operationalise successful SWFs (i.e. prudent natural resource 
revenue management framework and robust macroeconomic policies) (IMF 
2014a:18). Resultantly, such countries established premature funds. This raises the 
questions: why do countries that do not possess the prerequisite conditions required 
to operationalise commodity-based SWFs rush to establish these funds? The next 
section uses policy transfer research tradition to answer this question. 
2.2.3  Policy transfer 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996:343) define policy transfer (also known as emulation or 
lesson drawing) as “a process in which policies, administrative arrangements and 
institutions in one time or place are used for the development of policies, administrative 
arrangements and institutions in another time and place”. In other words, policy 
transfer posits that governments learn from the experiences of other governments 
(Crow 2012:28). Policy transfer studies have advanced the fact that domestic 
policymaking is no longer the monopoly of national governments; rather, policy ideas 
are sourced across borders (Tambulasi 2011:19). Policies, administrative 
arrangements, and institutions are either voluntarily transferred, or directly 
(conditionality) transferred, or indirectly coerced (obligated transfer) upon a 
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government by another government or supranational body (Dolowitz and Marsh 
2012:340). 
According to Dolowitz and Marsh (1996:349-350), there are seven objects that can be 
transferred through policy transfer, namely policy goals; structure and content; policy 
instruments or administrative techniques; institutions; ideology; ideas, attitudes, and 
concepts; and negative lessons. However, policy borrowers appear to be more 
concerned with policy structure than effect (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996:350). 
Furthermore, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996:345) posit that there are six main categories 
of actors involved in policy transfer, namely elected officials, political parties, 
bureaucrats or civil servants, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs or experts, and 
supranational institutions. Benson and Jordan (2011:369) argue that transnational 
advocacy networks, transnational philanthropic institutions, think tanks, epistemic 
communities, transnational corporations, international norm diffusers such as the 
OECD, and global financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, are actors 
also involved in policy transfer.  
While literature on policy transfer lacks an analytical framework that facilitates 
understanding and aids theory building (Wolman and Page 2002:477), there is 
consensus in the literature that placing policy transfer into a conceptual framework 
may advance the understanding of concepts such as what motivates policymakers to 
engage in the policy transfer process (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000:6). Therefore, 
although there is plenty of evidence that policy transfer occurs and that it is an 
important cause of policy innovation, more work needs to be done on how and why it 
happens (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996:355). In addition, the empirical question why and 
when certain policy transfer occurs in a particular setting and not others has not been 
fully addressed (Benson and Jourdan 2011:370).  
Chwieroth (2010:1) used policy transfer to explain the rise of SWFs in natural 
resource-rich economies. Moreover, Clark and Monk (2012:1) used policy transfer to 
explain the rise of SWFs in the Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE). This study uses policy transfer to advance the “premature 
fund” argument because developing countries such as Zimbabwe, which is the focus 
of this research, have inappropriately emulated successful SWFs in the developed 
world such as Norway’s GPFG (World Finance 2019). 
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Fawcett and Marsh (2012:164) argue that inappropriate policy transfer occurs when 
variables that underpin an emulated policy do not exist in the country that emulates 
the policy. This has often been the case when developing countries adopt Western 
policies, administrative arrangements, and institutions and hope to achieve the same 
results. As Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews (2000 cited in Fukuyama 2014:60) argue, 
“[o]ne of the big problems with policymakers in developing countries is that they 
engage in ‘isomorphic mimicry’; that is, copying the outward forms of policies of the 
developed world while being unable to produce the kind of outputs the latter achieve”. 
Implied here is the fact that policymakers in the developing world tend to emulate 
developed-world policies without thinking carefully about, and taking into cognisance, 
all the variables that underpin the success of these policies in developed countries 
where they have been developed. 
Isomorphic mimicry explains why Western developmental models such as the 
Structural Adjustment Programmes that were introduced by the World Bank and IMF 
did not produce positive results in most, if not all, developing countries that adopted 
the Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 1980s (Gono 2008:25). Isomorphic 
mimicry also explains why Western-developed New Public Management principles, 
which were developed by Western experts for Western countries, did not yield the 
same results when imported and applied in most African countries in the early 2000s 
(Uwizeyimana 2015:70). Moreover, the “isomorphic mimicry” adoption of the 
“Singaporean-modelled developmental approach” was found to be unviable for African 
nations such as Rwanda, which adopted them in the early 2000s (Uwizeyimana 
2019:215). It also explains why a number of developing countries are creating 
premature funds. They emulate the success of successful SWFs in developed 
countries without taking into cognisance the underlying variables that underpin their 
success in the countries they are adopted from.  
There is evidence that Western administrative approaches and practices and 
institutional arrangements do not achieve the same result when applied in dissimilar 
contexts such as Africa because of dissimilar social, economic, political, and cultural 
contexts between Western and African contexts (Nel 2015:83). For example, 
privatisation of public services, which was part of New Public Management in the early 
2000s, had better outcomes in Western countries because their citizens have higher 
incomes and could afford privatised services, while the privatisation of public services 
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has had disastrous effects in Africa (Zhou 2000:201). This is the case because most 
citizens, especially in rural areas, of most African countries are generally poor, 
unemployed, living below the poverty line, and cannot afford privatised public services 
(Nel 2015:83-85). 
Developed countries’ SWFs, such as, Abu Dhabi’s ADIA, and Norway’s GPFG, are 
among the most closely watched, admired, and emulated SWFs in the world (Wright 
2019). However, the aforementioned SWFs succeeded because their governments 
possess prudent natural resource revenue management frameworks and robust 
macroeconomic policies (Balding 2012:6). In other words, successful SWFs such as 
Abu Dhabi’s ADIA and Norway’s GPFG are by-products of prudent natural resource 
revenue management frameworks and robust macroeconomic policies (Balding 
2012:6). In contrast, natural resource-rich economies in the developing world such as 
Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea rushed to create commodity-based SWFs before 
they had acquired the prerequisite conditions required to operationalise successful 
SWFs such as Abu Dhabi’s ADIA, and Norway’s GPFG (Matambo and Dixon 
2021:37). Resultantly, these countries established premature funds. They emulated 
the success of successful SWFs without taking into cognisance factors that underpin 
their success. 
Similarly, some natural resource-rich developing economies feel obliged to establish 
commodity-based SWFs when advised to do so by their development partners (i.e. 
the Bretton Woods’ institutions and United Nations agencies such as the United 
Nations Development Program). Development partners such as the Bretton Woods 
institutions provide technical support in deciding the type(s) of SWF(s) that 
policymakers in developing countries should deploy in relation to broader policy 
objectives and institutional capacity of the aid-recipient governments (Tafotie 2018:1).  
In 2003, the World Bank helped the Chadian government finance a 650-mile oil 
pipeline project that would enable the landlocked central African country transport oil 
from its interior to the Atlantic coast of Kribi in Cameroon (Keenan 2005:477). The 
World Bank backed the project in the hope of showing that Africa could use its natural 
resources to benefit the poor (Kojucharov 2007:477). As a condition for agreeing to 
finance the oil pipeline project, the World Bank asked the Chadian government to 
deposit 10% of its oil proceeds in an escrow fund (future generations fund) supervised 
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by the bank in London (World Bank 2006:v). The World Bank intended to invest the 
funds on behalf of Chad in areas such as education, health, and rural development 
(Winters and Gould 2011:229). However, within months of establishing the future 
generations’ fund, Chad’s parliament rescinded the fund and used its resources to 
finance military intervention to quell a rebel uprising (Zissis 2006:1). From the 
foregoing discussion it can be deduced that the Chadian government established a 
future generations’ fund because it felt obliged to the adopt recommendations of the 
World Bank. However, it did so without taking into cognisance factors that underpin 
the success of successful commodity-based SWFs (i.e. a prudent natural resource 
revenue management framework and robust macroeconomic policies) (Matambo and 
Dixon 2021:37). Consequently, Chad established a premature fund. 
In summary, from the foregoing discussion it can be deduced that two factors explain 
the rise of premature funds. Firstly, premature funds are created when governments 
emulate successful SWFs in developed countries without taking into cognisance the 
variables that underpin their success. Secondly, premature funds usually emerge 
when developing countries feel obliged to adopt the advice of development partners 
to establish commodity-based SWFs without taking into cognisance factors that 
underpin their success. The next section conceptualises the term “premature fund”. 
2.3  CONCEPTUALISING PREMATURE FUNDS 
Conceptual frameworks are products of the qualitative process of theorisation 
(Jabareen 2009:49). Conceptualisation is the process of developing clear, rigorous, 
systematic conceptual definitions for abstract ideas or concepts (Neuman 2014:205). 
The notion of “premature funds” has received little attention thus far in academic 
literature. Bauer and Mihalyi (2018:1) define “premature funds” as SWFs that are 
poorly designed and poorly attuned to a country’s macroeconomic context and 
development needs. However, literature does not go on to explain why some countries 
prematurely establish SWFs. This thesis develops the ‘premature fund’ argument by 
adding additional or complementary explanations from Chwieroth (2010:3), Clark and 
Monk (2010:1) and Dixon (2019:12).  
According to Chwieroth (2010:3), many countries (including those that do not possess 
the prerequisite conditions required to operationalise a successful SWF, i.e. prudent 
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natural resource revenue management frameworks and robust fiscal policies) have 
established or are considering establishing SWFs because of the need to conform to 
peer-group standards and/or to maintain or enhance pride, prestige, and status among 
their structural equivalents. For example, in 2019 Kenya proposed to establish a 
commodity-based SWF because natural resource-rich African countries such as 
Botswana have successfully done so (Bauer, Olan’g and Mihalyi 2019:1). However, 
despite possessing vast deposits of oil, gas, titanium, gold, coal, copper, niobium and 
manganese, the people of Kenya have not benefitted much from this abundant natural 
resource base. The country’s extractive industries are captured by state elites. In other 
words, Kenya cannot adequately capture and account for its resource rents (Scott 
2015:1). In short, the country’s proposed SWF is a premature fund. Kenya needs to 
adopt a prudent natural resource revenue management framework that enables it to 
adequately capture and account for its resource rents before it can operationalise a 
successful commodity-based SWF (Matambo and Dixon 20021:37).  
Similarly, Clark and Monk (2012:1) many SWFs have emerged in the developing world 
because possessing an SWF denotes “modernity through finance”. Andrew Bauer 
(quoted in World Finance 2019) argues that in some instances SWFs have become 
symbols of development and progress, instead of solutions to specific macroeconomic 
or budgetary problems. For example, three draft SWF bills that seek to manage 
Lebanon’s yet-to-be-found hydrocarbons have made their way to Lebanon’s 
parliament (Azhari 2017:1). Lebanese policymakers are toying with the idea of creating 
an SWF because possessing one opens access to exclusive industry associations and 
forums, which provide networking opportunities necessary for attracting foreign 
investment (Bauer 2017:9).  
Correspondingly, Dixon (2019:12) argues that some countries establish SWFs to 
entrench state control and widen their patronage turf. For example, Angola’s former 
president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos (1979-2017), appointed his son, Jose Filomeno 
dos Santos (at one point touted as his father’s successor), as the inaugural board 
chairperson of FSDEA in 2012 (Byee 2013:1). In turn, Jose Filomeno dos Santos 
appointed the asset management company, Quantum Global, of his life-long friend 
and business associate, Swiss-Angolan venture capitalist Jean-Claude Bastos de 
Morais, as the sole fund manager of FSDEA’s investments without going to tender 
(Jose Filomeno dos Santos was a director at an investment bank owned by Bostos 
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prior to his appointment to FSDEA) (Dos Santos 2018). Consequently, FSDEA 
invested hundreds of millions of dollars in projects that Bastos de Morais had interests 
in (Markowitz 2020:18). For example, FSDEA invested US$157 million in a planned 
five-star hotel in Luanda owned by Bastos de Morais (Emi 2019). Moreover, Bastos 
de Morais was paid the obscene sum of US$750 million for managing FSDEA – 
US$250 million more than was publicly stated (Dos Santos 2018). In 2019, the new 
Lourenco administration (2017-present) announced that it had recovered US$3 billion 
stolen from the FSDEA by Dos Santos and Bastos de Morais (Emi 2019). 
From the foregoing discussion it can be concluded that some natural resource-rich 
developing countries rushed to establish commodity-based SWFs to conform to peer 
group standards, look modern and sophisticated through finance and entrench state 
control. 
2.4  CONCLUSION 
The contribution of this chapter is that it presents the theoretical and conceptual issues 
that underpin the creation of premature funds. In an effort to ameliorate challenges 
associated with the natural resource curse many natural resource-rich developing 
economies are establishing commodity-based SWFs. However, most of these efforts 
are premature because a number of natural resource-rich developing countries cannot 
adequately capture and account for their resource rents. Some natural resource-rich 
developing countries are rushing to establish commodity-based SWFs because they 
inappropriately emulate successful SWFs such as Norway’s GPFG and Botswana’s 
Pula Fund. Other, natural resource-rich developing economies are rushing to establish 
commodity-based SWF because they feel obliged to adopt the recommendations of 
development partners to establish SWFs. Moreover, a number of natural resource-rich 
developing economies are rushing to establish commodity-based SWFs to look 
modern and sophisticated through finance and to entrench state control.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
ZIMBABWE’S SWF: A CASE OF A PREMATURE FUND 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter presented the theoretical and conceptual issues that underpin 
the creation of premature funds. This chapter applies the framework laid out in Chapter 
Two to the Zimbabwean context. Chapter Three sets the broad base. Subsequent 
chapters, (i.e. Chapter Four and Five) in their analysis of the Zimbabwe case, speak 
back to the discussion in Chapter Three about the broader political economy 
constraints. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 (a preface to Section 3.3) discusses 
the nature of Zimbabwe’s political economy. Section 3.3 explains how the government 
of Zimbabwe haphazardly established a commodity-based SWF to ameliorate 
challenges associated with the natural resource curse haunting the Zimbabwean 
economy such as political Dutch disease and economic mismanagement. The 
penultimate section discusses the factors behind the creation of a premature fund in 
Zimbabwe, and the last section concludes the chapter. 
3.2  ZIMBABWE’S POLITICAL ECONOMY 
This section explains how policy is made, who holds economic power and why. This 
background enables the reader to understand` the nature of Zimbabwe’s political 
economy before reading empirical findings in subsequent sections of the chapter and 
the thesis as a whole. Zimbabwe’s politically economic is basically characterised by 
two factors: a) an excessively powerful executive president and b) a state that is 
captured by a comprador securocrat bourgeoisie. The sub-sections below parse out 
the aforementioned characteristics of the political economy of the Zimbabwean state. 
3.2.1  An excessively powerful executive president 
The Lancaster Constitution of 1979 (Act Number 1 of 1979), adopted at the Lancaster 
House Peace talks in London in 1979, embraced the Westminster parliamentary 
governance system with a non-executive president as the head of state (largely a 
ceremonial figurehead like the Queen of England) and a prime minister as the head of 
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the government (with executive powers) (Makumbe and Compagnon 2000:33). 
However, the then prime minister, Robert Mugabe, did not like the limitations imposed 
by this British-style system of government. He preferred a strong presidency (Magaisa 
2018). In 1987, the then Minister of Justice, Harvard Law School-trained Eddison 
Zvobgo, who also harboured ambitions to one day succeed Mugabe, introduced the 
most substantial change in Zimbabwe’s governance system (Madhuku 1999:91). In 
one swoop, the parliamentary executive system of the Lancaster House Constitution 
of 1979 was metamorphosed into an obscure system with an all-powerful president 
who enjoyed the best of both the parliamentary executive system (the Westminster 
model) and the American-style executive presidency (Moyo 1992:30).  
Mandaza (2016:13) argues that the creation of an executive president resulted in the 
“big man” syndrome with the executive president as the epicentre and symbol of power 
in Zimbabwe. The executive presidency concentrates so much power in the hands of 
one person to the extent that he or she does not need either parliament or the ministers 
to run the country (Sithole and Makumbe 1997:135). Every decision has to be 
approved by the president personally: new bills to be gazetted, regulations, 
appointments in the civil service and parastatals (or state-owned enterprises), detailed 
policy guidelines, tender awards, and financial operations (Makumbe and Compagnon 
2000:34). During the process of adopting Zimbabwe’s current constitution in 2013, 
strenuous efforts were made by the main opposition party, the MDC, to reduce the 
president’s executive powers and to strengthen the parliament and to provide a 
balance. However, ZANU-PF resisted these reforms as it preferred a strong 
presidency and it prevailed (Magaisa 2018). 
3.2.2  State capture by a comprador securocrat bourgeoisie  
Armed with a Royal Charter granted by the Queen of England, Cecil John Rhodes and 
his British South Africa Company annexed Zimbabwe on behalf of the British empire 
in September 1890 (Mlambo 2014:30). The country attained independence on 18 April 
1980 after a protracted liberation struggle led by the Patriotic Front (a mass nationalist 
movement; i.e. the Zimbabwe African National Union [ZANU] and the Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union [ZAPU]) and its respective military wings, the Zimbabwe 
African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary 
Army (ZIPRA) (Munochiveyi 2011:66). Consequently, at independence, a civil-military 
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coalition that always placed its political survival and welfare above the broader 
development goals of the country captured the Zimbabwean state (Mandaza 2016:4). 
In other words, Zimbabwe’s liberators feel entitled to rule in perpetuity and seize the 
nation’s wealth as they see fit (Bratton and Masunungure 2011:iv).  
The conflation of interests between the government and the military made Zimbabwe 
a “securocractic state” (a country in which the security sector permeates all institutions 
of governance and the economy), with a head of state whose tenure is dependent on 
his utility in serving army interests. The extent of the president’s vulnerability was 
made clear by the events of November 2017 that led to the ouster of the Robert 
Mugabe (prime minister from 1980-1987 and executive president from 1987-2017) 
(Mills et al. 2019:184). The so-called G40 faction (younger generation who did not 
participate in the liberation struggle) in the ruling ZANU-PF led by Grace Mugabe 
(president Mugabe’s wife) and his nephew, Patrick Zhuwao; the then Minister of Local 
Government, Saviour Kasukuwere; and Mugabe’s chief propagandist, Jonathan 
Moyo, outmanoeuvred the so-called Lacoste faction led by the then vice president, 
Emmerson Mnangagwa (which consisted mainly of liberation cadres backed by the 
army) in a succession battle to take over from president Robert Mugabe (Asuelime 
2018:9).  
Then vice president Mnangagwa was fired from government on 6 November 2017 for 
allegedly being disloyal to president Mugabe (Ndlovhu 2018:1). The president’s wife, 
Grace Mugabe, was positioned to take over from Mnangagwa and ultimately Mugabe 
himself (De Freytas-Tamura 2017). On 13 November 2017, the then commander of 
the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), General Constatino Guvheya Nyikadzino 
Chiwenga, surrounded by over 100 senior military officials, declared that 
[t]he current purging which is clearly targeting members of the party with a 
liberation background must stop forthwith. The known counter revolutionary 
elements that have fomented the current instability in the party must be 
exposed and fished out. As the party goes for the extraordinary congress, 
members must go with equal opportunity to exercise their democratic rights 
(cited by Chigara 2018:3). 
President Mugabe was forced to resign (ZANU-PF had given him a 24-hour ultimatum 
to either resign or face impeachment) on 21 November 2017 to give way to the army’s 
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favoured successor, Emmerson Mnangagwa (Hellier and Murisa 2020:6-7). The 
events that led to former president Mugabe’s demise clearly illustrate how powerfully 
the army is involved in Zimbabwe’s politics and running of government business. 
The two pillars of Zimbabwe’s securocractic state are violence or the threat of it and/or 
patronage, which has become integral to endemic corruption and blatant looting of 
state resources (Mandaza 2016:7). Successive economic policies have been twisted 
to suit the sectional interests and corrupt practices of the top echelons of government 
(Compagnon 2011:196). For example, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
Indigenisation Policy and the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) became 
the slogan used by the political elite to legitimise shameless seizure of white-owned 
private property by the Zimbabwe government and the ruling elite at the expense of 
genuine African entrepreneurship (Mandaza 2016:9). In other words, while the 
indigenisation policies and programmes were not a problem in themselves (Zvoushe 
2019; Chilunjika and Uwizeyimana 2015:130), the fact that they were used to keep the 
ruling elite in power and to intensify capital accumulation by the state bourgeoisie was 
problematic (Compagnon 2011:202).  
In the aftermath of ZANU-PF’s electoral defeat to the nascent Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) in the February 2000 referendum, Zimbabwe’s military 
Joint Operations Command (JOC), which comprises the commander of the ZDF (the 
national army and the air force combined), the heads of the air force, the national army, 
police, and prisons and intelligence services usurped cabinet’s policymaking powers 
to enrich themselves and their political comrades (Tendi 2013:829). In other words, 
since the turn of the millennium, the JOC has been the supreme decision-making body 
in all government and state-owned institutions in Zimbabwe. It is not accountable to 
parliament or cabinet (Moyo 2019:57).  
In October 2008, in the midst of world’s worst economic crisis, characterised by 
hyperinflation in the fiscal cliff zone of 231 million percent, the army seized the 
Marange diamond field (one of the largest diamond fields in the world) (Compagnon 
2011:222). The army takeover seems to have been aimed at allowing key army units 
access to the country’s riches during difficult times (Human Rights Watch 2009a:1). 
Members of Parliament’s Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mines were granted 
access to Marange once in 2012, but they were denied access to the production 
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statistics (Maguwu 2013:76). However, the presidium, senior ZANU-PF officials, 
military personnel, as well as friendly diplomatic missions have unfettered access to 
Marange (Maguwu 2013:76). According to Towriss (2013:100),  
it has become increasingly apparent that the chief beneficiaries (of Zimbabwe’s 
mining activities) are serving and retired members of the Zimbabwean National 
Army (ZNA), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), the Air Force of Zimbabwe 
(AFZ) and the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). With the consent and 
assistance of a number of ZANU-PF politicians, individuals within these security 
agencies have profited from a significant proportion of the country’s most 
valuable diamond fields.  
Zimbabwe’s ‘securocrat’ political economy discussed above suggests that the country 
is natural resource cursed (i.e. the economy is mismanaged and plagued by political 
Dutch disease). The next section explains how Zimbabwean policymakers 
haphazardly established a commodity-based SWF to ameliorate the aforementioned 
challenges associated with the natural resource curse. 
3.3  ZIMBABWE’S SWF HAPHAZARDLY CREATED AS A PANCEA TO THE 
NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE 
Zimbabwe is endowed with an abundant natural resource base. It hosts more than 60 
minerals including: one of the world’s largest diamond deposits, the largest deposit of 
metallurgical quality chromite, the bulkiest known reserves of asbestos of high quality, 
and the second largest platinum reserves (Mlambo 2018:13). However, despite 
possessing the aforementioned abundant natural resource base the majority of the 
country’s people have not benefitted much from it because Zimbabwe’s extractive 
industries are captured by a securocrat comprador bourgeoisie that feels entitled to 
rule and loot the country’s resources in perpetuity (Maguwu 2013:74). During his 92nd 
birthday interview Zimbabwe’s late former president Robert Mugabe acknowledged 
that 
We [the government of Zimbabwe] have been not been receiving much from 
the diamond industry at all. Not much by way of earnings. I do not think we have 
exceeded US$2 billion or so, yet we think that US$15 billion or more has been 
earned in that area. So where are our carats going, the gems? There’s been 
50 
quite a lot of secrecy in handling them. And we have been blinded ourselves, 
that means our people whom we expected to be our eyes and ears have not 
been able to see or hear. A lot of swindling and smuggling has taken place and 
the companies that have been mining, virtually, l want to say robbed us of our 
wealth (BBC News 2016). 
Interviewee 1, an opposition member of parliament interviewed for the purposes of this 
study, corroborated the former president’s sentiments by arguing that  
“When diamond was discovered, we [Zimbabweans] thought everything was 
going to be awesome. We thought life was going to be better. What we hoped 
for was that the money which was going to come from the diamonds was going 
to benefit the citizens. We expected to see Zimbabwe growing. We hoped to 
develop our system of life. That is the creation of jobs, better schools, better 
healthcare, better roads, and the likes. Unfortunately, senior military officials 
have dampened that dream. They are heavily involved in the mining activities 
in Marange. There’s a military official everywhere. They openly tell us that 
‘guys, when we are here we mean business. That’s where our money is coming 
from and it’s our reward from the government’. Right from the beginning there 
was no transparency and accountability from the mining company to the 
citizens. We do not know what they are doing, what are their profits and what 
are they getting. No one knows. The government has damned us. All our hopes 
have been shattered. I feel angry because our land is being mined without us 
benefitting anything”. 
Similarly, Interviewee 6, an academic specialist and leading mineral economist 
interviewed for the purposes of this study, argued that 
“[w]ith the potential to generate billions of dollars, the Marange diamond fields 
brought hope and the possibility of change to a nation on the brink of collapse 
[Zimbabwe’s economy was navigating through dire fiscal straits with the highest 
inflation in world history when diamonds were discovered in 2006]. [However,] 
what happened was totally the opposite. The diamonds that held so much 
promise have only brought violence and loss. Backed by security forces, 
government took over the diamond fields. Illicit multi-billion diamond trade in 
Marange has been used to fuel Zimbabwe’s oppressive state security forces 
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whilst 72% of Zimbabweans live on less than US$1.25 a day [absolute poverty]. 
Current and former security forces are at the centre of Zimbabwe’s diamond 
industry. The fact that Robert Mhlanga, an ex-chief of Staff Operations: Air 
Force of Zimbabwe, is chief executive officer of Mbada Diamond Limited [one 
of Zimbabwe’s lead diamond companies] says a lot about who controls 
Zimbabwe’s diamond industry”.  
Moreover, contrary to the modified Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH), which 
emphasises the need to invest a portion of a country’s natural resource revenue in 
other forms of capital such as physical and human capital (Lange and Wright 
2004:485), the government of Zimbabwe spends almost all of its revenue (80%) on 
recurrent expenditure (Jourdan et al. 2012:39). In other words, state elites are 
mismanaging Zimbabwe’s economy. Interviewee 6, an academic specialist and 
leading mineral economist interviewed for the purposes of this study, argued that 
“[t]he state heavily relies on the mining sector to fund government consumption 
or recurrent expenditure, which has left little for capital development within the 
mining sector and outside the mining sector. Government has a mining 
production arm called the Zimbabwe Mining Development Company, which is 
interested in exploration but we [Zimbabwe] do not have the amount of capital 
required for such ventures. Instead of re-investing into the mining sector, the 
money goes towards consumption. We have a huge wage bill that takes over 
80% of the national budget, so that’s where the money is going. Consequently, 
government has not been able to build any reserves or savings over time. We 
[Zimbabwe] are producing gold and all these other commodities but the RBZ 
does not have reserves. The RBZ governor only has four weeks import cover, 
which is not healthy for any country. Moreover, Zimbabwe does not use natural 
capital accounting. It is not able to account for the depletion of its natural 
resources. The country is not able to plan for a time when we will not have 
natural resources. We might end up in a crisis where those resources on which 
we heavily depend suddenly become non-existent”.   
In principle, the government of Zimbabwe established a commodity-based SWF to 
ameliorate natural resource curse challenges haunting the Zimbabwean economy (i.e. 
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political Dutch disease and economic mismanagement) (Parliament of Zimbabwe 
2014:8). Matambo and Dixon (2021:37) argue that: 
[w]hile there can be benefits to establishing an SWF, it is important to stress 
that successful SWFs such as Botswana’s Pula Fund are by-products of 
prudent resource revenue management frameworks and robust 
macroeconomic policies. An SWF only makes sense in countries that have 
robust mechanisms for capturing and accounting for resource rents, and a 
budgetary framework that channels those rents to broad-based and inclusive 
social and economic development. The benefit of an SWF is that it can provide 
financial stability over time by taking in more resource rents than can be feasibly 
absorbed by the domestic economy during peaks in the commodity-price cycle, 
as well as by releasing cash to the government during economic downturns or 
shocks in order to mitigate the worst effects and retain existing development 
gains. 
The IMF (2014a:18) advised the government of Zimbabwe to re-examine the fiscal 
regime of its extractive industries before launching a commodity-based SWF because 
the country cannot adequately capture and account for its resource rents. However, 
the government of Zimbabwe rushed to establish a commodity-based SWF without 
taking heed of the IMF’s (2014a:18) advice. Consequently, the government of 
Zimbabwe established a premature fund. In other words, policymakers put the cart 
before the horse. Government needs to adopt a prudent natural resource revenue 
management framework and robust macroeconomic policies before the country can 
operationalise a successful commodity-based such as Botswana’s Pula Fund 
(Matambo and Dixon 2021:37). This raises the question: why did the government of 
Zimbabwe rush to establish a commodity-based SWF before it had acquired the 
prerequisite conditions required to operationalise a successful SWF (i.e. prudent 
natural resource revenue management framework and robust macroeconomic 
policies)? The following section explains the factors behind the creation of Zimbabwe’s 
premature fund. 
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3.4  FACTORS BEHIND THE CREATION OF A PREMATURE FUND IN 
ZIMBABWE 
This section explains why the government of Zimbabwe rushed to establish a 
commodity-based SWF before it had acquired the prerequisite conditions required to 
operationalise a successful SWF. The factors discussed in the following sections 
include (a) inappropriate policy transfer, the need to look modern through finance, and 
the fear of being the “odd one out”, (b) obligated policy transfer, and (c) the need to 
reinforce state control. 
3.4.1  Inappropriate policy transfer, the need to look modern through finance, 
and the fear of being the “odd one out”  
Inappropriate policy transfer, the need to look modern and sophisticated through 
finance, and the fear of being the odd one out are some of the factors that explain the 
creation of a premature fund in Zimbabwe. During his second reading of Zimbabwe’s 
SWF Bill (H.B. 6A, 2013), the then Deputy Minister of Finance and Economic 
Development, Samuel Udenge, alluded to the fact that the idea to establish an SWF 
in Zimbabwe is the outcome of extensive research on the experiences of countries 
that have successfully established SWFs. The many countries from which Zimbabwe 
was taking lessons for establishing and managing a successful SWF cited by the 
Deputy Minister included Norway, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Botswana, 
Nigeria, Singapore, Algeria, and Malaysia, among others (Parliament of Zimbabwe 
2014:12). Therefore, according to the former Deputy Minister of Finance and 
Economic Development, “Zimbabwe is not treading on virgin territory, it is not 
reinventing the wheel” (Parliament of Zimbabwe 2014:12) because there were many 
examples of countries with successful and relatively successful SWFs. Samuel 
Udenge was not the only one to support the idea of establishing Zimbabwe’s SWF 
based on the lessons learnt from other countries that possess SWFs. 
In a debate after the second reading of Zimbabwe’s SWF Bill, Senator Mumvuri, a 
member of the ruling ZANU-PF, argued that 
[t]he Sovereign Wealth Fund seems to be the in thing and a must for every 
nation now. He (the minister) has given us a list of those successful wealth 
funds. At a ZIM-ASSET [Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic 
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Transformation] workshop earlier this year, we had the opportunity to listen to 
the Norwegians giving testimony to the success of their wealth fund which have 
greatly developed their country. Therefore, Zimbabwe cannot be left out, let us 
try it despite the misgivings which my colleague has explained (Parliament of 
Zimbabwe 2014:12).  
Concomitantly, Interviewee 5 (a former ZANU-PF minister), who was interviewed by 
the researcher during the process of this research, argued that  
“President Mugabe was inspired by the way Norway managed its resources. 
He actually went to the extent of inviting Norway to come and assist us in setting 
up an SWF”.  
Correspondingly, Interviewee 3, an expert administrator interviewed for the purposes 
of this study, argued that he supported the establishment of the SWF because, as he 
put it: 
“Singapore’s Temasek Holdings, valued at US$275 billion in a country with a 
population of about five million people, is the envy of many. There are no 
minerals or strategic assets as those possessed by Zimbabwe in Singapore but 
in their wisdom the people of Singapore are earning a lot of non-tax 
contributions from all over the world through dividends from their holdings 
company. The Chinese government copied what the people of Singapore did 
in 2007. CIC is also making a significant contribution to China’s fiscus. Why 
should Zimbabwe be left out from earning money for its people through strategic 
investments?”  
The records in the office of Zimbabwe’s parliament show that the Parliament of 
Zimbabwe sent a delegation led by the Speaker of Parliament to Kuwait to gain an in-
depth understanding of the KIA’s operations in 2016. In its feedback report, the 
delegation recommended that the government of Zimbabwe “should learn from 
Kuwait’s experience because Zimbabwe also has abundant mineral deposits” 
(Parliament of Zimbabwe 2016:24).  
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However, Interviewee 1, an opposition member of parliament, argued that  
“Zimbabwe’s SWF only exists on paper because the ZANU-PF government 
admired successful SWFs such as the KIA without taking into consideration its 
own macroeconomic circumstances.”   
Correspondingly, in a debate after the second reading of Zimbabwe’s SWF Bill, 
Senator Marava (an opposition MDC legislator) argued: 
If we can talk of 73 Sovereign Wealth Funds in the whole world to date and 
Zimbabwe’s economy being what it looks like; the income per capita in 
Zimbabwe, if I am not wrong is around a dollar per head. That is not welcome. 
We should at least, right now be learning from our friends who are running these 
funds; second people who really do some investigations and research and then 
come out with a proper position that we do not make another mistake, like the 
National Social Security Authority (NSSA) and so forth (Parliament of 
Zimbabwe 2014:12).  
From the foregoing discussion it can be deduced that the government of Zimbabwe 
rushed to create a commodity-based SWF without sound macroeconomic justification 
to do so because a number of natural resource-rich countries have done so. In other 
words, the government of Zimbabwe created an SWF to conform to peer-group 
standards and to maintain or enhance pride, prestige, and status among its structural 
equivalents. The next subsection explains the absence of symmetry of intent (national 
convergence) as another reason behind the creation of a premature fund in Zimbabwe. 
3.4.2  Obligated policy transfer 
Between 2000 and 2008, Zimbabwe experienced its worst political, humanitarian, and 
economic crisis, characterised by allegations of electoral fraud, food shortages, and 
hyperinflation, which reached the fiscal cliff zone of 231 million percent by July 2008 
(Gono 2008:78). The late Morgan Richard Tsvangirai, founding president of 
Zimbabwe’s main opposition political party, the MDC, garnered 47.9% of the popular 
vote against President Mugabe’s 43.2% in the 2008 presidential election (Mokhawa 
2009:26). However, Tsvangirai failed to garner a clear majority (i.e. 50% plus one vote) 
that is required by Zimbabwean electoral law for one to form a government (Coltart 
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2016:474). As a result, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission had to call for a second 
round of elections to determine the ultimate winner (Mokhawa 2009:26). In the run-up 
to the June 2008 presidential run-off, ZANU-PF, in conjunction with the military (the 
stockholders of power in Zimbabwe), embarked on “Operation Mavhotera Papi’” 
(Operation Where Did You Vote) (Masunungure 2011:56). The run-up to the 27 June 
2008 presidential run-off was characterised by massive voter intimidation and the 
death of over 200 opposition activists (Masunungure 2011:54). Morgan Tsvangirai 
pulled out of the elections, but the elections went ahead with his name on the ballot 
paper. President Mugabe won 85% of the vote in the one-man race (Coltart 2016:475). 
By the end of 2008, Zimbabwe had become a burden to its neighbours, particularly 
Botswana and South Africa, because many of its nationals fled the country in pursuit 
of greener pastures in neighbouring countries (Coltart 2016:475). Consequently, the 
Southern African Development Community and the African Union decided to intervene 
to stop the escalation of the Zimbabwean crisis (Coltart 2016:475). Then South African 
president, Thabo Mbeki, was appointed as the mediator between Mugabe and 
Tsvangirai. Mbeki’s intervention culminated in the signing of the Global Political 
Agreement (power sharing agreement) in September 2008 and the formation of a 
Government of National Unity in February 2009 (Mills et al. 2019:186). 
At the inception of the inclusive government in February 2009, the Harare office of the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) one of Zimbabwe’s biggest 
development partners developed a working paper series summarily titled 
Comprehensive Recovery in Zimbabwe to help Zimbabwe out of the rubble of its 
decade-long economic crisis (Biti 2014:8). The working paper series included a paper 
developed by leading Zimbabwean economist Professor Tony Hawkins, titled The 
Mining Sector in Zimbabwe and its Potential Contribution to Economic Recovery. 
Hawkins (2009:47) argued that “with estimated mineral export earnings of 
US$860 million in 2008 – 40 percent of all foreign earnings and more than half of 
merchandise export revenue there is a prima facie case for creating an SWF in 
Zimbabwe”. Hawkins’ (2009:47) argument was premised on the idea that resource 
depletion considerations should be at the heart of the taxation regime of Zimbabwe’s 
mining industry. In other words, Zimbabwe’s natural resources will not last forever and 
the country therefore needs to find ways to sustainably manage its natural resource 
revenue. To that end, some percentage of mineral taxation should be set aside in an 
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SWF, whose managers should be tasked with ensuring that revenues are invested in 
the domestic economy rather than used to finance general government consumption 
spending.  
Hawkins’ (2009:47) recommendation was a noble idea because it sought to promote 
sustainable natural resource revenue management and development. However, 
contrary to the IMF’s (2014a:18) advice (i.e. postponing the launch of the SWF until 
Zimbabwe had re-examined the fiscal regime of its extractive industries), Zimbabwean 
policymakers rushed to establish a commodity-based SWF because they felt obliged 
to adopt the recommendations of one of the country’s biggest development partners 
(i.e. the UNDP).  
3.4.3  Reinforcing state control 
As Tangri (1999:5-10) argues, patronage politics has frequently prevented the 
effective establishment and operation of state-run enterprises (such as SWFs) in 
Africa. In their quest to secure political incumbency, state elites dispense government-
controlled resources and jobs to political allies, relatives, and friends. Interviewee 1, 
an opposition member of parliament interviewed for the purposes of this study, argued 
that  
“the appointment of parastatal heads [in Zimbabwe] is not done through 
parliament as it should be. It is done by a cabinet minister with the approval of 
the president. The country just wakes up to the news that this person is now a 
director of an institution called an SWF. The individuals appointed are not 
subjected to a public interview. There is no justification why those individuals 
were hired”.  
Interviewee 1’s sentiments reveal that appointees to Zimbabwe’s SWF board are 
political appointees who serve at the pleasure of the president. 
Sections 3(2) and 6(1) of Zimbabwe’s SWF Act vest the ownerships of Zimbabwe’s 
SWF in the Republic of Zimbabwe, with the president as the trustee. Moreover, it 
empowers the Minister of Finance to appoint the CEO, board chairperson, and board 
members of Zimbabwe’s SWF with the approval of the president. The appointment of 
Kombo Moyana, former president Robert Mugabe’s ally (Bond 1998:201), as board 
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chairperson of Zimbabwe’s SWF (Chigumira et al. 2016:2) suggests that the SWF was 
created to widen the ruling elite’s patronage turf. Moyana was appointed as the first 
black governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) in 1983 (Bond 1998:201). He 
used intimidation and fear in Zimbabwe’s financial sector during his tenure (1983-
1993) to advance Mugabe’s interests (i.e. consolidation of power through policies such 
as indigenisation, economic empowerment, and black affirmative action) (Bond 
1998:201). His appointment as chairperson of Zimbabwe’s SWF board in 2015 was 
thus widely seen as a retirement package for his loyalty to former president Mugabe 
(Chigumira et al. 2016:2). 
Concomitantly, Interviewee 7, an academic specialist interviewed for the purposes of 
this study, argued that  
“Mugabe appointed [Kombo] Moyana as chairman of the country’s SWF 
because of his close links to then president [Mugabe] and affiliation to the party 
[ZANU-PF]”.  
Moreover, Interviewee 1, an opposition member of parliament interviewed for the 
purposes of this study, argued that  
“Kombo Moyana was appointed board chairman of Zimbabwe’s SWF because 
parastatals [such as Zimbabwe’s SWF] are retirement homes for retired regime 
intellects and members of the ruling party not appointed to cabinet [such as 
Moyana]”.  
Moreover, section 11 of Zimbabwe’s SWF Act stipulates that the Minister of Finance, 
in consultation with the president, may give policy direction to the board in “national 
interest”. In other words, the political authority (the president and minister) can override 
the investment decision-making authority of the board (the experts). Consequently, 
Zimbabwe’s SWF may be used to finance pet projects affiliated to the ruling elite. 
During a debate after the second reading of Zimbabwe’s SWF Bill, Senator Chitaka 
(an opposition legislator) lamented that “though the idea of establishing an SWF is 
noble, the country is running the risk of creating a feeding trophy for the ruling elite like 
the NSSA” (Parliament of Zimbabwe 2014:12). Zimbabwe’s government-owned 
pension fund, the NSSA, is notorious for bailing out banks owned by the ruling elite 
without returns to the government. For example, Binder Dijker Otte’s (2019:47) 
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forensic report on behalf of the Auditor-General revealed that the NSSA, under the 
instruction of the then Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, Priscilla 
Mupfumira, lent Metbank (a bank affiliated to Zimbabwe’s ruling elite) US$62 million 
despite its history of defaulting on loans from the pension fund.  
The appointment of Kombo Moyana, a Mugabe loyalist, as the inaugural board 
chairperson of Zimbabwe’s SWF suggests that Zimbabwe’s SWF was created to 
widen the ruling elite’s patronage turf. Moreover, the fact that the political authority 
(president and minister) can give policy direction to the board suggests that 
Zimbabwe’s SWF might be used to finance pet projects affiliated to state elites instead 
of investing in economically viable projects.  
3.5  CONCLUSION 
The contribution of this chapter is that it explains why Zimbabwe’s SWF is a premature 
fund. It sets the base for subsequent chapters. Chapter Four and Five speak back to 
the political economy constraints discussed in this chapter. Zimbabwe’s ‘securocrat’ 
political economy suggests that the country is natural resource cursed. In principle, 
the government of Zimbabwe established a commodity-SWF to ameliorate challenges 
associated with the natural resource curse (i.e. Dutch disease and economic 
mismanagement). However, contrary to the advice of the IMF (i.e. postponing the 
launch of the SWF until government had re-examined the fiscal regime of its extractive 
industries), the government of Zimbabwe rushed to establish a commodity-based SWF 
before it had acquired the prerequisite conditions required to operationalise a 
successful SWF (i.e. prudent natural resource revenue management framework and 
robust macroeconomic policies). Thus, Zimbabwean policymakers established a 
premature fund. The chapter argued that the government of Zimbabwe rushed to 
establish a commodity-based SWF before it had acquired the prerequisite conditions 
required to operationalise a commodity-based SWF because it inappropriately 
emulated successful SWFs in other countries. Moreover, it did so to look modern and 
sophisticated through finance. In addition, it feared being the odd one out among its 
structural equivalents (a number of natural resource-rich economies possess 
commodity-based SWFs). Furthermore, the government of Zimbabwe rushed to 
establish an SWF because senior government officials believe the country’s 
macroeconomic circumstances justify the creation of one. However, opposition 
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politicians and facts on the ground dispute this claim. The chapter also argued that the 
government of Zimbabwe felt obliged to establish an SWF because it came as a 
recommendation from the UNDP (one of Zimbabwe’s biggest development partners). 
Lastly, the chapter argued that Zimbabwe’s SWF was created to widen the ruling 
elite’s patronage turf.  
The next chapter discusses key natural resource revenue management principles and 




NATURAL RESOURCE REVENUE MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter discussed the political economy variables that impede the 
operationalisation of Zimbabwe’s SWF. This chapter examines natural resource 
revenue management principles and practices in the developing world.  
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 unpacks fiscal frameworks suitable 
for natural resource-rich developing economies; thereafter, the chapter explains how 
fiscal frameworks in the developing world are operationalised; Section 4.4 
contextualises the discussion by examining natural resource revenue management 
practices in Chile and Botswana; Section 4.5 discusses lessons learnt from the case 
studies discussed; Section 4.6 examines the case of Zimbabwe and the final section 
concludes the chapter. 
4.2 FISCAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPING RESOURCE-RICH 
ECONOMIES 
The ability to transform non-renewable natural capital (sub-oil assets) into other forms 
of productive capital (physical, human, foreign, social, and financial capital) (CABRI 
2016:1) is key to achieving sustainable growth and development in natural resource-
rich developing economies (Lange and Wright 2004:485). Transforming non-
renewable natural capital into other forms of productive capital diversifies the economy 
(increases sources of income and reduces dependence on volatile natural resource 
revenues) (Hadri 2011:127) and increases or at least preserves the country’s overall 
asset base for the benefit of future and present generations (AfDB 2016:11). 
The Hartwick-Solow rule, also known as the sustainability theory or PIH, posits that 
the depletion of natural capital should be offset by investing in other forms of capital 
capable of generating as much benefit as the natural capital they replace (physical, 
human, foreign, social, and financial capital) (Lange and Wright 2004:485). However, 
although the Hartwick rule is a useful rule of thumb, it is not ideal for developing 
countries (Hamilton and Ley 2011:131). Natural resource-rich developing economies 
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are underdeveloped, and capital or credit constrained (Baunsgaard et al. 2012:5). 
There is thus a trade-off between spending more now versus saving for future 
generations (Gelb 2011:60). 
Collier, Van der Ploeg and Venables (2008) and Collier (2012) (both cited by the AfDB 
2016:12) modified the PIH by arguing that an optimal savings or investment path for 
developing economies would be devoting a portion of resource revenues to 
consumption, especially in the early years of exploitation of mineral resources, 
although savings and investments should approach 100% of resource revenue as the 
resources approach depletion (Sharma and Strauss 2013:8). 
According to Ekeli and Sy (2011:114), the lifespan of natural resource revenue 
determines the exact savings/investment/consumption path of natural resource-rich 
developing economies. Natural resource revenues are considered to be long-term if 
they exist for more than a generation (30 to 35 years) (Baunsgaard et al. 2012:5). 
Natural resource-rich developing countries that possess temporary resource 
revenues, such as Ghana and Uganda, should invest most of their resource revenues 
domestically (Gylfason 2011:10). Investing in the domestic economy (human and 
physical capital) helps such economies to move from being primary-based economies 
to high-tech manufacturers such as Finland and Korea before the natural resources 
are exhausted (Gelb 2011:66). 
On the other hand, natural resource-rich developing economies that possess long-
term natural resource revenues such as Botswana should invest domestically while 
maintaining macroeconomic stability (Baunsgaard et al. 2012:5). However, the 
economy might not be able to quickly and productively utilise the domestic investment. 
This provides reasonable grounds for governments to save revenue until it can be 
utilised productively and effectively, as is usually done by Botswana (Kojo 2010:9). 
The next section discusses special fiscal rules and institutions that ensure fiscal 
sustainability in natural resource-rich developing economies. 
4.3  SPECIAL FISCAL RULES AND INSTITUTIONS TO ENSURE FISCAL 
SUSTAINABILITY 
Measures to ensure fiscal sustainability (natural resource revenue usage that benefits 
present and future generations) are operationalised through the adoption of fiscal 
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rules, fiscal advisory councils, and commodity-based SWFs (Hamilton and Ley 
2011:137), as discussed below. 
4.3.1  Fiscal rules  
Fiscal rules are statutory or non-statutory commitments that bind successive 
governments to long-term fiscal discipline and fiscal sustainability by imposing multi-
year constraints on overall government expenditure (Ray, Velasquez and Islam 
2015:1). Fiscal rules either place a quantitative constraint on fiscal policy (numerical 
rules) or stipulate the procedure by which fiscal decisions are made (procedural fiscal 
rules) (Sharma and Strauss 2013:9). There are four types of fiscal rules that can be 
used to ensure the fiscal sustainability of developing resource-endowed countries. 
These are budget balance rules, debt rules, expenditure rules, and revenue rules (Ray 
et al. 2015:2; Bauer 2014:4). Fiscal rules are country specific. The choice of fiscal rules 
depends on a country’s development needs, institutional capacity, and exposure to 
external shocks (Sharma and Strauss 2013:9). Table 4.1 identifies the types of fiscal 
rules that exist in the literature, describes them, identifies specific examples, and 
explains how each example works. 
Table 4.1: Types of fiscal rules 
Type of rule Description Example Explanation of example 
Budget 
balance rule 
Commits government to a 
balance over the budget 
cycle (Ray et al. 2015:2). In 
other words, places a limit 
on overall, primary, or 
current budget balances in 





Structural surplus of 1% of GDP 
with an escape clause. What 
constitutes a “structural balance” 
is informed by a 10-year forecast 
of copper and molybdenum 




Structural deficit cannot exceed 
2% percent of GDP. 
Norway (political      
commitment) 
Non-oil structural deficit of the 
central government cannot 
exceed 4%, which is the expected 
long-run real return on SWF 
investments. The fiscal guidelines 
allow temporary deviations from 
the rule under specific 
circumstances. 
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Type of rule Description Example Explanation of example 
Debt rule Details the size of the debt 
that can be acquired, and/or 
the maximum proportion of 
the budget that can be 
allocated to debt servicing 
(Ray et al. 2015:2). In other 
words, places a limit on 
public debt as a percentage 





Total central and local 
government debt should not 
exceed 60% of GDP. 
Mongolia 
(statutory rule) 




Imposes limits on how much 
can be spent during the 
budget cycle (Ray et al. 
2015:2; Bauer 2014:4).  
Botswana 
(statutory rule) 
Ceiling on the expenditure-to-
GDP ratio of 40%. 
Mongolia 
(statutory rule)  
Expenditure growth limited to non-
mineral GDP growth. 
Peru (statutory 
rule) 
Real growth current expenditure 
ceiling of 4%. Exceptions made if 
congress declares an emergency. 
Revenue 
rule 
Imposes restrictions or a 
ceiling on how overall or 
natural resource revenue 
can be spent (Ray et al. 




50-75% of oil revenues minus 
income tax and property tax 
enters the budget; the rest is 
saved in the Alaska Permanent 
Fund, which saves some 
revenues and disburses the rest 




Mineral revenues may only be 
used for public investment or 
saved in the Pula Fund. 
Ghana (statutory 
rule)  
Maximum 70% of seven-year 
average of petroleum revenue 
enters the budget. Maximum 21% 
is allocated to the Stabilisation 
Fund. Minimum 9% is allocated to 
the Heritage Fund for future 
generations. Percentages subject 




US$8 billion plus/minus 15% 
(depending on economic growth) 
of petroleum revenue is 
transferred from the National 
Fund to the budget annually. 
East Timor 
(statutory rule)  
Revenue entering the budget from 
the Petroleum Fund cannot 
exceed 3% of national petroleum 
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Type of rule Description Example Explanation of example 
wealth. Exceptions are made if the 
government provides a detailed 




Maximum 40% of excess oil and 
gas revenue above estimated 
revenue is used to finance the 
budget; the rest goes into the 
Heritage and Stabilisation funds. 
An 11-year revenue average is 
used for budget estimates. 
Source: Adapted from Ray et al. (2015:2); Bauer (2014:4). 
4.3.1.1  Criticisms of fiscal rules imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions 
From the above discussion, it can be argued that having a fiscal rule is important for 
the sustainable management of natural resource revenue. However, the Bretton 
Woods institutions often impose fiscal rules on governments in the developing world 
as conditions for loans advanced to them (Ray et al. 2015:4). These rules have been 
criticised for being too rigid (Sharma and Strauss 2013:9), too mechanical (Gylfason 
2011:14), arbitrary, and non-contingent on the economic situation of developing 
countries (uncritically replicating those in place in the developed world) (Ray et al. 
2015:4). For example, the IMF imposed a 70% of GDP debt limit on Chad as a 
condition to advance a loan to the Chadian government (Mihalyi and Fernandez 
2018:38). However, Chad often exceeds the aforementioned fiscal rule (Sharma and 
Strauss 2013:9).  
Ray et al. (2015:4) argue that fiscal rules do not necessarily need to be enacted into 
law because there are countries such as Botswana that have a record of self-imposed 
fiscal discipline. In other words, fiscal discipline is in a better position to exist if it is a 
principled political commitment on the part of the parliament and the executive 
because a government can choose to ignore the dictates of its own statutes when 
circumstances force it to (Hagemann 2011:80).  
From the foregoing discussion it can be deduced that fiscal rules can be used to instil 
a culture of fiscal discipline and fiscal sustainability in natural resource-rich developing 
economies. However, governments need to have the political will to implement the 
dictates of their own fiscal rules. In other words, political commitment to fiscal discipline 
66 
and fiscal sustainability is more important than enacting fiscal management laws 
because governments that are not committed tend to bypass, eliminate, or change 
fiscal rules when they feel like doing so. The next subsection discusses independent 
fiscal advisory councils. 
4.3.2  Fiscal advisory councils 
Fiscal advisory councils, also known as fiscal “watchdogs” (Calmfors and Wren-Lewis 
2011:651), independent fiscal institutions, or independent parliamentary budget 
offices (Von Trapp and Wehner 2016:11), are publicly funded independent entities that 
help limit the potential bias of governments’ revenue projections (governments often 
make optimistic revenue projections that lead to unrealistically high demands on the 
fiscus that cause high budget deficits and damage the stability of public finances) 
(Zigman and Jergovic 2017:15) through evaluating or assessing a country’s revenue 
forecasts (IMF 2013:1). Fiscal advisory councils also monitor governments’ 
commitment to sustainable natural resource revenue management (oversee the 
implementation of fiscal rules) (Zigman and Jergovic 2017:15). 
Natural resource-rich developing economies such as Chile, Ghana, and East Timor 
created fiscal advisory councils to assure the electorate (through the media and public 
debate) that their governments are committed to fiscal discipline and the prudent 
management of natural resource revenues (Sharma and Strauss 2013:9). Public 
scrutiny of fiscal policy raises the cost of fiscal indiscipline and contains governments’ 
desire to spend unnecessarily (IMF 2013:15). However, when there is no commitment 
to fiscal discipline, there is no assurance that fiscal advisory councils will work because 
politicians can choose to ignore them (Hagemann 2011:2). Moreover, captured fiscal 
councils can be used to promote a particular form of fiscal policy that benefits the rich 
at the expense of everyone else (Sharma and Strauss 2013:15). 
From the foregoing discussion it can be deduced that fiscal advisory councils are 
useful institutions that can be used to promote fiscal sustainability and fiscal discipline 
in natural resource-rich developing economies. However, fiscal councils can only be 
successful if there is political commitment to fiscal discipline. Moreover, fiscal councils 
need to be free from state capture for them to operate effectively. The next subsection 
discusses commodity-based SWFs. 
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4.3.3  Policy framework for establishing commodity-based SWFs in the 
developing world 
Dixon and Monk (2011a:8) developed an SWF deployment policy framework, also 
known as the SWF cascade, which suggests that natural resource-rich developing 
countries, particularly those on the African continent, can benefit from gradually setting 
up three separate SWFs over time: a stabilisation fund, a development fund, and a 
savings fund. Dixon and Monk (2011a:8) argue that natural resource-rich developing 
economies should first deploy stabilisation funds to smoothen the commodity cycle 
(booms and busts associated with commodity price volatility) because commodity 
price volatility makes budget planning unpredictable (Markowitz 2020:6).  
Once a stabilisation fund acquires sufficient reserves to stabilise the economy and 
insulate the budget in the event of an external shock, policymakers can go on to create 
a development fund. When the development fund meets the developing country’s 
development needs, policymakers may consider establishing an intergenerational 
savings fund that shares wealth across generations (Dixon and Monk 2011a:9). Wills 
et al. (2016:3) argue that while long-term saving funds may be appropriate for mature 
and developed economies such as Norway, they are inappropriate for capital-starved 
developing economies in Africa. Developed societies such as Norway are established, 
they have robust infrastructure, high income per capita, and low unemployment levels 
(Wills et al. 2016:3). Creating a savings fund in such a scenario is therefore justified. 
In contrast, Africa is in dire need of investment in the social needs of its people at 
every level (Chatham House 2014:5). African countries thus need to stabilise and 
develop their economies before they can think of saving for future generations. Figure 
4.1 summarises Dixon and Monk’s (2011a:8) SWF deployment policy framework. 
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Figure 4.1: SWFs in Africa: A policy framework 
 
Source: Dixon and Monk (2011a:8). 
4.4  CASE STUDIES OF NATURAL RESOURCE REVENUE MANAGEMENT IN 
THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
This section discusses natural resource revenue management practices in Chile and 
Botswana (i.e. the paragons of natural resource revenue management in Latin 
America and Africa respectively). 
4.4.1  Chile 
Chile, the world’s largest producer and exporter of copper, is the poster child of prudent 
natural resource revenue management in Latin America (Gregorio and Labbe 
2011:203). Moreover, Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perception Index 
ranks Chile the least corrupt country in Latin America (Transparency International 
2021:2). Because of sustained political commitment to prudent natural resource 
revenue management since the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet 
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(1973-1990), Chile’s GDP has tripled over the last four decades (Gylfason 2011:25), 
far outstripping its Latin American neighbours (Frankel 2010:173).  
The country’s average growth rate of 7.4% between 1984 and 1998 was equivalent to 
that of the “Asian Tigers” (the world’s fastest-growing economies towards the end of 
the 20th century and during the early 21st century, namely Taiwan, China, South Korea, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong) (Havro and Santiso 2008:14). Chile’s GDP per capita 
significantly increased from US$2 500 in 1990 (Del Valle 2019:1) to US$16 037 in 
2019 (Masigan 2019). Moreover, Chile is the first Latin American country to be 
inducted into the OECD (an elite group of high-income countries committed to 
democracy, free trade, and international cooperation) (Gurria 2010:1). In short, Chile 
is one of the few natural resource-rich developing countries that have managed to 
escape the natural resource curse (Fuentes 2009:5). 
However, the aforementioned numbers and achievements hide a fundament problem. 
They do not account for inequality (Del Valle 2019:1). Despite Chile’s success, it is 
one of the most unequal countries in the world (World Bank 2019:1). Towards the end 
of 2019, Chileans protested against billionaire president Sebastian Pinera’s failure to 
bridge the income gap (McGowan 2020). According to Del Valle (2019:1), 1% of 
Chile’s population owns 33% of the country’s wealth. Moreover, Chile’s 12 richest 
billionaires have fortunes equivalent to 25% of the country’s GDP. In short, Chile’s 
success story has largely benefitted only a few. 
Although Chile’s inequality challenges dent the country’s image as the poster child of 
prudent natural resource revenue management in the developing world, they cannot 
totally discredit the country’s remarkable economic achievements over the past four 
decades. Because of its solid fiscal policy (saving during commodity price booms and 
dissaving during commodity price busts or global economic downturns), Chile was one 
of the few countries that was able to put together a sizeable anti-crisis fiscal package 
(US$4 billion financed by its stabilisation fund) during the 2008-2009 global financial 
crisis (IMF 2018:4). The following subsection discusses Chile’s natural resource 
revenue management framework. 
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4.4.1.1  Chile’s natural resource revenue management framework  
Chile’s natural resource revenue management framework is primarily anchored on a 
fiscal rule (the structural budget rule) and two commodity-based SWFs; the ESSF (a 
stabilisation fund) and the PRF (a savings fund) (Frankel 2010:5). The following 
subsections parse out the aforementioned components of Chile’s natural resource 
revenue management framework.  
(a)  Chile’s structural budget rule 
Premised on the advice of the IMF (Hadri 2011:128), the Ricardo Lagos administration 
(2000-2006) introduced a non-statutory structural budget rule in 2001 to guide 
government expenditure (Frankel 2010:5). According to Cespedes, Parrado and 
Velasco (2014:118), “under this rule, annual fiscal expenditure has a ceiling that is 
equal to or close to the central government’s long-term or structural revenue, 
irrespective of income fluctuations caused by cyclical fluctuations in economic 
activities, the price of copper or other variables that determine effective fiscal income”. 
Unlike the effective budget (normal budget), the structural budget reflects a medium- 
to long-term view of the economy (Hadri 2011:128). In other words, it makes fiscal 
policy predictable (Gregorio and Labbe 2011:203). The structural budget rule ensures 
that governments smoothen spending throughout the commodity cycle (i.e. 
government saves during commodity price booms and spends during commodity price 
busts) (Cespedes et al. 2014:106).  
To arrive at a definition of long-term or structural income, the Chilean structural 
balance rule uses the long-term price of copper and molybdenum and the growth trend 
of the GDP (Hadri 2011:128). To avoid any political biases, two independent fiscal 
panels of experts drawn from mining companies, universities, the financial sector, and 
research centres meet in the middle of each fiscal year (Frankel 2010:176) to estimate 
the long-term price of copper and the GDP trend (Arezki 2011:149). In the case of 
copper, each expert submits estimates of the average price of copper for the next 10 
years (Havro and Santiso 2008:14). To arrive at the final figure, these estimates are 
averaged with the exclusion of maximum and minimum values (Cespedes et al. 
2014:118). In a similar fashion, when calculating the value of the GDP trend, each 
expert submits GDP estimates for the next five years (Fuentes 2009:28). Because of 
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the absence of an expert committee that calculates the long-term price of 
molybdenum, the Chilean government uses the average monthly prices of the metal 
over the last four years as a proxy for the long-term price (Fuentes 2009:28).  
Initially, the structural surplus target was set at 1% of the GDP (government spending 
was lower than collected revenue by 1% of the GDP) (Frankel 2010:5). The 
aforementioned target was necessitated by the need to accumulate large public 
savings to pay off the country’s sovereign debt that amounted to 11% of the GDP and 
to recapitalise the central bank, which was operating on a deficit since it bailed out 
financial institutions during the 1982-1983 banking crises (Cespedes et al. 2014:118). 
Largely because of the implementation of the structural balance rule, the Chilean 
government accumulated net assets and eventually became a net creditor (Cespedes 
et al. 2014:119). As a result, in 2009, the Chilean government reduced the structural 
balance target to zero percent (a balanced budget) (Frankel 2010:5).  
The implementation of the structural budget rule gave rise to substantial fiscal savings, 
which needed to be managed (Cespedes et al. 2014:119). The Chilean government 
created the ESSF (AfDB 2016:15) and the PRF to manage the surplus resulting from 
the application of the structural balance rule (Hagemann 2011:90). The following 
subsection discusses the aforementioned commodity-based SWFs in detail. 
(b)  Chile’s commodity-based SWFs 
The mandate of the PRF is to help finance the government’s pension and social 
security obligations (AfDB 2016:17). On the other hand, the ESSF was deployed to 
finance fiscal deficits that may occur during periods of weak growth and low copper 
prices (OECD 2018:7). Resources from the ESSF are also used to repay debt or fund 
the PRF (Cespedes et al. 2014:120). Treasury transfers fiscal surplus equivalent to at 
least 0.2% and at most 0.5% of the previous year’s GDP into the PRF (AfDB 2016:13). 
The remaining surplus after payment into the PRF is paid into the ESSF (OECD 
2018:7).  
From the foregoing discussion it can be deduced that Chile has a prudent natural 
resource revenue management framework anchored on a structural balance rule. 
Excess natural resource revenue accrued as a result of the application of the structural 
budget rule, which necessitated the creation of commodity-based SWFs to manage 
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the funds. Chile’s SWFs are used to support the country’s pension liabilities, to 
stabilise the economy, and to insulate the budget during economic downturns – as 
happened during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (Ossowski and Halland 
2016:111). The next subsection discusses another poster child of natural resource 
revenue management in the developing world: Botswana. 
4.4.2  Botswana 
Botswana is Africa’s paragon of natural resource revenue management (Kojo 2010:3). 
When Botswana attained independence on 30 September 1966, it was ranked among 
the 25 poorest countries in the world (Andreasson 2010:97), and labelled a “hopeless 
basket case” (Mogalakwe and Nyamnjoh 2017:1), with a meagre GDP income per 
capita of US$80 (Taylor 2002:3). A modern economy was virtually non-existent 
(Molokwane 2019:51). The housing stock consisted almost entirely of traditional 
rondavels (huts) (Leith 2000:22), which housed 90% of the population, who subsisted 
on drought-prone agriculture (AfDB 2003:69). Only 29 000 Batswana were formally 
employed (Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2009:4), mostly in neighbouring South Africa 
(Botswana acted as a labour reserve for South Africa during the colonial era) 
(Mogalakwe and Nyamnjoh 2017:1). The country had no electricity system, no pipe-
borne water system or sewerage, no public high schools, no public transportation 
service, one five-kilometre (km) stretch of paved road (Leith 2000:22), and the capital 
city (Gaborone) amounted to little more than a railway station (Mogalakwe and 
Nyamnjoh 2017:1). The country’s literacy rate was below 25% (Sebudubudu and 
Molutsi 2009:4). Only 22 Batswana had graduated from university and 100 from 
secondary school (Meija and Castel 2012:2). The new government’s national budget, 
which averaged US$3 million in the early years of independence (Mogae 2006:2), 
heavily relied on grants from the British government (half of recurrent expenditure and 
all development expenditure were dependent on aid) (Botlhale 2017:95). In short, at 
independence, the new black government had to develop the country from scratch 
(Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2009:28-34).  
Fortunately, within months of attaining independence, the De Beers mining company 
discovered the glittering hope that Botswana needed: diamonds in Orapa on the 
eastern edge of the Kalahari Desert (Botlhale 2017:96). In the 1970s, larger and more 
valuable Kimberlite diamond deposits were discovered in Letlhakane and Jwaneng 
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(Andreasson 2010:98). Exploitation of the aforementioned diamond deposits started 
almost immediately (Botlhale 2017:96). The 1972/1973 fiscal year was dubbed the 
“Year of Botswana’s second independence” because it is the year in which Botswana 
became self-sufficient (independent of British aid and grants) (Matambo 2019:2). The 
government of Botswana now had the resources to develop its rural economy into a 
relatively modern economy (Lange and Wright 2004:20).  
The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)-led government used diamond rents to finance 
the construction of physical infrastructure (roads, dams, telecommunications 
infrastructure, water reticulation systems, schools, universities, clinics, and hospitals) 
and social infrastructure (healthcare and education) (Andreasson 2010:98). 
Consequently, Botswana now has one of the highest education enrolments in the sub-
Saharan African region (Iimi 2007:670). The country’s literacy rate increased from less 
than 25% in 1966 (Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2009:4) to over 90% in 2020 (United 
Nations Educational and Scientific Organisation 2020:1). Furthermore, the country’s 
tarred road network has increased from one 5-km strip road in 1966 (Leith 2000:22), 
to the current 32 000 km that stretch to almost all parts of the country (Mguni 2019). 
In addition, Botswana’s GDP per capita has risen from US$80 (Taylor 2002:3) in 1966 
to US$8 259 in 2020 (World Bank 2020b:1) – surpassing that of neighbouring South 
Africa, which is sub-Saharan Africa’s second largest economy (Gylfason 2011:22).  
In short, in three and a half decades (from 1966 to mid-1992), the government of 
Botswana transformed Botswana from one of the poorest countries in the world to a 
middle-income economy (Matsheka 2020:2) with relatively modern infrastructure 
(Leith 2000:5). Botswana now aspires to achieve high-income country status by its 
70th independence anniversary in 2036 (Botswana Presidential Taskforce Team 
2016:3).  
However, the country is stuck in the middle-income country trap (Collier 2007:38). In 
other words, average income per capita has stagnated (Calleja and Prizzon 2019:17), 
because the fiscal importance of diamonds is declining (AfDB 2016:7). Geological 
projections indicate that the country’s diamond deposits could be depleted by 2029 
(Besada and O’Bright 2018:87). New sources of economic growth need to be found to 
sustain the economy (Harvey 2015:2).  
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Measures to diversify the economy have largely been unsuccessful because they have 
been centred on diversification to other minerals rather than other sectors of the 
economy (Mhone and Bond 2001:1). The government of Botswana has pinned its 
hope on its recent discovery of an estimated 208 billion tonnes of coal and a significant 
amount of iron ore reserves (Besada and O’Bright 2018:87). However, the exploitation 
of coal and iron ore would not be as profitable as the exploitation of diamonds (Harvey 
2015:2). Moreover, despite its remarkable record as the beacon of natural resource 
revenue management and development in the developing world, almost half of 
Botswana’s two and a half million citizens, particularly the rural folk, still live in poverty 
(Matsheka 2020:2).  
Although Botswana’s inequality challenges dent its reputation as Africa’s star economy 
and paragon of natural resource revenue management in the developing world, they 
do not discredit the country’s significant economic achievements over the past 54 
years (Sebudubudu and Mooketsane 2016:145). The next subsection explains why 
Botswana has prospered.  
4.4.2.1  Why did Botswana succeed? 
Numerous reasons account for Botswana’s success story. Firstly, the country is run 
by determined state elites (Botlhale 2017:94) who skilfully entered into a partnership 
with De Beers (the world’s largest diamond-producing company) to exploit Botswana’s 
diamonds (the government did not have the resources to prospect and develop a 
mining industry in Botswana) (Andreasson 2010:100). Secondly, the state is relatively 
free from capture by class, regional, or sectoral interests and it is one of the least 
corrupt countries on the African continent (Gelb 2011:66). Thirdly, Botswana has 
arguably one of the most competent bureaucracies on the African continent 
(Sebudubudu and Mooketsane 2016:145). Botswana is also one of the few African 
countries that have remained politically stable since independence (political stability is 
essential to the development process) (United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa 2018:8). Most importantly, particularly to this study, the government of 
Botswana has a prudent natural resource revenue management framework that 
promotes sustainable growth and development (Mogae 2006:3). The following 
subsections parse out the aforementioned factors that account for Botswana’s natural 
resource revenue management success story. 
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(a)  Determined founding state elites and their coalition with De Beers 
Botswana’s founding political leadership, led by president Seretse Goitsebeng Maphiri 
Khama, and his unique public-private partnership with De Beers (the world’s biggest 
producer and distributor of diamonds), are credited for Botswana’s success story 
(Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2006:49). When diamonds were discovered in 
Botswana in the late 1960s, the government lacked the capacity to develop a diamond 
industry (Andreasson 2010:100). The government of Botswana skilfully negotiated a 
50/50 mining venture partnership with De Beers, which culminated in the creation of 
DEBSWANA. Similar partnerships between a Western multinational company and an 
African nation are non-existent (Mguni 2019).  
However, the executive director of the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa 
(quoted in Tiro 2019) argues that the agreement between De Beers and the 
government of Botswana (which has been kept secret) has largely benefitted De Beers 
and Botswana’s state elites. Mogalakwe and Nyamnjoh (2017:6) assert that 
Botswana’s much-talked-about “economic miracle” status has not translated into a 
reduction of poverty and inequality for the Batswana. Almost half of Botswana’s two 
and a half million citizens, particularly in the rural areas, still languish in abject poverty 
(Mogalakwe and Nyamnjoh 2017:6). However, despite the aforementioned criticism, 
the role of DEBSWANA in uplifting Botswana’s economy from the backwaters of sub-
Saharan Africa to a middle-income economy with modest infrastructure cannot be 
totally dismissed (Mogalakwe and Nyamnjoh 2017:8).  
(b)  Botswana’s government is relatively free from capture and corruption 
Botswana is relatively free from capture by any class, regional, or sectoral interests 
and it has very low corruption levels, by African standards (Sebudubudu 2003:125). 
Contrary to popular belief, the executive director of the Open Society Initiative for 
Southern Africa, Siphomasi Malunga (quoted in Malunga 2019), argues that “long 
before the famous capture of the South African state by the Gupta brothers, it was 
widely known that De Beers was appointing ministers and senior officials in 
Botswana’s government”.  
Although not as widespread as in most parts of Africa, corruption allegations have 
been levelled against Botswana’s elite (Sebudubudu 2003:125). For example, 
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according to Mogalakwe and Nyamnjoh (2017:5), members of the Khama family are 
often referred to as “Botswana’s military millionaires” because one of the family’s 
companies, Seleka Springs, is responsible for the procurement of the Botswana 
Defence Force’s equipment. However, Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption 
Perception Index ranked Botswana as the second least corrupt African country after 
the Seychelles (Transparency International 2021:2). Despite Botswana’s issues, the 
country fares better than its regional counterparts in terms of containing corruption. 
Thus, Botswana’s relative autonomy from capture by class, regional, and sectoral 
interests explains why Botswana is one of Africa’s economic success stories.  
4.4.2.2  Political stability 
Botswana’s political stability since independence also explains why the country is a 
paragon among natural resource-rich developing countries (Botlhale 2017:95). The 
country has experienced seamless transitions of power from Seretse Goitsebeng 
Maphiri Khama to Quett Ketumile Joni Masire to Festus Mogae (Leith 2000:9), to 
Seretse Ian Khama and most recently to Mokwgweetsi Eric Keabatswe Masisi (Warren 
2019). Moreover, Freedom House (2020:1) ranks Botswana among the freest polities 
in the world with a score of 72/100.  
Mogalakwe and Nyamnjoh (2017:8) argue that the BDP has managed to retain power 
because of a skewed electoral system. In the 2014 general elections, the BDP clung 
onto power despite getting less than 50% of the popular vote because Botswana uses 
the first-past-the-post electoral system, which disadvantages smaller political parties 
(Seabo and Molebatsi 2017:1). However, despite the aforementioned criticism, 
Botswana remains an exemplar of democracy and good governance in Africa because 
it has been politically stable throughout its post-independence history (Sebudubudu 
2003:125).  
4.4.2.3  Competent and apolitical bureaucracy 
Botswana’s success story can also be accounted for by the fact that Botswana has 
one of the most competent merit-based and apolitical bureaucracies on the African 
continent (Sebudubudu and Mooketsane 2016:145). However, contrary to popular 
belief, Mogalakwe and Nyamnjoh (2017:5) argue that when the Botswana Defence 
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Force was formed in 1977, President Khama appointed his son, Ian Khama, as 
Brigadier General at the age of 23 above the heads of far more experienced officers 
from the then Botswana Police Mobile Unit. The aforementioned example illustrates 
that although Botswana’s civil service is praised as a competent and professional 
bureaucracy (Sebudubudu and Mooketsane 2016:145), it has its own shortcomings 
(Mogalakwe and Nyamnjoh 2017:5).  
4.4.2.4  Prudent natural resource revenue management framework 
More importantly, Botswana is a success story among natural resource-rich 
developing economies because it has a prudent and robust natural resource revenue 
management framework whose primary objective is to ensure Botswana’s sustainable 
growth and development (Kojo 2010:3). Botswana’s natural resource revenue 
management framework is anchored on two pillars, namely macroeconomic 
stabilisation and the prioritisation of development expenditure (OECD 2018:20). The 
aforementioned pillars are operationalised through the Pula Fund (Botswana’s natural 
resource fund with a stabilisation and savings function) and the Sustainable Budget 
Index (SBI) (a fiscal guideline or non-statutory fiscal rule) (AfDB 2016:11). The 
following subsections discuss the aforementioned components of Botswana’s natural 
resource revenue management framework in greater detail.  
(a)  Sustainable Budget Index (SBI) 
Premised on the Hartwick-Solow rule of fiscal sustainability and the need to contain a 
government’s temptation to spend natural resource revenue on recurrent expenditure, 
the government of Botswana often invests most, if not all, of its natural resource 
revenue in other forms of capital (physical, human, foreign, social, and financial 
capital) capable of improving or at least maintaining the country’s asset base for future 
generations (IMF 2020a:11). The aforementioned principle is operationalised through 
a fiscal guideline (non-statutory fiscal rule) known as the SBI, which is defined as the 
ratio of recurrent expenditure (excluding health and education because Botswana 
classifies these as development expenditure) to non-mineral revenue (other sources 
of revenue besides natural resource revenues) (Barbier 2005:138).  
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The SBI is calculated as follows. 
SBI = recurrent expenditure 
        Non-mineral revenue 
An SBI of more than 1 indicates that non-investment expenditure is partly financed by 
natural resource revenue, whereas an SBI of less than 1 indicates that non-natural 
resource revenue is financing recurrent expenditure and natural resource revenue is 
financing investment or is being saved in the Pula Fund (Meija and Castel 2012:9). 
The success of Botswana’s SBI is dependent on the executive committing to drafting 
sustainable budgets and the parliament approving the budget and development plans 
therein (OECD 2018:21). Between the 1983/1984 and 2014/2015 fiscal years, the SBI 
was below 1, except for the years 2000/2001 and 2004/2005 when it was over 1 (AfDB 
2016:12).The benefits of this commitment are self-evident (OECD 2018:19); Botswana 
has made tremendous progress in terms of physical, social, and human capital 
development since independence (Good 2008:2). 
Since the 2014/2015 fiscal year, there have been significant deviations from the SBI 
(IMF 2014b:24) because of increased government recurrent expenditure (particularly 
the public sector wage bill), low Southern African Customs Union (SACU) revenue 
transfers (the main source of non-natural resource revenue) (Calleja and Prizzon 
2019:18), and more recently the need to finance measures to mitigate the effects of 
the COVID-19 pandemic (IMF 2020a:11). In his 2020/2021 national budget speech, 
Botswana’s Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Dr Thapelo Matsheka, 
pegged the country’s natural resource revenues at BWP20.2 billion against a 
development budget of BWP12.03 billion (Matsheka 2020:24), culminating in an SBI 
of 1.68 for the 2020/2021 fiscal year. This implies that in the 2020/2021 fiscal year, 
some natural resource revenues will be used to finance recurrent expenditure – 
contrary to the SBI principle. 
The AfDB (2016:23) argues that although the SBI is a convenient rule of thumb, the 
assets that the government invests in do not guarantee sustainable growth and 
development unless the principle is supplemented by effective project analysis, 
appropriate project selection and prioritisation systems, and effective monitoring and 
evaluation. Another limitation of the SBI is the fact that it does not provide any 
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guidance on the proportion of natural resource revenues that should be invested in 
physical and human capital projects and those that should be saved in financial assets 
(AfDB 2016:23). In an effort to address the aforementioned limitation of the SBI, the 
government of Botswana has proposed the enactment of a new fiscal rule that 
specifies that 60% of natural resource revenue should be used to finance physical and 
human capital investments and 40% of natural resource revenue should be saved for 
future generations (IMF 2020a:11). 
The IMF (2020a:11) argues that achieving the aforementioned 40/60 
savings/development expenditure target is difficult because diamond revenue is no 
longer as significant as it used to be in the past (diamonds are depleting and extraction 
has become more expensive, which resulted in a reduction in diamond revenue) and 
SACU revenue (the biggest non-mineral revenue head) is volatile. Collier (2012) and 
Collier et al. (2008) (both cited in the AfDB 2016:12) argue that an optimal 
savings/investment path would involve devoting some portion of resource revenues to 
consumption.  
From the foregoing discussion it can be deduced that although the SBI is a noble rule 
of thumb, it needs to be modified to suit a natural resource-rich developing country 
setup (Sharma and Strauss 2013:3). In other words, the government of Botswana 
needs to realign its trade-off between spending and investing/saving to its 
macroeconomic circumstances. The next subsection discusses the Pula Fund as the 
pillar of Botswana’s natural resource revenue management framework. 
(b)  Pula Fund 
Named after the Setswana name for rain, the Pula Fund holds 70% of Botswana’s 
international reserves (Kojo 2010:10). The Pula Fund consists of the Government 
Investment Account, which reflects savings accumulated from fiscal surplus and the 
Bank of Botswana’s reserve accumulation above liquid reserves (Revenue Watch 
Institute 2013:1). Any resources that the government of Botswana fails to productively 
invest in the domestic economy because of absorptive capacity constraints are 
invested in the Pula Fund (IMF 2012:12). 
The Reserve Bank of Botswana Act (Statutory Instrument Number 19 of 1996), the 
Pula Fund’s enabling legal framework, does not specify the Pula Fund’s objectives in 
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the context of overall fiscal policy (Revenue Watch Institute 2013:1). Since the creation 
of the Pula Fund in 1993, it has served as a savings and short-term stabilisation fund 
(World Bank 2018:4). Between 2016 and 2019, Treasury secretly raided the Pula Fund 
to finance public sector pensions, cover budget deficits, and boost liquidity to avoid 
unpopular decisions such as increasing taxes, doing away with free education, and/or 
freezing public sector wages (Ntibinyane and Letlole 2016). Treasury’s secret 
withdrawals from the Pula Fund cast doubt on the Pula Fund’s intergenerational equity 
mandate because its resources are fast depleting (Newel 2019). The Bank of 
Botswana’s 2020 financial statement indicates that the value of the Pula Fund 
decreased from P51 billion in March 2019 to P47 billion in March 2020, a decrease of 
P4 billion (Weekendpost 2020).  However, the Pula Fund has successfully cushioned 
Botswana’s economy from external shocks such as the 2008-2009 global financial 
crisis (Ntibinyane and Letlole 2016). The next section discusses the lessons drawn 
from the case of Chile and Botswana. 
4.5  LESSONS DRAWN  
From the case studies discussed in this chapter it can be deduced that despite Chile’s 
fiscal stability, the benefit is not felt by many (particularly the poor). The Chilean 
structural budget rule illustrates how smoothening resource revenues across 
commodity price and business cycles makes budget planning and execution 
predictable. Moreover, the Chilean example illustrates that successful commodity-
based SWFs are created to manage excess natural resource revenues accrued as a 
result of a country’s fiscal discipline. In other words, fiscal discipline and robust 
macroeconomic policies are a precursor to the success of SWFs. Furthermore, Chile’s 
resilience during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis illustrates the importance of 
saving resource rents during commodity booms for rainy days.  
The case of Botswana illustrates how sustainable natural resource use (investing in 
physical and human capital) can transform an underdeveloped economy into a modern 
middle-income economy within a generation. Moreover, Botswana’s example 
illustrates the importance of political stability and altruistic leadership and bureaucracy 
to national development. Furthermore, both Chile and Botswana are ranked among 
the least corrupt countries in the world (i.e. the top 35 in the Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index). 
81 
4.6  ZIMBABWE 
A far cry from Chile and Botswana (i.e. the paragons of natural resource revenue 
management in the developing world), Zimbabwe is the by-word for African failure 
(Kovacs 2012:1). Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perception Index 
ranks Zimbabwe 157 out 180 countries with a score of 24 out of 100 (Transparency 
International 2021:3). The ‘jewel of Africa’ has degenerated into a failed state 
(Andreasson 2010:122). Unlike Botswana which virtually had nothing at 
independence, Zimbabwe (known as Southern Rhodesia before independence) had 
almost everything. At independence in 1980, the new black government led by the 
guerrilla leader and avowed Marxist Robert Mugabe, inherited one of the most 
prosperous though unevenly developed economies in sub-Saharan Africa (Kanyenze 
et al 2012:2). The racist and segregatory policies of the colonial regime skewed the 
economy in favour of the white settler minority (40 000 people) and marginalised the 
indigenous black majority (7 million people) (Zvoushe et al 2017:125). However, newly 
independent Zimbabwe was the bread basket of southern Africa, it was highly 
industrialised and had a modest infrastructure base by African standards. Moreover, 
it also possessed a vast natural resource base of close to 60 minerals (Herbst 
1990:17-19).  
Unlike Botswana whose independence was negotiated and peacefully handed over, 
Zimbabwe went through a protracted liberation struggle (15 years of war) against 
colonial rule led by a group of nationalists in the fold of the PF (i.e. ZANU and ZAPU) 
and their military arms ZANLA and ZIPRA respectively (Andreasson 2010:122). 
Consequently, at independence in 1980 a civil-military coalition led by Robert Mugabe 
(the first black Prime Minister of Zimbabwe) representing the nationalists, Solomon 
Mujuru (the first black commander of the ZNA) and Emmerson Mnangagwa (Mugabe’s 
chief spy) representing the guerrillas captured the Zimbabwean state (Dashwood 
2000:8). The coalition pact whose chief protagonist (i.e. Robert Mugabe) was an 
avowed socialist lost its commitment to the poor as a result of its embourgeoisement. 
This led to the formation of a state led securocrat comprador bourgeoisie interested 
primarily in wealth accumulation and political survival (Bratton and Masunungure 
2011:iv).  
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Zimbabwe’s securocrats have plundered and plunged the country into crisis and 
paralysis (Bond and Manyanya 2002:1). Because of the ruling elites’ politics of 
predation, patronage and survival (i.e. unbudgeted war veteran pay-outs, involvement 
in the Congo war, the haphazard land reform programme, the indigenisation and 
economic empowerment policy), the Zimbabwean economy experienced an 
unprecedented decline between 1997 and 2008. The collapse was of proportions 
never recorded in any country not physically at war (Biti 2014:1). During this period 
the economy shrank by half (Zhou and Chilunjika 2015:61). When official inflation 
skyrocketed to 231 million percent in July 2008, the government of Zimbabwe 
instructed the national statistics agency to stop publishing inflation figures. The IMF 
estimates that Zimbabwe’s inflation rate had reached 500 billion percent in September 
2008 the highest in recorded history (Biti 2014:2). 
In June 2006, the world’s richest alluvial diamond deposits were discovered at 
Marange, at Chiadzwa, an area in Zimbabwe’s eastern province of Manicaland 
(Towriss 2013:99). Estimated to yield at least US$2 billion per annum, the Marange 
diamond fields had the potential to breathe new life to Zimbabwe’s ailing economy 
(Mupfumi 2017:2). However, no meaningful diamond revenues have been remitted to 
Treasury even though Zimbabwe is a major producer of the gemstones, largely 
through companies in which the state has a stake (Biti 2014:24). Zimbabwe’s 
government has failed to adequately capture and account for its diamond revenues 
because the Marange diamond fields were captured by securocrats at the height of 
Zimbabwe’s economic decline in 2008 (Maguwu 2013:74). The bankrupt ZANU-PF 
led government has used the country’s diamonds to buy the loyalty of the army, the 
stockholders of power in Zimbabwean politics, in order to maintain its hold on power 
(Towriss 2013:99). During his 92nd birthday interview in 2016, Zimbabwe’s late former 
president and commander in chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces Robert Mugabe 
openly admitted that USD$15 billion worth of diamond revenue had been looted from 
the Marange diamond fields (Mandaza 2016:9). In short, Zimbabwe is plagued by 
political Dutch disease. The sub-section below examines Zimbabwe’s natural resource 
framework. 
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4.6.1  Zimbabwe’s natural resource revenue management framework 
Poles apart from Chile and Botswana’s natural resource revenue management 
frameworks which enable their governments to adequately capture and account for 
their resource rents and channel the resources towards broad based inclusive social 
and economic development, Zimbabwe does not possess a natural resource revenue 
management framework that guides how the country’s natural resource should be 
managed (Centre for Natural Resource Governance n.d:4). In other words, the fiscal 
regime of Zimbabwe’s extractive industries suffers from a lack of transparency and 
proper regulation (Biti 2014:24). Section 298(1)(c) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
(Constitution Amendment Number 20 of 2013), merely states that the burdens and 
benefits of Zimbabwe’s (natural) resources should be equitably shared between 
present and future generations. This constitutional provision suggests that the 
government of Zimbabwe should sustainably manage its natural resource revenue 
(replace the country’s depleting natural resources with other forms of capital that 
compensate the country’s depleting natural capital base i.e. physical, human, social 
and financial capital). However, this principle is not backed by any statutory or non-
statutory commitment (Centre for Natural Resource Governance n.d:4). Prudent 
natural resource revenue management frameworks are underpinned by statutory or 
non-statutory commitments. For example, Chile and Botswana’s natural resource 
revenue management frameworks are underpinned by the structural budget rule and 
the SBI respectively.  
Consequently, because of the absence of an explicit statutory or non-statutory 
commitment to prudent natural resource revenue management, almost all of 
Zimbabwe’s natural resource revenue is spent recurrent expenditure (i.e. more than 
80% of Zimbabwe’s budget is used to finance government’s wage bill) (Jourdan et al 
2012:39). Thus, contrary to the PIH very little if any of Zimbabwe’s natural resource 
revenue is invested other forms of capital that replace the country’s depleting natural 
capital base (Mlambo 2018:1). Moreover, during the coalition government (i.e. 
between 2009 and 2013), the then Minister Finance Tendai Biti accused ZANU-PF of 
running a parallel fiscus (i.e. using government resources to fund party programmes). 
Tendai Biti often alleged that the ministry of mines and mining development then led 
by Obert Mpofu (a ZANU-PF stalwart) was not remitting natural resource revenues 
(i.e. diamond revenue) in full (Biti 2014:12). For example, Treasury had to review the 
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2012 national budget downwards from US$4 billion to US$3.6 billion because of the 
underperformance of the diamond revenue head (Biti 2012:71). A paltry US$43 million 
was remitted against a projection of US$400 million, despite the fact that Zimbabwe 
had exported diamonds worth USD$563 million (Biti 2012:233). Moreover, the 
Maverick Citizens (2021:8) estimate that at least US$1.5 billion worth of gold is 
smuggled out of Zimbabwe by syndicates linked the ruling elite. In addition, the 
Zimbabwe Revenue Authority faces challenges such as tax evasion through under 
invoicing and transfer pricing when collecting royalties and other mining taxes 
(Kaseke, Chaminuka and Musingafi 2015:93).  
Furthermore, contrary to Dixon and Monk’s (2011a:8) SWF deployment policy 
framework, which emphasises the need to gradually and systematically deploy SWF 
types in natural resource-rich developing economies the government of Zimbabwe 
simultaneously deployed an SWF with a stabilisation, development, and savings 
mandate. A stabilisation fund could be a useful addition of Zimbabwe’s natural 
resource revenue management framework and macroeconomic toolkit, because 
commodity price volatility is one of the most damaging factors among natural resource-
rich developing economies such as Zimbabwe (Hawkins 2009:48). The stabilisation 
fund can be used to smoothen natural resource revenue across the commodity cycle 
(i.e. booms and busts) (Dixon and Monk 2011a:8). However, the government of 
Zimbabwe can only operationalise a successful stabilisation fund if it adequately 
captures and accounts for its resource rents. In other words, a prudent natural 
resource revenue management framework underpins the success of successful SWFs 
(Matambo and Dixon 2021:37). Moreover, the development and saving funds are 
premature. The government of Zimbabwe needs to adequately capitalise its 
stabilisation fund before it can deploy a development fund, and fulfil the development 
objectives of its development fund before it can deploy a savings fund (Dixon and 
Monk 2011a:8). In short, Zimbabwe’s SWF was haphazardly deployed.    
4.7  CONCLUSION 
The contribution of this chapter is that it benchmarked Zimbabwe’s natural resource 
revenue management framework against international best practices and principles of 
natural resource revenue management in the developing world. This chapter 
unpacked key principles and practices of natural resource revenue management in 
the developing world. The PIH posits that, in order to achieve sustainable development 
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natural resource-rich developing economies should compensate their depleting 
natural capital base with other forms of capital (i.e. physical, human, social and 
financial capital).  Sound fiscal frameworks for developing natural resource-rich 
economies are operationalised through fiscal rules, fiscal advisory councils, and 
commodity-based SWFs.  
To contextualise the discussion, the chapter examined the paragons of natural 
resource revenue management in the developing world (i.e. Chile and Botswana). 
Chile is the paragon of natural resource revenue management in Latin America 
because it is committed to a fiscal rule known as the structural budget rule which 
smoothens natural resource revenue throughout the commodity cycle. The Chilean 
government created the PRF and the ESSF to manage natural resource revenue 
accrued as a result of the implementation of the structural budget rule. Botswana is a 
paragon of prudent natural resource revenue management in Africa because it has 
managed to leverage its natural resources for the development of the country. At 
independence in 1966 Botswana was one of poorest countries in the world with an 
impoverished rural economy. However, after the discovery of diamonds a few years 
later the country was transformed into a modern middle-income economy. Botswana’s 
success is underpinned by the implementation of a fiscal rule the SBI.  
A far cry from Botswana and Chile Zimbabwe does not have a prudent natural 
resource revenue management framework that guides natural resource revenue 
management. Consequently, most of the country’s natural resource revenues are 
used to finance recurrent expenditure (i.e. civil servants salaries in particular). 
Moreover, the country’s mining sector lacks transparency and it is not properly 
regulated. Government cannot properly capture and account for its resource rents. 
The country’s extractive industries are captured by a comprador securocrat 
bourgeoisie that feels entitled to loot and rule the country in perpetuity. Furthermore, 
contrary to the SWF deployment policy framework, the government of Zimbabwe 
haphazardly deployed a commodity-based. It simultaneously deployed an SWF with 
a stabilisation, development, and savings mandate. Though a stabilisation fund could 
be a useful addition to Zimbabwe’s natural resource revenue management framework, 
the government of Zimbabwe needs to prudently management its natural resource 
revenue before it can operationalise a successful SWFs such as Chile’s ESSF and 
PRF and Botswana’s Pula Fund.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES FOR SWFs 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter examined natural resource revenue management principles and 
practices in the developing world. This chapter examines SWF governance principles 
and practices. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 discusses SWF governance 
principles, Section 5.3 discusses the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices 
(GAPPs) of managing SWFs commonly referred to as the Santiago Principles and 
Truman’s scoreboard of SWF governance, Section 5.4 contextualises the discussion 
by examining the governance architecture of selected commodity-based SWFs in the 
developing world, Section 5.5 discusses governance principles and best practices 
lessons drawn, Section 5.6 presents the case of Zimbabwe and the last section 
concludes the chapter. 
5.2  SWF GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 
According to the OECD (2015:17), “governance as it relates to investment funds (such 
as SWFs) refers to the structure, process, and practices that establish the relationship 
between the owner or sponsor of the fund, the board of directors, the management, 
and any third-party asset manager, and the criteria that guide investment decision-
making”. SWFs can only be useful tools for managing natural resource revenue and 
promoting sustainable economic development if the appropriate design and 
governance systems are in place (Dixon and Monk 2011b:1). Principles of SWF 
governance, such as institutional coherence (clarity of mission and integration into 
overall fiscal policy), people (merit-based human resources management practices), 
process (sound investment decision making and implementation), and politics 
(freedom from political interference), underpin the success of SWFs (Clark and Urwin 
2008:2). In other words, the success or failure of an SWF comes down to the strength 
of its institutional structure and management (Markowitz 2020:9). The following 
subsections parse out each of the aforementioned SWF governance principles. 
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5.2.1  Institutional coherence 
Institutional coherence pertains to what an SWF is set up to do, its relationship with 
public finance, and how the relationship feeds into how the SWF is governed and 
invests as a financial institution (Clark and Urwin 2008:9). For example, Chile’s 
stabilisation fund, the ESSF, was created to complement the country’s structural 
budget rule (smoothening natural resource revenue throughout the commodity price 
cycle) (Santiso 2012:82). Institutionally, stabilisation funds such as Chile’s ESSF are 
housed in the sponsoring government’s central bank or Treasury because these 
government agencies possess expertise that can manage a stabilisation fund (i.e. 
economists) (Dixon 2016:6). Stabilisation funds such as Chile’s ESSF invest in low-
risk liquid assets such as highly rated sovereign bonds (debt security issued by a 
national government, e.g. US Treasury bills and Eurobonds), which can be quickly 
mobilised in the event of an unexpected external shock (Triki and Faye 2011:6). 
A savings fund such as Norway’s GPFG can be subsumed in the same institutional 
architecture as a stabilisation fund but as a separate portfolio because different SWF 
objectives have a different investment focus, different time horizons and different 
organisation resourcing needs (Dixon 2016:6). Given that savings funds such as 
Norway’s GPFG invest surplus fiscal or balance of payment surplus for future 
generations over decades, they invest in riskier assets such as securities (e.g. 
equities) or private investments (Hove 2016:12). Taking on greater risk in the 
investment portfolio requires more complex and sophisticated governance 
architecture and human resources capabilities (OECD 2018:15). Accordingly, savings 
funds are better served by independent but government-controlled asset management 
companies (a firm that invests pooled capital from clients) (Dixon 2016:7). For 
example, the Norwegian government established the Norges Bank Investment 
Management (NBIM) (an asset management company) to manage the GPFG under 
the supervision of the Treasury (Santiso 2012:50).  
However, the governance and management of a development fund are very different 
from that of a stabilisation fund and somewhat more sophisticated than a savings fund 
(Santiso 2008:1). Whereas a stabilisation fund is often created in existing institutions 
of the government (i.e. central bank or Treasury), the investment objectives of 
development funds such as Kazakhstan’s Samruk-Kazyna necessitates institutional 
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architecture, that does not typically exist within the government, and human resource 
capabilities of existing government agencies (Dixon 2016:7). Development funds need 
to be managed by individuals with experience and expertise in scoping (examining), 
executing, and monitoring direct investments (Santiso 2008:3). Such expertise may 
be in short supply in countries with an underdeveloped financial market. Moreover, it 
may be difficult to attract such talent in the private sector to work for a state agency 
(Dixon 2016:7).  
5.2.2  People 
SWFs should be able to attract, retain, and incentivise personnel that can run a 
modern financial institution (Dixon and Monk 2014:365). In other words, all hiring 
decisions should be based exclusively on an individual’s financial competency (and 
not their connections or relations) (Dixon 2016:7). In accordance with the 
aforementioned principle, New Zealand’s Superannuation Fund’s human resource 
policy stipulates that, the fund seeks to “maintain and adhere to a recruitment, 
selection and appointment process that ensures all potential employees are treated 
with fairness and respect and are assessed on merit” (New Zealand Superannuation 
Fund 2019:5). Moreover, as public entities charged with investing in private markets, 
SWFs must find ways to fill public sector jobs with individuals who can compete with 
the private sector (Clark and Monk 2012:12). Attracting the best talent in the financial 
services industry is difficult because it is expensive for fund sponsors (governments) 
to pay employees private sector rates and compensation (Dixon and Monk 2011a:12). 
In a bid to attract and retain distinguished investment bankers and top private equity 
professionals, renowned SWFs such as Qatar Investment Authority and Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority restructured their remuneration scales (Clarke 2013). In 2013, 
Qatar Investment Authority hired Ugo Arzani, Merril Lynch’s (i.e. investment and 
wealth management division of Bank of America) former managing direction as head 
of consumer and retail investments. Abu Dhabi Investment Authority also appointed 
John McCarthy a former investment banker at Deutsche Bank (German multinational 
investment bank) as head of infrastructure (Clarke 2013).  
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5.2.3  Process 
Clark and Monk (2012:12) argue that, “financial institutions (such as SWFs) require 
highly developed decision-making frameworks and risk mitigation capabilities in order 
to manage the complexities of investing. Successful investment management within 
institutional investors is a function of how decision-making is framed, routinised, and 
implemented”. The SWF should be managed in a transparent and accountable 
manner (i.e. clear reporting mechanisms to the SWF’s sponsor and other stakeholders 
should be put in place) (Dixon and Monk 2011b:10). For example, NBIM (the 
operational management of GPFG) submits quarterly and annual reports to Treasury 
which in turn submits an annual report to the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) (Asian 
Development Bank 2016:39). 
Moreover, the SWF’s investment goals must be aligned with the institutions risk profile. 
Failure to do so can lead to disastrous investment decisions (Dixon and Monk 
2011b:10). For example, during the Gaddaffi era, the LIA invested in sophisticated and 
risky investments such as private equity and derivatives despite lacking the 
operational robustness and financial experience required to manage such investments 
(Dixon 2016:7). In 2008, the LIA invested in a series of derivatives transactions valued 
at US$1.2 billon structured by Goldman Sachs (a leading investment bank) that lost 
98.5% of their value (Saigol and O’Murchu 2011). The Libyan government ended up 
suing Goldman Sachs for exploiting the LIA’s limited financial experience (The 
Guardian 2016). 
Furthermore, Dixon and Monk (2011b:10-11) argue that, “the fund must have an 
explicit statement of core ‘investment beliefs’ that ultimately guide investment 
decision-making. These are beliefs about the way financial institutions and agents 
behave”. For example, NBIM’s strategic plan (2020-2022), states that Norway’s GPFG 
invests across three asset classes across the globe (i.e. equities, fixed income and 
real assets). The investments are made abroad to avoid overheating the Norwegian 
economy (NBIM 2020:12). 
5.2.4  Politics 
Although SWFs are products of political decisions, board and portfolio managers must 
be free from undue political interference because politically motivated decisions can 
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have negative impacts on the expected financial returns (Clark and Monk 2012:13). In 
other words, the role of politicians (parliament and the executive) is to set the mandate 
of the fund, and to hold the fund accountable for its performance (Dixon and Monk 
2011a:13). Politicians or other government officials should not be involved in 
investment decision making (which should be left to the board and portfolio managers). 
Political interference in the affairs of SWFs can lead to investments in pet projects that 
result in the failure of the fund in the long term (Dixon 2016:7). For example, during 
the Gaddaffi era (1969-2011), the LIA’s investment decisions were politically charged 
because Gaddaffi’s son and touted successor Seif-al-Islam called the shots through 
his friend, Mustafa Zarti, who was appointed deputy chief investment officer (Saigol 
and O’Murchu 2011). In 2010, the LIA invested US$300 million in little-known 
Palladyne International Asset Management of the Netherlands led by Ismail Abuder 
Shokeri Ghanem’s son-in-law (the chairperson of Libya’s National Oil Corporation and 
the most senior oil official in the country) (Saigol and O’Murchu 2011). Unsurprisingly, 
within a year, the investment had lost 17% of its value (Saigol and O’Murchu 2011). 
Moreover, according to Dixon and Monk (2011b:11), “there needs to be a rigorous 
process that ensures board members appointed to the institution have expertise and 
lack political agendas. This can be based on a set of a priori expectations as regards 
candidates’ expertise and experience”. For example, Section 38(3) of Australia’s 
Future Fund Act (Statutory Instrument Number 12 of 2006), stipulates that an 
individual is only eligible for appointment as a board member of the fund if they have 
substantial experience or expertise and professional credibility or significant standing 
in investing in financial assets, managing investments in financial assets and corporate 
governance. 
5.3  SWF BEST PRACTICE LITMUS TESTS  
This section discusses litmus tests used to evaluate the extent to which SWFs adhere 
to international best practices of managing SWFs. These include: the GAPPs more 
commonly known as the Santiago Principles and the Truman scoreboard. The sub-
sections below parse out these litmus tests. 
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5.3.1  The Santiago Principles 
The GAPPs of managing SWFs, generally known as the Santiago Principles, are 
international principles and best practices of managing SWFs crafted by the 
International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG-SWF), a group of 23 
leading SWFs, now known as the IFSWF, in September 2008 (IFSWF 2019:2). Before 
the adoption of the Santiago Principles in 2008, SWFs provoked backlash from 
politicians in the Western world, such as former French president Nicholas Sarkozy, 
German chancellor Angela Merkel, and former US secretary of state Hilary Clinton 
(The Economist 2008). Western politicians feared that government-driven 
international investments from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region could 
be a Trojan horse designed to undermine the Western world’s political and economic 
sovereignty through stealing its wealth (Yi-Chong 2012:193). In many cases, the 
operations of SWFs from the MENA region such as the KIA were substantially opaque 
(Clark and Dixon 2017:145). Stone and Truman (2016:1) argue that “such opacity, 
along with their size, gave rise to suspicions about the motives behind their 
investments and their potential to contribute to economic, financial, or political 
disruption”. In 2006, the US Congress blocked Dubai Ports Authority, a UAE state-
owned infrastructure operator, from purchasing some of America’s busiest port 
terminals in New York, New Orleans, Miami, Newark-Port Elizabeth, Baltimore, and 
Philadelphia because US Coast Guard Intelligence raised concern over the Dubai 
Ports Authority’s obscure operations (Clark and Dixon 2017:145). 
However, the Western world’s scepticism evaporated during the 2008 global financial 
crisis because Wall Street, the centre of global finance, required a fresh source of 
capital to bail out failing banks and collapsing equity markets (The Economist 2008). 
SWFs from the MENA region, the “barbarians at the gate” attempting to storm the 
bastions of Western capitalism turned into the most courted “white knights” 
responsible for saving global finance from the brink of collapse (Das, Mazarei and Van 
der Hoorn 2010:xv). Between 2007 and 2008, SWFs shored up the balance sheets of 
distressed Wall Street financial institutions such as Citigroup, Merill Lynch, and 
Morgan Stanley (Lenihan 2014:234).  
In a bid to allay fears surrounding SWFs and to develop trust between SWFs and 
recipients of SWF investments, the G-7 asked the IMF’s financial committee (finance 
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ministers and central bank governors of the IMF’s 185 member states) to develop a 
set of best practices for managing SWFs (Norton 2010:471). In response to the G-7’s 
request, the IMF, in conjunction with the US Treasury Department, convened the IWG-
SWF to craft GAPP that underwrite SWFs’ acceptance by the international community 
(Deloitte 2008:6).  
In September 2008, a preliminary agreement was reached in Santiago, Chile, on a set 
of 24 GAPP (Das, Mazarei and Stuart 2010:xv). This marked the first time that SWFs 
had a comprehensive framework that guided their governance practices and 
investment policies (Das et al. 2010:59). The Santiago Principles are premised on 
three pillars. The first pillar prescribes the enactment of a sound legal framework that 
clearly stipulates the objectives of an SWF (IWG-SWF 2008:5). The objectives must 
be aligned to the overall macroeconomic objectives of the government because SWFs 
are designed to complement a government’s efforts to better manage the economy 
(Brown Capital Management Africa Forum 2016:2). The second pillar of the Santiago 
Principles prescribes the establishment of an effective institutional framework and 
governance structure for the management of an SWF (IWG-SWF 2008:5). In other 
words, at the core of the second pillar lies the notion of distancing the political owner 
(government) from its operational management (Behrendt 2010:4). The owner’s 
influence should be limited to setting the fund’s objectives, appointing the members of 
the governing body (or bodies), and overseeing the SWF’s operations (GAPP 7) (IWG-
SWF 2008:5); whereas the operational management should be tasked with 
implementing the strategies set by the owner and governing bodies independently and 
in accordance with clearly defined responsibilities (GAPP 9) (Behrendt 2010:4). Lastly, 
the third pillar prescribes an investment and risk management framework that could 
be used by SWFs (IWG-SWF 2008:5). It requires SWFs to disclose investment 
policies (GAPP 18), including strategic investment allocation, investment themes, 
investment objectives, and horizons (Behrendt 2010:4). 
The IFSWF has promoted the completion of Santiago Principles’ self-assessment 
tests among its member states (IFSWF 2019:3). Truman (2013:1) contends that the 
IFSWF “exaggerates the extent of implementation of the Santiago Principles by SWFs 
associated with the IFSWF”. The IFSWF (2019:1) argues that all its member states 
have implemented at least partially each of the Santiago Principles. However, Stone 
and Truman (2016:15) note that IFSWF member states such as Libya, Qatar, and 
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Equatorial Guinea scored 29% or below on Truman’s scoreboard for SWF best 
practices, which is an independent SWF governance assessment mechanism.  
Though Zimbabwe is not a member of the IFSWF, the third schedule of Zimbabwe’s 
SWF Act (Statutory Instrument Number 7 of 2014), stipulates that Zimbabwe’s SWF 
adheres to the Santiago Principles. In 2016, the Zimbabwe Economic Policy and 
Research Unit (ZEPARU) a government linked think-tank assessed the extent to which 
Zimbabwe’s SWF adheres to the Santiago Principles. The think tank concluded that 
Zimbabwe’s SWF adheres to the Santiago Principles (Chigumira et al 2016:44-48). 
However, the assessment was somewhat exaggerated probably because of ZEPARU 
affiliation to the government of Zimbabwe and absence of institutional capacity to 
conduct an in-depth evaluation of the SWF’s adherence to the Santiago Principles. 
This thesis offers an independent expert evaluation of the SWF’s adherence to the 
Santiago Principles. The researcher contends that by and large Zimbabwe’s SWF 
does not adhere to the Santiago Principles. Table 5.1 juxtaposes ZEPARU’s 
observations to that of the researcher. 
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Table 5.1: Zimbabwe's SWF adherence to the Santiago Principles  
Santiago Principle ZEPARU observation Researcher’s observation 
GAPP 1- Principle 
 
The legal framework for the SWF should be 
sound and must support its effective operation 




The legal framework for the SWF should 





The key features of the SWF’s legal basis and 
structure, as well as the legal relationship 
between the SWF and other state bodies, 
should be publicly disclosed. 
The institutional framework for Zimbabwe’s SWF is 
established under the SWF of Zimbabwe Act of 
2014. The Minister of Finance administers the Act. 
 
The SWF, to be known as the SWF of Zimbabwe, is 
a separate independent legal entity, which is one 
common and accepted legal form in establishing 
SWFs. 
 
The Act establishing the SWF is a public document 
that can be purchased at a nominal cost from the 
Government Printer. No website has been created 
to make it fully publicly available. 
Zimbabwe’s SWF does not have a sound legal framework. 
The current enabling legislation does not support the SWF’s 
effective operation and achievement of stated objective(s). 
The stipulated objectives of Zimbabwe’s SWF (i.e. 
stabilisation, development, and saving) are poorly attuned to 
Zimbabwe’s macro-economic circumstances and 
development needs. Although a stabilisation fund could be a 
useful addition to Zimbabwe’s natural resource revenue 
management framework and macroeconomic toolkit, the 
government of Zimbabwe must establish a prudent natural 
resource revenue management framework that enables it to 
adequately capture and account for its resource rents. 
Policymakers can only deploy a development fund when the 
stabilisation fund has been adequately capitalised. 
Moreover, the government can only deploy a savings fund 
when the development fund achieves its development 
objectives. 
GAPP 2- Principle 
 
The policy purpose of the SWF should be 
clearly defined and publicly disclosed. 
The purpose of the SWF is clearly stated in section 
4 of the Act as: 
(a) To make secure investments for the benefit 
and enjoyment of future generations of 
Zimbabweans;  
(b) To support the development objectives of the 
government, including its long-term economic 
and social development;  
(c) To support fiscal or macroeconomic 
stabilisation, in particular to supplement (in 
accordance with this Act and the Finance Act) 
the revenues of Zimbabwe when these are 
prejudiced by the fluctuation of prices payable 
for those minerals on which royalties and other 
taxes are collected for the benefit of the 
consolidated fund; and 
(d) To contribute to the revenues of Zimbabwe 
from the net returns on its investments in 
accordance with section 21 (with regard to 
payment of dividends). 
The policy purpose of Zimbabwe’s SWF is not clearly 
defined. It is not clear what exactly the government wants to 
achieve with its SWF because it has multiples objectives; 
most of which are not attuned to the country’s 
macroeconomic circumstances and development needs (i.e. 
the development and savings mandate). Although 
possessing multiple objectives may not necessarily be a poor 
policy decision, each objective must be attuned to the 
country’s macroeconomic circumstances and development 
needs. 
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GAPP 3- Principle 
 
Where the SWF’s activities have significant 
direct domestic macroeconomic implications, 
those activities should be closely coordinated 
with the domestic and monetary authorities, so 
as to ensure consistency with the overall 
macroeconomic policies. 
Section 16(c) of the Act states: “to the extent that 
the investment mandate permits investment in 
domestic assets, no such investment may be made 
in Zimbabwe government debt, lending domestic or 
providing government guarantee.” 
The Act does not distinguish between public spending and 
investment via the budget and development investment as a 
financial activity into the private sector. Doing so is important 
as it would avoid conflating the two. If not clearly 
distinguished and coordinated, the development fund may be 
used to usurp parliament’s oversight of the national budget. 
 
GAPP 4- Principle 
 
There should be clear and publicly disclosed 
policies, procedures, or arrangements in 
relation to the SWF’s general approach to 
funding, withdrawal, and spending operations. 
 
GAPP 4.1-Sub-Principle 




The general approach to withdrawals from the 
SWF and spending on behalf of government 
should be publicly disclosed 
Section 14(1) of the Act specifies sources of funds 
to be deposited in the SWF, namely: 
1. Such portions (not exceeding a quarter) of 
royalties in respect of minerals. 
2. Such portions not exceeding one quarter of the 
“special dividend on the sales of diamonds, 
gas, granite and other extractables by or on 
behalf of the MMCZ payable to the 
Consolidate Revenue Fund”;  
3. Any moneys appropriated by an Act of 
Parliament; 
4. The profits and proceeds of the investments of 
the SWF; 
5. Any moneys received by the SWF under any 
contract of insurance effected by the Board; 
and 
6. Such other moneys that may accrue in the 
course of the operation of the SWF. 
7. Section 23 lays out the rules for withdrawals. 
However, while the withdrawal rules are closely 
linked to the government budget 
surplus/deficits, the amount is not determined 
as part of the annual budget process or pre-
agreed rules as per good practice. IFSWF 
(2014) notes that in most cases, withdrawals 
are made with the government budget 
framework to ensure consistency with other 
macroeconomic policies. 
The SWF’s primary deposit rule, which stipulates that such 
portions not exceeding a quarter of royalties in respect of 
minerals, is vague. The government is not bound by the 
provision because the rule states the upper limit of deposits 
that can be made into the SWF without stating the lower limit. 
Consequently, the government of Zimbabwe has not 
deposited any royalties into the SWF since its establishment 
in 2014. 
 
The researcher agrees with ZEPARU’s observation with 
regards to the withdrawal rule.  
GAPP 5- Principle 
 
The relevant statistical data pertaining to the 
SWF should be reported on a timely basis to 
In terms of section 12 of the Act, the Board of the 
SWF should submit quarterly and annual reports as 
well as occasional reports when required to the 
Though section 12 of Zimbabwe’s SWF stipulates that the 
SWF should submit quarterly and annual reports to the 
Minister which shall be tabled before Parliament, 
Zimbabwean Stated Owned Enterprises are notorious for 
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the owner, or as otherwise required, for 
inclusion where appropriate in macroeconomic 
data sets. 
Minister of Finance which reports the Minister shall 
table before Parliament. 
delaying and at times failing to submit such reports (Zhou and 
Zinyama 2012:229-230). There is need to include a punitive 
measure for failing to do so. Such a provision is more likely 
to ensure that the principle is adhered to.  
GAPP 6- Principle 
 
The governance framework for the SWF should 
be sound and establish a clear and effective 
division of roles and responsibilities in order to 
facilitate accountability and operational 
independence in the management of the SWF 
to pursue its objectives. 
The Minister of Finance representing the 
government provides the board of the SWF with the 
investment mandate which the board implements 
independently. The board is accountable for the 
overall portfolio performance and is ultimately 
accountable to the government for the effective 
management of the SWF. 
 
Section 25 of the Act provides for the audit of the 
SWF by the Auditor-General. 
Zimbabwe’s SWF does not possess a sound governance 
framework. Section 11 of Zimbabwe’s SWF Act stipulates 
that the Minister of Finance in consultation with the president 
can give the board directions in ‘national interest’. In other 
words, the political authority can override the decisions of the 
investment decision making authority (board) which 
compromises the organisation’s operational independence.  
GAPP 7-Principle 
 
The owner should set the objectives of the 
SWF, appoint members of its governing 
body(ies) in accordance with clearly defined 
procedures, and exercise oversight over the 
SWF’s operations. 
The SWF’s objectives are set out in the Act. With 
the approval of the president, the Minister of 
Finance appoints the Board in terms of section 6 of 
the Act. 
As is the case with Norway’s GPFG ownership of 
Zimbabwe’s SWF should be vested in the Parliament of 
Zimbabwe rather than the president. In a representative 
democracy, Parliament is better positioned to appoint an 




The governing body(ies) should act in the best 
interests of the SWF, and have a clear 
mandate and adequate authority to carry out 
its functions. 
The First Schedule of the Act provides guidelines for 
the appointment, renewal, or removal of board 
members as well as with regard to the engaging of 
investment managers and consultants. 
The governing body of Zimbabwe’s SWF (i.e. the board) is 
composed of political appointees. In other words, the board 
members serve at the pleasure of the state president and are 
likely to advance his interests. Parliament of Zimbabwe 
instead of the president is better positioned to appoint an 
apolitical board which is more likely to act in the best interests 
of the SWF. 
GAPP 9-Principle 
 
The operational management of the SWF 
should implement the SWF’s strategies in and 
independent manner and accordance with 
clearly defined responsibilities. 
The Act allows the SWF management to operate 
independently from government. It executes 
investment strategies and is responsible for all 
investment transactions and reports regularly to the 
Minister of Finance who represents the government. 
The independence of the operational core is compromised 
by the fact that Section 11 of Zimbabwe’s SWF Act 
empowers the Minister of Finance in consultation with the 




The accountability framework for the SWF’s 
operations should be clearly defined in the 
The accountability framework is clearly defined in 
the Act in Section 12. 
Section 12 clearly stipulates that the board should present 
quarterly and annual reports to the Minister of Finance no 
later than 30 days after the lapse of the quarter and 60 days 
after the lapse of the year. In turn the Minister of Finance is 
obliged to table the reports before Parliament within 15 days 
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relevant legislation, charter, other constitutive 
documents, or management agreements.  
of receiving the reports when Parliament is in session. 
However, Zimbabwean State-Owned Enterprises are 
notorious for delaying and at times failing to table such 
reports (Zhou and Zinyama 2012:229-230). The Act should 
include punitive measures for failing to do so. Punitive 
measures are likely to encourage responsible authorities to 
submit these reports. 
GAPP 11-Principle 
 
An annual report and accompanying financial 
statements on the SWF’s operations and 
performance should be prepared in a timely 
fashion and in accordance with recognised 
international or accounting standards in a 
consistent manner. 
The Act requires the production of an annual report 
that includes: 
1. The investment mandate adopted by the 
Minister and the investment guidelines 
determined by the board; 
2. The performance of the Fund; 
3. An assessment of the internal and external 
audits and risk management control systems in 
place; 
4. The audited financial statements of the Fund; 
5. All payments to and transfers from the Fund; a 
list of names of persons holding positions 
relevant to the operations and performance of 
the Fund; and any other information relevant to 
the management of the Fund. 
The report is required to be submitted not later 
than sixty days after the end of the financial year. 
Though the enabling legal framework requires annual reports 
and financial statements to be presented in a timely fashion 
and in accordance with recognised international or 
accounting, Zimbabwean State-Owned Enterprises are 
notorious for delaying and in some instances failing to submit 
such reports. Moreover, Auditor General reports over the 
years indicate that the books of accounts of some State-
Owned Enterprises are poorly compiled because some 
organisations or under staffed or incapacitated (Zhou and 
Zinyama 2012:229-230). The SWF needs to be capacitated 
with qualified accounts in order for it to be able to timeously 
produce up to date and quality financial statements. 
GAPP 12-Principle 
 
The SWF’s operations and financial statements 
should be audited annually in accordance with 
recognised international or national auditing 
standards in a consistent manner. 
The Act provides for an independent audit by the 
Auditor-General whose report is tabled in 
Parliament by the Minister of Finance. 
Though the SWF Act requires Zimbabwe’s SWF to be 
subjected to an independent audit by the Auditor-General, 
history has proven that the executive tends to ignore the 
Auditor-General’s recommendations. The government of 
Zimbabwe needs to give the Auditor-General sanctioning 
powers so that auditing of State-Owned Enterprises such as 
Zimbabwe’s SWF can be effective. 
GAPP 13-Principle 
 
Professional and ethical standards should be 
clearly defined and made known to the 
members of the SWF’s governing body(ies), 
management and staff. 
Sections 28, 29 and 30 of the Act clearly spell out 
professional and ethical standards as well as 
penalties. 
Though Section 28, 29 and 30 of Zimbabwe’s SWF Act 
provides a robust code of conduct, punitive measures for 
failing to submit reports timeously should be included in the 
professional standards. 
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GAPP 14-Principle 
 
Dealing with third parties for the purpose of the 
SWF’s operational management should be 
based on economic and financial grounds, and 
follow clear rules and procedures. 
Section 9 of the Act provides for the appointment of 
investment managers through an open, 
competitive, and transparent process. 
Researcher concurs with ZEPARU’s observation. 
GAPP 15-Principle 
 
SWF operations and activities in host countries 
should be conducted in compliance with all 
applicable regulatory and disclosure 
requirements of the countries in which they 
operate. 
Section 27 of the Act states that the Board of the 
Fund shall operate in accordance with the laws of 
the country in which the Fund has made an 
investment as well as the Money Laundering and 
Proceeds of Crime Act. 
Research concurs with ZEPARU’s observation. 
GAPP16-Principle 
 
The governance framework and objectives, as 
well as the manner in which the SWF’s 
management is operationally independent from 
the owner should be publicly disclosed. 
 
 
The governance framework and objectives, as well as 
the manner in which the SWF’s management is 
operationally independent from the owner is spelt out 
in the Act i.e. specific functions of the Board (section 
7). While, the Act is a public document that can be 
purchased at the Government Printers, disclosure to 
the generality of the population within and outside 
Zimbabwe can be improved through creating a 
dedicated website in line with the e-government 
programme. 
Researcher concurs with ZEPARU’s observation. 
GAPP 17-Principle 
 
Relevant financial information regarding the 
SWF should be publicly disclosed to 
demonstrate its economic and financial 
orientation, so as to contribute to stability in the 
financial markets and enhance trust of recipient 
countries. 
While this information is tabled in Parliament, it is 
not publicly available via a website. In other 
jurisdictions the Board also issues public quarterly 
updates on performance and asset allocation. 
Researcher concurs with ZEPARU’ 
GAPP 18-Principle 
 
The SWF’s investment policy should be clear 
and consistent with its defined objectives, risk 
tolerance. And investment strategy, as set by 
the owner of the governing body(ies), and be 
based on sound portfolio management 
practices. 
 
In terms of Section 15 of the Act, the board is 
empowered to create the following sub-funds: 
1. Government Investment Sub-Fund to achieve 
the objective of securing investments for the 
benefit and enjoyment of future generations; 
2. Infrastructure Development Sub-Fund to 
achieve the objective of supporting the 
development objectives of the government 
In the short to medium term macroeconomic stabilisation is 
the only feasible objective of Zimbabwe’s SWF because 
commodity price volatility is one of the most damaging factors 
among natural resource-rich developing economies such as 
Zimbabwe. Policymakers can only deploy a development 
fund when the stabilisation fund has been adequately 
capitalised and a savings fund when the development fund 
has achieved its development objective. There is congruity 
between the SWF’s investment policy and most feasible 
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GAPP 18.1-Sub-Principle 
 
The investment policy should guide the SWF’s 





The investment policy should address the 
extent to which internal and/or external 
investment managers are used, the range of 
their activities and authority, and the process by 





A description of the investment policy of the 
SWF should be publicly disclosed. 
including its long-term economic and social 
development. 
3. Stabilisation Sub-Fund to achieve the objective 
of supporting fiscal or macroeconomic 
stabilisation; 
4. Other Sub-Funds as the Board considers 
expedient to establishing for the purposes of 
achieving the objectives of the SWF. 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe is the primary 
custodian of the Fund. The following principles 
apply to the investment of the Fund: 
1. The Fund must be invested in conformity with 
the Board’s investment mandate; 
2. Investment must be in old bullions, stockpiles 
of precious stones and other precious metals, 
and foreign assets; and 
3. To the extent that the investment mandate 
permits investment in domestic assets but not 
in Government debt. Domestic general lending 
or providing government guarantees. 
4. Section 18 of the Act lays down the principles 
of the investment mandate which are required 
to be in line with the Santiago Principles. 
 
However, the investment policy is not publicly 
disclosed as required by section 16(5) of the Act. 
policy objective (i.e. macroeconomic stabilisation) because 
gold bullions are highly liquid and they can easily be disposed 
in the event of an external shock. 
GAPP 19-Principle 
 
The SWF’s investment decisions should aim to 
maximise risk-adjusted financial returns in a 
manner consistent with its investment policy, 




If investment decisions are subject to other than 
economic financial considerations, these 
should be clearly set out in the investment 
policy and be publicly disclosed. 
 
The Board of the Fund is required to maximise 
risk-adjusted returns as is required by section 7 of 
the Act. 
The researcher concurs with ZEPARU’s observation. Section 
7(e) of Zimbabwe’s SWF Act stipulates that one of the 
functions of the SWF’s board is “to reinvest the profits and 
proceeds of its investments to generate future risk-adjusted 
returns”. 
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GAPP 19.2-Sub-Principle 
 
The management of an SWF’s assets should 
be consistent with what is generally accepted 
as sound asset management principles. 
GAPP 20-Principle 
 
The SWF should not seek or take advantage of 
privileged information or inappropriate 
influence by broader government in competing 
with private entities.  
This is not specifically stated in the Act but might be 
available in the unpublished investment policy. 
The researcher concurs with ZEPARU’s observation. 
GAPP 21-Principle 
 
SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a 
fundamental element of their equity 
investment’s value. If an SWF chooses to 
exercise its ownership rights, it should do so in 
a manner that is consistent with its investment 
policy and protects the financial value of its 
investments. The SWF should publicly disclose 
its general approach to voting securities of 
listed entities, including the key factors guiding 
its exercise of ownership rights. 
The SWF is new and its general approach to voting 
securities of listed entities including the key factors 
guiding its exercise of ownership rights are still in 
their infancy or yet to be developed. 
The researcher concurs with ZEPARU’s observation. 
GAPP 22-Principle 
 
The SWF should have a framework that 





The risk management framework should 
include reliable information and timely reporting 
systems, which should enable the adequate 
monitoring and management of relevant risks 
within acceptable parameters and levels, 
control and incentive mechanisms, codes of 
conduct, business continuity planning, and an 
independent audit function. 
 
This framework should be embodied in the 
investment mandate which is not yet publicly 
available as required by section 16(5) of the Act. 
The researcher concurs with ZEPARU’s observation. 
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GAPP 22.2-Sub-Principle 
 
The general approach of the SWF’s risk 




The assets and investment performance 
(absolute and relative to benchmarks, if any) of 
the SWF should be measured and reported to 
the owner according to clearly defined 
principles or standards. 
This is provided for in Section 12 of the Act. Though Section 12 of the SWF Act provides for the need to 
measure and report asset and investment performance, 
Zimbabwean State-Owned Enterprises are notorious for 
delaying or ignoring such requirements. Punitive measures 
should be included in the provision in order to compel the 
relevant authorities to implement this requirement. 
GAPP 24-Principle 
 
A process of regular review of the 
implementation of the GAPP should be 
engaged in by or on behalf of the SWF. 
Since the Act explicitly embodies the Santiago 
Principles, regular reviews are expected. 
Zimbabwe is not a member of the IFSWF. Thus it does not 
attend regular reviews of the implementation of the GAPP. 
Zimbabwe’s should join the IFSWF so that it is able to review 
the implementation of GAPPs with its peers. 
Source: Author’s compilation.  
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From Table 5.1, it can be deduced that ZEPARU exaggerated the SWF’s adherence 
to the Santiago Principle. In some instances, ZEPARU did not critically assess the 
SWF’s adherence to the Santiago Principles. For example, though Zimbabwe’s SWF 
Act (Statutory Instrument Number 7 of 2014) requires the SWF board to timeously 
submit performance reports, Zimbabwean State-Owned Enterprises are notorious for 
delaying or failing to submit reports (Zhou and Zinyama 2012:229-230). Therefore, 
though it is a statutory requirement the status quo indicates that it is likely to be 
ignored. Moreover, ZEPARU did not critically reflect on the soundness of the 
objectives of the SWF stipulated in the enabling legal framework. From Table 5.1, it 
can be concluded that by and large Zimbabwe’s SWF does not adhere to the Santiago 
Principles.   
5.3.2 Truman’s scoreboard for SWF best practices 
Edwin Truman of the Peterson Institute of International Economics developed a 
scoreboard that evaluates an SWF’s adherence to best practices of managing SWFs 
based on the practices of 44 SWFs at the time (Truman 2008:1). The scoreboard 
contains 33 elements that are categorised into four categories, namely structure, 
governance, accountability, and behaviour, with a final score reflecting the percentage 
of possible points achieved out of 100 (Truman 2008:6). Table 5.2 shows the metrics 
used to assess each category. 
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Table 5.1: Elements of Truman's scoreboard 
   
Source: Markowitz (2020:10).  
 
The structure category assesses the institutional coherence of an SWF. It examines 
the objective of each SWF, its source of funding, its investment strategy, and how they 
relate to the country’s macroeconomic policy objectives (Truman 2008:8). Moreover, 
the governance category assesses the extent to which an SWF’s board is independent 
from the political authority (Truman 2008:9). Furthermore, the transparency and 
accountability category assesses the extent to which the SWF is transparent and 
accountable to the country’s citizens (Truman 2008:10). Lastly, the behaviour category 
assesses the investment strategy of the SWF. It measures the extent to which the 
investment strategy conforms to the objectives the SWF was set up to achieve 
(Truman 2008:12). Table 5.3 presents the last Truman scoreboard results for the year 
2015 (published in 2016). 
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Table 5.2: Truman's 2015 scoreboard 
Country Fund name Score 
Norway GPFG 98 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund 94 
USA Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund 93 
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan 92 
Canada Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 91 
Chile ESSF  91 
Chile PRF  88 
East Timor Petroleum Fund of East Timor 88 
USA Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation 88 
Australia Future Fund 87 
USA New Mexico Investment Council 84 
Ireland Ireland Strategic Investment Fund 82 
USA Alabama Trust Fund 82 
Trinidad and Tobago Heritage Stabilisation Fund 81 
Korea Korea Investment Corporation 78 
Palestine Palestine Investment Fund 77 
Nigeria Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority 76 
Singapore Temasek Holdings 76 
USA Texas Permanent School Fund 73 
China CIC 70 
USA Texas Permanent University Fund 70 
France Caisse des Despots et Consignations  68 
Hong Kong Exchange Fund 68 
Mexico Budgetary Income Stabilisation Fund 68 
UAE Mubadala Development Company 68 
Angola FSDEA 67 
Italy Fondo Strategico Italiano 67 
France BPI France Investissements 65 
USA North Dakota Legacy Fund 64 
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional Berhad 61 
Singapore GIC  61 
Brazil Sovereign Fund of Brazil 60 
Botswana Pula Fund 59 
UAE Dubai Holding 59 
UAE ADIA 58 
Rwanda Agaciro Development Fund 57 
UAE Investment Corporation of Dubai 55 
UAE International Petroleum Investment Company 55 
Bahrain Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company 52 
Oman State General Reserve Fund 52 
Russia National Welfare and Reserve Fund 49 
Iran National Development Fund of Iran 48 
Kazakhstan National Investment Corporation 48 
Mexico Fondo Mexicano del Petroleo para la Estabilizacion ye el 
Dessarrollo 
48 
Peru Fiscal Stabilization Fund 48 
Morocco Moroccan Fund for Tourism Development 47 
Ghana Ghana Petroleum Funds 45 
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Country Fund name Score 
Venezuela Macroeconomic Stabilisation Fund 42 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 40 
Vietnam State Capital Investment Corporation 39 
Russia Russia Direct Investment Fund 36 
Kiribati Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund 35 
UAE Abu Dhabi Investment Council 33 
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency 30 
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 26 
Libya LIA 23 
UAE Isitithmar World 23 
Equatorial Guinea Fund for Future Generations 11 
Source: Stone and Truman (2016:7-8). 
 
From Table 5.3, it can be deduced that 40 out of 60 SWFs subjected to the last Truman 
SWF governance scoreboard scored above half. This implies that most of the world’s 
SWFs have a relatively sound governance framework. Zimbabwe’s SWF is yet to be 
subjected to Truman’s SWF governance scoreboard. However, based on the 
assessment of the SWF’s adherence to the Santiago Principles in Table 5.1, 
Zimbabwe’s SWF is likely to score below average. The next section discusses the 
governance architecture of selected commodity-based SWFs in the developing world. 
5.4  GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE OF SELECTED SWFs 
This section contextualises the discussion by examining the governance architecture 
of selected successful commodity-based SWFs in the developing world, namely 
Chile’s SWFs (i.e. the ESSF and PRF) and Botswana’s Pula Fund. 
5.4.1  Chile’s SWFs  
The governance framework of Chile’s SWFs is exemplary though somewhat flawed 
(Solimano and Guajardo 2017:11). The ESSF and the PRF are institutionally coherent. 
The ESSF was established to complement Chile’s structural budget rule. It finances 
deficits that arise in periods of low growth and commodity price slumps. On the other 
hand, the PRF was established to finance government’s old age and solidarity pension 
fund liabilities (IMF 2007:1). The Minister of Finance, has the prerogative to decide 
whether the investment policy (which he or she decides) will be implemented through 
Treasury or delegated to the central bank or other external managers (Solimano and 
Guajardo 2017:11). Acting on the instruction of the Minister of Finance, Chile’s central 
106 
bank contracted JP Morgan Chase Bank (one of America’s largest banks) to serve as 
international custodian of Chile’s SWF investments. JP Morgan is responsible for 
calculating the SWFs returns, reporting the investment portfolios and portfolio risks, 
monitoring compliance with investment limits and performing other middle office 
function complemented by Treasury and General Treasury of Chile personnel (Ministry 
of Finance 2018:16). In short, Chile has adequate human resource capacity to 
successfully manage its SWFs. 
Furthermore, Chile’s SWFs are governed in a transparent and accountable manner. 
Treasury established an SWFs unit within the ministry which acts as the technical 
secretariat of the financial committee (the board). The unit prepares monthly, quarterly, 
and annual reports on the performance of the SWF which are tabled before congress 
by the Minister of Finance and transmitted to the general public in English and Spanish 
on the SWFs website. Additionally, every two years the SWFs conduct self-
assessment tests that are publicly disclosed which examine the extent to which the 
SWFs adhere to international best practices (i.e. the Santiago Principles) (Ministry of 
Finance 2018:19). 
Moreover, investment beliefs that guide investment decision making in Chile’s SWFs 
are explicitly stated in their investment policies. The investment belief is in sync with 
the SWFs overall objectives.  ESSF’s investment policy is primarily anchored on fixed 
income investments in reserve currencies (i.e. 40% dollars, 25% Euros, 20% Yen and 
7.5% Swiss francs) which are typically favoured in times of crisis (Santiso 2012:82). 
On the other hand, PRF’s investment policy is primarily anchored on equities, 
sovereign bonds, corporate bonds, mortgage-backed securities, high-yield bonds, and 
unlisted real estate assets (Ministry of Finance 2018:43). 
However, the SWFs enabling legal framework (i.e. the Fiscal Responsibility Law) 
grants the Minister of Finance (the political authority), excessive powers and sidelines 
the financial committee (the investment decision making authority). The financial 
committee (appointed by the Minister of Finance with the approval of Parliament based 
on merit i.e. experience in financial and economic affairs) is an external advisory board 
tasked with advising the Minister of Finance on the analysis and design of SWF 
investment policy (Solimano and Guajardo 2017:11). Investment design making 
should be the prerogative of the financial committee. The function of the Minister of 
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Finance should be restricted to stipulating the SWFs policy objectives and performing 
an oversight role (Dixon 2016:7). The next sub-section discusses the governance 
architecture of Botswana’s Pula Fund. 
5.4.2  Botswana’s Pula Fund 
Botswana’s Pula Fund is one of the best governed SWFs in the developing world 
(Dixon 2016:8). Though the Pula Fund’s policy objective is unclear, it has been used 
to stabilise the economy during periods of economic turmoil (e.g. the 2008 global 
economic crisis and the current global economic recession due to the COVID-19 
pandemic). It also serves as a future generations’ savings fund (Revenue Watch 
Institute 2013:1). In tandem with its set objectives (i.e. macroeconomic stabilisation 
and intergenerational equity), the Pula Fund invests in fixed income securities (i.e. 
reserve currencies: 41.9% dollars, 37.4% euros, 11.3% pound sterling and 9.4% yen) 
and global equities (Revenue Watch Institute 2013:4). Bank of Botswana’s risk 
management office is responsible for assessing portfolio risk and ensuring that it is 
consistent with the level of risk tolerance stipulated in the investment guidelines 
approved by the board (Chigumira et al 2013:37). 
Furthermore, the board and operational management of Botswana’s Pula Fund are 
relatively free from political interference and the enabling legislation established a 
clear accountability framework (World Bank 2018:4). There is a clear separation of 
responsibilities between the political authority (Parliament and the Minister of Finance) 
and the investment decision-making authority (the Board of the Bank of Botswana and 
the Pula Fund’s investment committee) of the SWF. Botswana’s Parliament 
established the objectives of the Pula Fund through the SWF’s enabling legal 
framework and reinforces them in national development plans that guide its operations 
(Revenue Watch Institute 2013:8). The Minister of Finance and Development Planning 
(the responsible minister) receives reports on the performance of the Pula Fund from 
the Board of the Bank of Botswana which he tables before Parliament (World Bank 
2018:4). On the request of the Minister of Finance and Development Planning, the 
Auditor General reports on the accounts and operations of the Pula Fund (Revenue 
Watch Institute 2013:8). The Board of the Bank of Botswana manages the Pula Fund. 
Members of the board include: an official from the Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning representing government, the Governor of the Bank of 
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Botswana and seven independent non-executive directors (Chigumira et al 2016:37). 
The Board of the Bank of Botswana is responsible for approving investment policies 
and guidelines crafted by the investment committee (Revenue Watch Institute 2013:8). 
The investment committee which is chaired by the Governor of the Bank of Botswana 
and includes experts from the central bank’s financial market department is 
responsible for the execution of the investment strategy with the assistance of external 
managers. Bank of Botswana’s payments and settlement department and its finance 
department perform back office functions and performance reviews respectively 
(Chigumira et al 2016:37).   
Moreover, Pula Fund has a robust human resource management framework that 
attracts and retains some of the best talent in the global financial industry. Because 
most of the skills required to manage a sophisticated SWF are not readily available in 
Botswana, the Bank of Botswana engages the services of an international recruitment 
agency based in London that helps shortlist potential fund managers. The recruitment 
agency recommends the shortlisted candidates to the Board of the Bank of Botswana 
which makes the final selection. On appointment fund managers sign performance-
based contracts. Every six months each fund manager reports on how assets under 
their purview are performing. The contracts of fund managers that are performing 
below expectation are terminated (Chigumira et al 2013:76) 
5.5  GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES: LESSONS DRAWN 
This section discusses the lessons drawn from the cases discussed in the preceding 
section. From the preceding section it can be concluded that though somewhat flawed 
Chile’s SWFs is well governed. The SWFs objectives are logically integrated into the 
country’s macroeconomic policies and natural resource revenue management 
framework (i.e. the structural budget rule). Moreover, the SWFs investment beliefs are 
explicitly stated and they are in tandem with the objectives of the SWF. Furthermore, 
the SWFs are managed in a transparent and accountable manner. Updates on the 
performance of the SWFs are uploaded on government websites for the benefit of the 
general public. However, the SWFs enabling legal framework grants excessive 
investment decision making powers to the Minister of Finance which should be the 
prerogative of the financial committee. 
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Botswana’s Pula Fund is another example of a well governed SWF in the developing 
world. The objectives of the Pula Fund are properly attuned to Botswana’s 
macroeconomic circumstances and development needs. The Pula Fund has 
successfully cushioned Botswana’s economy during periods of economic turmoil such 
as the 2008 global economic crisis. Moreover, the Pula Fund’s investment objectives 
are clearly stated are they are in line with the overall objectives of the SWF. 
Furthermore, the Pula Fund is relatively free from political interference and it is 
managed in a transparent and accountable manner. There is a clear separation 
between the political authority and the investment decision making authority. In 
addition, the Pula Fund has a robust human resource management policy framework 
that attracts some of the best talent in the global financial industry. 
5.6  THE GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE OF ZIMBABWE’S SWF 
In contrast to Chile’s SWFs and Botswana’s Pula Fund, Zimbabwe’s SWF has a weak 
governance framework. It is not clear what exactly the government of Zimbabwe wants 
to achieve with its SWF because it has multiple policy objectives (i.e. macroeconomic 
stabilisation, development and intergenerational equity). Possessing an SWF with 
multiple policy objectives is not necessarily a bad policy decision if the different SWF 
types are separately established or ring-fenced (OECD 2018:15). However, each 
policy objective has to be attuned to the country’s overall macroeconomic policies and 
natural resource revenue management framework (Matambo and Dixon 2021:37). A 
stabilisation fund could be a useful addition to Zimbabwe’s natural resource revenue 
management and macroeconomic policy framework because commodity price 
volatility is one of the most damaging factors among natural resource-rich developing 
economies such as Zimbabwe. The stabilisation fund can be used to smoothen natural 
resource revenue across the commodity cycle (Hawkins 2009:48). However, 
government needs to be able to capture and account for its natural resource revenue 
before it can successfully operationalise the stabilisation fund (Matambo and Dixon 
2021:37). Policymakers should deploy a development fund when government has 
adequately capitalised the stabilisation fund and a savings fund when the development 
fund has achieved its development objective (Dixon and Monk 2011a:8).  
There is congruity between the SWF’s investment policy and its most feasible policy 
objective (i.e. macroeconomic stabilisation). Section 16(3)(b) of Zimbabwe’s SWF Act 
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(Statutory Instrument Number 7 of 2014) stipulates that Zimbabwe’s SWF invests in 
gold bullion and stockpiles of precious stones and other precious minerals abroad. 
Bullion coins such as the South African Krugerrand, Australian Kangaroo coin and 
English Britannia coin could be good investments for Zimbabwe’s SWF because they 
are reasonably liquid thus they can be easily mobilised in the event of an unexpected 
shock. However, Zimbabwe’s SWF should avoid investing in special edition 
commemorative sovereign coins which are usually more expensive and resell for less 
than better known coins. It should also avoid investing in sovereign coins from less 
known countries (Garret 2018). 
However, the political authority (i.e. president and the Minister of Finance), interfere in 
the day to day administration of the SWF because Zimbabwe has an excessively 
powerful executive president who personally approves every decision (i.e. policy 
guidelines and regulations, senior appointments to state-owned enterprises, financial 
operations and new bills to be gazetted) (Makumbe and Compagnon 2000:34). 
Section 3 of Zimbabwe’s SWF Act (Statutory Instrument Number 7 of 2014) vests 
ownership of Zimbabwe’s SWF in the Republic of Zimbabwe, with the president of 
Zimbabwe acting as the trustee. Furthermore, Section 11 of Zimbabwe’s SWF Act 
stipulates that the president and Minister of Finance can give policy direction to the 
board (the investment decision-making authority) in “national interest”. The 
aforementioned statutory provision seriously compromises the independence of the 
board because it grants the political authority power to override the investment 
decision making authority of the board. Consequently, Zimbabwe’s SWF may be used 
to invest in pet projects linked to state elites (Dixon and Monk 2011b:4). In addition, 
Section 6(b) of Zimbabwe’s SWF Act (Statutory Instrument Number 7 of 2014) 
empowers, the Minister of Finance with the approval of the president to appoint a nine-
member board. The board members should have proven competencies in finance, 
investment, economics, business management and law. In order limit the executive’s 
excessive influence over Zimbabwe’s SWF, Parliament should appoint the SWF’s 
board.  
Furthermore, Zimbabwe’s bloated and resource constrained government is struggling 
to put in place appropriate administrative structures to spearhead the 
operationalisation of the country’s SWF (Eldredge 2016:109). Since 2015, an interim 
secretariat which comprises three executives seconded by Treasury, the central bank 
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and the Office of the President and Cabinet, is providing administrative services, with 
the Accountant General providing oversight, while proper structures are being 
established (Chinamasa 2015:167). 
In addition, section 12 of Zimbabwe’s SWF Act (Statutory Instrument Number 7 of 
2014) provides for a robust accountability framework that requires the board to submit 
quarterly and annual reports to the Minister of Finance who should table them before 
Parliament within 15 days of receiving them. However, Zimbabwean State-Owned 
Enterprises are notorious for delaying and in some instances ignoring the need to 
submit quarterly and annual reports to Treasury (Zhou and Zinyama 2012:229-230). 
Including punitive measures in the enabling legal framework for failing to submit 
performance reports could encourage the board and operational management to 
adhere to the need to timeously submit reports to the relevant authorities. Moreover, 
the government of Zimbabwe should setup a website that updates the country’s 
citizens on the performance of the SWF once it has been operationalised. 
5.7  CONCLUSION 
The contribution of this chapter is that it provides the first independent expert 
assessment of the governance architecture of Zimbabwe’s SWF. Section 5.2 
presented the analytical framework of the chapter. It identified and discussed SWF 
governance principles and practices. The governance principles and practices include: 
institutional coherence, process, people, and politics. Section 5.3 went on to discuss 
litmus tests used to examine the extent to which SWFs adheres to international best 
practices. The litmus tests discussed include the GAPPs and Truman’s scoreboard. 
In section 5.3.1, the researcher contends that ZEPARU’s assessment of Zimbabwe’s 
SWF was exaggerated. The researcher presented an independent expert assessment 
of the extent to which Zimbabwe’s SWF adheres to the Santiago Principles. Using the 
analytical framework presented in Section 5.2, Section 5.4 discussed cases of well 
governed SWFs in the developing world (i.e. Chile’s SWFs and Botswana’s Pula 
Fund). Section 5.5 presented lessons drawn for Zimbabwe. Section 5.6 assessed the 
extent to which Zimbabwe’s SWF adheres principles and practices of managing 
SWFs. The chapter concludes that by and large Zimbabwe’s SWF has a weak 
governance framework. It is not clear what Zimbabwe wants to do with its SWF 
because its multiple policy objectives are not aligned to the country’s natural resource 
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revenue management and macroeconomic policy frameworks. A stabilisation fund 
could be a useful addition to the country’s natural resource revenue management and 
macroeconomic policy framework. Nonetheless, the government of Zimbabwe needs 
to adequately capture and account for its resource rents before it can operationalise a 
successful SWF. There is congruity between the investment policy of the SWF and its 
most feasible policy option (i.e. macroeconomic stabilisation) because gold bullions 
are highly liquid assets which can be easily accessed in the event of an external shock. 
However, the political authority of Zimbabwe’s SWF interferes in the affairs of the fund 
because the country has an excessively powerful president who is involved in all 
government decision making processes. The SWF is therefore likely to be used to 
finance pet projects linked to state elites. In addition, the bloated and resource 
constrained government of Zimbabwe is struggling to establish appropriate 
administrative structures to spearhead the operationalisation of Zimbabwe’s SWF. 
Moreover, though the enabling legal framework of Zimbabwe’s SWF provides for a 
robust accountability framework, Zimbabwean State-Owned Enterprises are notorious 
for delaying or ignoring to submit performance reports to their responsible Ministers. 
Including punitive measures in the enabling legal framework could encourage the 
relevant authorities to timeously submit the report. The next chapter presents a 
synthesis of the entire thesis, evaluation, conclusions, and proposals.   
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CHAPTER SIX:  
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Four and Five revealed that prudent natural resource revenue management 
frameworks and sound SWF governance principles and practices underpin the 
successful operationalisation of commodity-based SWFs. However, Zimbabwe has a 
weak natural resource revenue management framework, and its SWF has a weak 
governance architecture. In short, Zimbabwe’s SWF is a premature fund. It was poorly 
designed and poorly attuned to the country’s macroeconomic circumstances and 
development needs. This chapter concludes the study by providing recommendations 
on how the government of Zimbabwe can successfully operationalise its commodity-
based SWF.  
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 provides recommendations on how 
the government of Zimbabwe can successfully operationalise its commodity-based 
SWF. The final section concludes.  
6.2  RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of research findings presented and discussed in this thesis, this study makes 
the following recommendations: (a) free Zimbabwe’s extractive industries from mining 
cartels, (b) adopt a prudent natural resource revenue management framework, (c) 
gradual deployment of SWF types, (d) ensure there’s coherence between the 
objectives of the SWF and the country’s overall fiscal policy, (e) build human resource 
capacity, (f) completely separate the political authority from the investment decision 
making authority, (g) include punitive measures in the enabling legal for failing to 
implement its provision, (h) Zimbabwe’s SWF should join the IFSWF. The sub-sections 
below parse out the aforementioned recommendations. 
6.2.1  Free Zimbabwe’s extractive industries from mining cartels  
Research findings in Chapter Three and Four revealed that the country’s extractive 
industries are opaquely managed. They are captured by a securocrat comprador 
bourgeoisie that places its welfare and survival ahead of national development. 
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Consequently, the generality of the population does not know exactly how much the 
country earns from its natural resources. During his 92nd birthday interview, the late 
former president Robert Mugabe revealed that Zimbabwe lost US$15 billion worth of 
diamonds between 2006 and 2016. Moreover, during the era of Zimbabwe’s inclusive 
government, the then Minister of Finance Tendai Biti often accused ZANU-PF of 
running a parallel fiscus. During the time, Zimbabwe exported diamonds worth an 
average of half a billion United States dollars per annum. However, a paltry ten percent 
of export earnings were deposited into government coffers (Biti 2012:233). Following 
the substantial depletion of alluvial diamonds in Marange, mining cartels have shifted 
their attention to gold, nickel, and platinum deposits. Maverick Citizens (2021:7) 
estimate that more than US$1.5 billion worth of gold is smuggled out of Zimbabwe 
often ending up in Dubai. President Mnangagwa’s wife Auxillia and one of his sons 
Collins are implicated in Henrietta Rushwaya’s (the current head of Zimbabwe’s 
Mineral Federation) gold smuggling scandal which is currently on trial before the 
courts. Rushwaya was arrested at Robert Mugabe International Airport for attempting 
to smuggle 6 kilograms worth of gold worth US$330 000 on behalf of a smuggling 
syndicated involving members of the first family (Chikore 2020).  
Mining cartels linked to the first family control key government institutions. Therefore, 
it is difficult to prosecute them. Zimbabwe’s Prosecutor General cited in the Maverick 
Citizen (2021:8) laments that: 
“What we have in Zimbabwe is the problem of cartels who affect every sector 
of society. We have got sections in the judiciary, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, 
the National Prosecuting Authority and even the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption 
Commission who are controlled by cartels and manipulate investigations and 
this is pulling the country’s economy down”. 
Moreover, over the years Parliament which should oversee the management of the 
country’s extractive industries on behalf of the people has been given limited access 
to the country’s extractive industries particularly the Marange diamond fields (Maguwu 
2013:74). Mining cartels are untouchable because of the nature of Zimbabwe’s power 
dynamics. Power resides in an executive president who serves at the pleasure of the 
army (i.e. the stockholders of power in Zimbabwe because of the country’s liberation 
legacy) (Mills et al. 2019:184). In order to free the country’s extractive industries from 
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mining cartels, the study recommends that power should be evenly distributed across 
the three arms of government (i.e. executive, legislature and judiciary). As evidenced 
by the handling of the Nkandla debacle in South Africa where Parliament forced the 
then president Jacob Zuma to pay back state resources used to finance non-security 
upgrades to his personal residence which included a lavish swimming pool and 
amphitheatre, a strong legislature and judiciary can hold a corrupt executive to account 
(Toyana and Macharia 2016). Moreover, the study also recommends that Zimbabwe 
needs to professionalise its army. Section 212 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
[Amendment Number 20 of 2013] stipulates that the mandate of Zimbabwe’s defence 
forces is to protect the country, its people, its national security, and interests and its 
territorial integrity. From the aforementioned constitutional provision, it can be gleaned 
that the army should not be involved in politics or economic activities.  
6.2.2  Adopt a prudent natural resource revenue management framework 
The research findings in Chapter Four revealed that Chile’s ESSF and PRF and 
Botswana’s Pula Fund are successful commodity-based SWFs because they are by-
products of prudent natural resource revenue management frameworks. Chile and 
Botswana’s natural resource revenue management frameworks are underpinned by 
the structural budget rule and the SBI respectively. The structural budget rule 
smoothens Chile’s resource rents throughout the commodity cycle and the SBI 
ensures that a significant portion of Botswana’s natural resource revenue is invested 
in other forms of capital that replace the country’s depleting natural resource base (i.e. 
physical, human, social and financial capital). Moreover, both countries can 
adequately capture and account for their resource rents.  
In contrast, Zimbabwe does not have a natural resource revenue management 
framework that guides how the country’s resource rents are spent (Centre for Natural 
Resource Governance n.d.:4). Consequently, almost all of the country’s natural 
resource revenue is spent on recurrent expenditure. Moreover, Zimbabwe’s resource 
rents are not channelled towards broad based inclusive socio-economic development 
because the country is plagued by political Dutch disease (Mlambo 2018:1). As 
advised by IMF (2014:18), the government of Zimbabwe needs to re-examine the 
fiscal regime of its extractive industries before it can launch a successful commodity-
based SWF. In other words, the government of Zimbabwe has to adequately capture 
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and account for its resource rents before it can operationalise a successful commodity-
based SWF (Matambo and Dixon 2021:37). The first step towards doing so would be 
to adopt a natural resource revenue management framework that guides how resource 
rents should be spent. However, the natural resource revenue management 
framework can only achieve its set objectives if policymakers have the political will to 
implement it to the letter. 
6.2.3  Gradual deployment of SWF types 
The SWF deployment policy framework presented in Section 4.3.3 illustrated that 
African governments’ need to gradually and systematically deploy SWF types. 
Stabilisation funds should be the first port of call when deploying commodity-based 
SWFs on the African continent because commodity price volatility is one of the most 
damaging factors in the developing world. When the stabilisation fund has sufficient 
resources to stabilise the economy and insulate the budget in the event of an economic 
downturn, policymakers can deploy a separate development fund. Once the 
development fund achieves its development objectives, the government can deploy a 
separate savings fund. The research findings presented in Section 4.6 revealed that 
the government of Zimbabwe deployed an SWF with three sub-funds at the same time 
(i.e. a stabilisation fund, a development fund, and a savings fund). The study 
recommends that the government needs to successfully operationalise the 
stabilisation mandate of its SWF before it can think of deploying a development fund 
and a savings fund. More importantly, the SWF types should be established separately 
or ring-fenced so that the different objectives do not stifle one another (OECD 
2018:18). SWF types have different objectives, different time horizons, different 
human resource needs, and different investment strategies. Furthermore, the 
government of Zimbabwe has to adequately capture and account for its resource rents 
and channel its natural resources towards inclusive social and economic development 
before it can successfully operationalise the stabilisation fund (Matambo and Dixon 
2021:37). 
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6.2.4  Ensure there is coherence between the SWF and the country’s overall 
fiscal policy 
The research findings in Chapter Five revealed that Zimbabwe’s SWF lacks 
institutional coherence. In other words, what the SWF was created to do, its 
relationship with the country’s overall fiscal policy, and how that relationship feeds into 
the SWF’s governance framework and investment policy are not in sync.  
The government of Zimbabwe therefore needs to reassess why it created a 
commodity-based SWF. After doing so, it should objectively link the objectives of the 
SWF to the country’s overall fiscal policy. The government can then appropriately 
structure the SWF’s governance framework and investment policy in line with its set 
objectives. 
6.2.5  Build human resource capacity 
The research findings in Chapter Five revealed that Zimbabwean policymakers are 
struggling to setup appropriate structures to manage its SWF. The government of 
Zimbabwe should make use of the recently established Natural Resource Revenue 
Management Capacity Building Programme for the Macroeconomic and Financial 
Management Institute of Eastern and Southern Africa (MEFMI) region. This capacity 
building programme is training government employees in the MEFMI region on how to 
manage commodity-based SWFs in the developing world. 
6.2.6  Completely separate the SWF political authority from the investment 
decision making authority  
The research findings in Chapter Five revealed that political interference in the affairs 
of Zimbabwe’s SWF impedes the funds’ independence and ultimately its 
operationalisation. Thus, Zimbabwean policymakers need to amend the SWF’s 
enabling legal framework. As prescribed by the Santiago Principles, Zimbabwe’s SWF 
Act should clearly separate the roles and responsibilities of the political authority (the 
president and the Minister of Finance) and the investment decision-making authority 
(board of directors). The role of the political authority should be confined to 
establishing the SWF and facilitating the appointment of the board through a 
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transparent process based on merit rather than political affiliation. The investment 
decision making should be left to the experts (the board). 
6.2.7  Include punitive measures on the enabling legal framework for 
implement provisions 
Research findings in Chapter Five revealed that the enabling legal framework of 
Zimbabwe’s SWF provides for a robust accountability framework that requires the fund 
to timeously submit performance reports to the Minister of Finance who then tables it 
before Parliament. However, Zimbabwean State-Owned Enterprises are notorious for 
failing to timeously submit the reports and in some instances completely ignoring the 
requirement to do so. The study recommends that punitive measures should be 
included in the SWF’s enabling legal framework. They could encourage the 
responsible authorities to timeously submit the reports. 
6.2.8  Zimbabwe’s SWF should join the IFSWF 
Research Findings in Chapter Five revealed that Zimbabwe’s SWF is not a member 
of the IFSWF. The study recommends that the SWF should join the IFSWF so that it 
can benefit from the experiences of other governments that have successfully 
operationalised SWFs. 
6.3  PROPOSED MODEL FOR THE SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONALISATION 
OF ZIMBABWE’S SWF 
Based on recommendations discussed in the preceding section. The researcher 
developed a model that proposes how the government of Zimbabwe can successfully 
operationalise its commodity-based SWF. 
119 
Figure 6.1: Proposed model for the operationalisation of Zimbabwe’s SWF 
 
Source: researcher’s illustration. 
6.4  CONCLUSION 
The research findings in this thesis demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that 
Zimbabwe’s SWF was poorly designed and poorly attuned to the country’s 
macroeconomic circumstances and development needs. In short, Zimbabwe’s SWF is 
a premature fund. This study focused on the case of Zimbabwe because a more 
extensive study required financial resources beyond the means of the researcher. 
Moreover, the study had to be completed in a specified timeframe; thus, the researcher 
did not have the time to conduct a more extensive study. The premature fund 
phenomenon seems to be a challenge in natural resource-rich developing economies. 
The study recommends that more research needs to be conducted on the premature 
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Appendix A: Interview Data Transcription Codes 
Theme Brief sample of coded text 
Zimbabwe is natural resource cursed 1. Question: In your view, is the government of Zimbabwe facing any 
challenges in managing its natural resource revenue? If so, please 
highlight these challenges and explain the factors that account for 
these challenges and how these challenges can be overcome. 
2.  
1. “Unfortunately, senior military officials have dampened that 
dream. They are heavily involved in mining activities in 
Marange. There is a military official everywhere. They openly tell 
us that guys when we are here we mean business. That’s where 
our money is coming from and it’s our reward from government”. 
2. “The diamonds that held so much promise have only brought 
violence and loss. Backed by security forces, government took 
over the Marange diamond fields. Illicit multi-billion diamond 
trade in Marange has been used to fuel Zimbabwe’s state 
security forces whilst 72% of Zimbabweans live on less than 
US$1.25 a day”. 
Zimbabwe does not conform to the PIH 1. “The state heavily relies on the mining sector to fund 
government consumption or recurrent expenditure, which has 
left little for capital development within the mining sector and 
outside”. 
Inappropriate policy transfer Question: What strategies has the government of Zimbabwe 
adopted in its bid to promote sustainable natural resource revenue 
management and development in Zimbabwe? Please explain the 
rationale behind each strategy. 
 
1. “President Mugabe was inspired by the way Norway managed 
its resources. He actually went to the extent of inviting Norway 
to come and assist in setting up an SWF”. 
2. “The Chinese government copied what the people of Singapore 
did in 2007.CIC is also making a significant contribution to 
China’s fiscus. Why should Zimbabwe be left out from earning 
money from its strategic investments? 
3. Zimbabwe’s SWF only exists on paper because the ZANU-PF 
government admired successful SWFs without taking into 
consideration its circumstances. 
Reinforcing state control Question: In your view, what are the strengths and weaknesses of 
the institutional, regulatory, procedural, and structural frameworks 
that govern the implementation of Zimbabwe’s SWF? IF there are 
any weaknesses how can they be overcome? 
 
1. “The country just wakes up to the news that this person is now 
a director of an institution called an SWF. The individuals 
appointed to public interviews”. 
2. “Mugabe appointed Moyana as chairman of the country’s SWF 
because of his close links to the then president and affiliation to 
the party”. 
3. “Kombo Moyana was appointed board chairman of Zimbabwe’s 
SWF because parastatals are retired homes for regime 
intellectuals and members of the ruling party not appointed to 
cabinet”. 
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Appendix B: Interview Guide for ZANU-PF Officials and Relevant Government 
Institutions and Departments 
 




My name is Munashe Matambo, a doctoral student in the School of Public 
Management, Governance and Public Policy, at the University of Johannesburg, 
South Africa. I am conducting research on why Zimbabwe adopted an SWF and how 
it can be used to promote sustainable natural resources revenue management and 
development.  The information provided will also be a basis for recommendations and 
suggestions for improvement. All information is for academic purposes and will be 
treated with utmost confidentiality. 
 
1. To the best of your understanding, describe and quantify Zimbabwe’s natural resource 
base. 
 
2. In your opinion, can Zimbabwe be classified as a natural resource-rich economy and, 
if so, why? 
 
3. How much revenue does Zimbabwe derive from its natural resources annually and 
how much is remitted to Treasury? In your view, do you think that this is sustainable? 
 
4. How does Zimbabwe manage its natural resource revenue? 
  
5. In your view, is the government of Zimbabwe facing any challenges in managing its 
natural resource revenue? If so, please highlight these challenges and explain the 
factors that account for these challenges and how these challenges can be overcome. 
 
6. What strategies has the government of Zimbabwe adopted in its bid to promote 
sustainable natural resources revenue management and development in Zimbabwe? 
Please explain the rationale behind each strategy. 
 
7. In your opinion, from the strategies adopted by the government of Zimbabwe in its bid 
to foster sustainable natural resources revenue management and development, which 
one is likely to be the most useful in promoting this objective, and why? 
 
8. What is your understanding of the term “SWF” and what can it be used for? 
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9. To the best of your knowledge, who first mooted the idea of establishing an SWF in 
Zimbabwe and why? 
 
10.  Why did the government of Zimbabwe adopt an SWF? 
 
11. What will/what is Zimbabwe’s SWF be/being used for? 
 
12. In your opinion, does the rationale behind establishing an SWF in Zimbabwe foster 
sustainable natural resource revenue management and development in Zimbabwe? 
 
13. To the best of your knowledge, is there any link between Zimbabwe’s SWF and its 
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy? If so, please explain the 
relationship between the two and how they are coordinated. 
 
14. In your view, what contextual variables and prerequisite conditions are needed for the 
successful implementation of an SWF? Please give reasons for your answers.  
 
15. In your opinion, what is the current state of Zimbabwe’s political and socioeconomic 
environment? Does it enable the successful implementation of an SWF? Please give 
reasons for your answer. 
 
16. In your view, what are the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional, regulatory, 
procedural, and structural frameworks that govern the implementation of Zimbabwe’s 
SWF? If there are any weaknesses, how can they be overcome? 
 
17. To the best of your knowledge, which international best practices of managing SWFs 
exist, and in your opinion, to what extent does Zimbabwe’s SWF conform to these best 
practices? 
 
18. In your opinion, does Zimbabwe’s SWF have a role to play in promoting sustainable 
natural resources revenue management? If so, how, and if not, why not? 
 
19. In your opinion, is it appropriate for Zimbabwe to possess an SWF? Please account 
for the answer given with reasons. 
 






Appendix C: Interview Guide for Civil Society and Think Tanks 
 




My name is Munashe Matambo, a doctoral student within the School of Public 
Management, Governance and Public Policy, at the University of Johannesburg, 
South Africa. I am conducting research on why Zimbabwe adopted an SWF and how 
it can be used to promote sustainable natural resources revenue management and 
development. The information provided will also be a basis for recommendations and 
suggestions for improvement. All information is for academic purposes and will be 
treated with utmost confidentiality. 
 
1. In your opinion, can Zimbabwe be classified as a natural resource-rich economy and, 
if so, why?  
 
2. In your view, is the government of Zimbabwe facing any challenges in managing its 
natural resource revenue? If so, please highlight these challenges and explain the 
factors that account for these challenges and how these challenges can be overcome. 
 
3. What strategies has the government of Zimbabwe adopted in its bid to promote 
sustainable natural resources revenue management and development in Zimbabwe? 
Please explain the rationale behind each strategy. 
 
4. In your opinion, from the strategies adopted by the government of Zimbabwe in its bid 
to foster sustainable natural resources revenue management and development, which 
one is likely to be the most useful in promoting this objective and why? 
 
5. What is your understanding of the term “SWF”, and what can it be used for? 
 
6. To the best of your knowledge, who first mooted the idea of establishing an SWF in 
Zimbabwe, and why? 
 
7.  Why did the government of Zimbabwe adopt an SWF? 
 
8. What will/what is Zimbabwe’s SWF be/being used for? 
 
9. In your opinion, does the rationale behind establishing an SWF in Zimbabwe foster 
sustainable natural resource revenue management and development in Zimbabwe? 
 
10. In your view, what contextual variables and prerequisite conditions are needed for the 
successful implementation of an SWF? Please give reasons for your answers. 
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11. In your opinion, what is the current state of Zimbabwe’s political and socioeconomic 
environment? Does it enable the successful implementation of an SWF? Please give 
reasons for your answer. 
 
12. In your view, who benefits from the existence of an SWF in Zimbabwe, and why? 
 
13. To the best of your knowledge, which international best practices of managing SWFs 
exist, and, in your opinion, to what extent does Zimbabwe’s SWF conform to these 
best practices? 
 
14. In your opinion, does Zimbabwe’s SWF have a role to play in promoting sustainable 
natural resources revenue management? If so, how, and if not, why not? 
 
15. In your opinion, is it appropriate for Zimbabwe to possess an SWF? Please account 
for the answer given with reasons. 
 












Appendix D: Interview Guide for the Movement for Democratic Change 
Alliance (MDC-A) 
 




My name is Munashe Matambo, a doctoral student in the School of Public 
Management, Governance and Public Policy, at the University of Johannesburg, 
South Africa. I am conducting research on why Zimbabwe adopted an SWF and how 
it can be used to promote sustainable natural resources revenue management and 
development. The information provided will also be a basis for recommendations and 
suggestions for improvement. All information is for academic purposes and will be 
treated with utmost confidentiality. 
 
1. In your opinion, can Zimbabwe be classified as a natural resource-rich economy, and 
if so, why? 
 
2. To the best of your knowledge, how much revenue does Zimbabwe derive from its 
natural resources annually, and how much is remitted to Treasury? In your view, do 
you think that this is sustainable? 
 
3. How does Zimbabwe manage its natural resource revenue? 
  
4. In your view, to what extent has the government of Zimbabwe been successful in 
managing the country’s natural resource revenue? Please explain your answer. 
 
5. What strategies would an MDC-A-led government adopt in a bid to promote 
sustainable natural resources revenue management and development in Zimbabwe? 
Please explain the rationale behind each strategy. 
 
6. In your opinion, from the strategies adopted by an MDC-A-led government in its bid to 
foster sustainable natural resources revenue management and development, which 
one is likely to be the most useful in promoting this objective and why? 
 
7. What is your understanding of the term “SWF”, and what can it be used for? 
 
8. To the best of your knowledge, who first mooted the idea of establishing an SWF in 
Zimbabwe, and why? 
 
9. In your view, why did the incumbent government adopt an SWF, and do you think it 
was prudent for it to do so? Please explain your answer. 
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10. What weaknesses exist in the current SWF that has been adopted by the government 
of Zimbabwe? 
 
11. Why did the MDC-A highlight that it would adopt an SWF in its 2018 election manifesto, 
yet Zimbabwe already has an SWF Act and an SWF board? 
 
12. What would an MDC-A-led government do differently from the incumbent government 
in operationalising and implementing Zimbabwe’s SWF? 
 
13. What would an MDC-A-led government use the SWF for? Please explain your answer. 
 
14. In your opinion, can an MDC-A-led government use an SWF to foster sustainable 
natural resource revenue management and development in Zimbabwe? 
 
15. To the best of your knowledge, is there any link between Zimbabwe’s SWF and its 
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy? If so, please explain the 
relationship. 
 
16. In your view, what contextual variables and prerequisite conditions are needed for the 
successful implementation of an SWF? Please give reasons for your answers. 
  
17. In your opinion, what is the current state of Zimbabwe’s political and socioeconomic 
environment? Does it enable the successful implementation of an SWF? Please give 
reasons for your answer. 
 
18. To the best of your knowledge, which international best practices of managing SWFs 
exist and, in your opinion, to what extent does Zimbabwe’s SWF conform to these best 
practices? 
 
19. In your opinion, does Zimbabwe’s SWF have a role to play in promoting sustainable 
natural resources revenue management? If so, how and if not, why not? 
 
20. In your opinion, is it appropriate for Zimbabwe to possess an SWF? Please account 
for the answer given with reasons. 
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